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Attempts to build a free press are routinely made in countries 
experiencing violent conflict or the aftermath thereof. A free press, 
defined as a press that holds governments accountable, is thought of as 
an important part of an emerging democracy. The role of media 
development projects is nevertheless under-researched. Most 
examinations of such projects are done by practitioners active in media 
development. This thesis contributes to the emerging academic 
literature on media development and its role in statebuilding. It does so 
by investigating media development in the new state of South Sudan. 
Ethnographic observations, a social survey, and unstructured interviews 
have been applied during a fieldwork spell in Juba, which lasted from 
November 2014 to August 2015. The application of three methods 
allowed for an in-depth investigation of the South Sudanese 
understanding of media, which differed significantly from the aims of 
western media experts implementing media development projects. 
Furthermore, the thesis compares the strengths and weaknesses, and the 
results delivered, by each utilised research method, and thus investigates 
how these methods perform in a country of the global South. I argue that 
the various understandings of media in South Sudan differ significantly 
from the thinking and practices of western media practitioners. In South 
Sudan, this resulted in a deteriorating relationship between the country’s 
government and its international donors and led to problems for the 
newly trained journalists. Furthermore, my results show the limitations 
of using just one method in a country of the global South; and they 
provide an argument for bricolage, a research approach that combines 
perspectives, theories, and methods, when researching policy-relevant 
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  1 
1 – Introduction 
 
The media is an important part in peace and statebuilding in countries 
experiencing the aftermath of violent conflict. The United Nations (UN) 
routinely establishes radio stations as part of their missions (Orme 
2010), and several international nongovernmental organisations 
(iNGOs) are engaged in media development. While ample policy papers 
and project evaluations exist (Hume 2004; Kalathil 2011; Internews 
2012; BMZ 2015), academic engagement with the media as part of 
statebuilding has just begun to emerge (Allen and Stremlau 2005; Bratic 
2006; Stremlau 2014; Hoffmann and Hawkins 2015). A reason for this 
may be that in western thought the media’s place is ideally outside the 
state. It is a watchdog to hold government accountable (Coronel 2010) 
and its ability to fulfil this role is constrained by the regime type and the 
market in which it operates (Norris and Odugbemi 2010, pp.4, 5). There 
is a firm belief that the media, when built in a country of intervention, 
needs to be placed as far away from ‘the state’ as possible. The role of the 
state is mainly to make sure that the media can operate in an 
environment, “with laws restricting media freedom narrowly defined 
and limited to those necessary in a democracy, and with legal provisions 
that ensure a level economic playing field” (UNESCO 2008, p.5). Basically, 
in this view, when it comes to the media the role of the state is to provide 
a legal framework and keep its distance. Statebuilding, on the other hand, 
is about building or strengthening state institutions (Fukuyama 2004; 
Bliesemann de Guevara 2008), which is what the media is not. In 
consequence, media, although understood to be an important part of a 
healthy democracy, has rarely been investigated as part of the 
statebuilding endeavour. Scholars interested in statebuilding have 
written about marketisation and institution-building (Paris 2004), 
elections (Norris 2004; 2014; 2015), security sector reform and police 
forces (Hensell 2012; Biecker and Schlichte 2015), legitimacy of 
interventions (Andersen 2012), or the role and practices of the 
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international community itself (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012; 
Autesserre 2014; Smirl 2015; Koddenbrock 2016). When the media is 
investigated, practitioners engaged in media development mostly focus 
on people’s information needs (Internews 2012; Internews 2015a) and 
entertain the notion of the media as a watchdog, a control on 
government, and a means to hold governments accountable (Orme 2010; 
Kalahtil 2011). Scholars, however, have pointed out that there are 
“serious problems when relying on media freedom to build national 
consensus in fragile states” (Putzel and van der Zwan 2006, p.1). This 
difference in view echoes the discussion on the overall statebuilding 
process with its aim “to mould non-western states into modern 
‘governance-compatible’ entities according to liberal-democratic 
standards set up by the West” (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012, p.3). I draw 
further on Berit Bliesemann de Guevara’s work, in particular on the 
notion that statebuilding is not done by international actors alone but 
that national and local actors play a role in the endeavour (Bliesemann 
de Guevara 2010), and that statebuilding is subject to 
internationalisation and informalisation (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012). 
I argue that the media developed by international actors in a country of 
the global South and understood to be necessary for the functioning of a 
democratic state is subject to internationalisation and informalisation. 
International and local actors draw on their own repertoire of 
expectations and understandings. Furthermore, as the media is by 
definition a public undertaking and, in theory, accessible to everyone, 
there are not only clashes of international and national expectations, but 
these clashes are even more public and thus prominent. This may lead to 
problems between the national government and the international 
community. While the idea of statebuilding is to strengthen the state, 
western style media can be counterproductive.  
 
In investigating the western-led media as part of statebuilding and 
providing empirical findings from South Sudan, the thesis makes an 
original contribution to the emerging discussion on western-led media 
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in countries of the global South on the one hand, and to the literature on 
statebuilding on the other. South Sudan was chosen as the case study 
because of its unique position as a new country that has been undergoing 
a massive statebuilding and development campaign. Despite substantial 
help from the international community, including a media development 
campaign, conflict broke out again in December 2013. These conditions 
make the country an appropriate environment for investigating the 
effects of media in an ongoing statebuilding process. The study is an 
important contribution as the evidence on media’s effects on both state 
and peacebuilding is scarce (Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; Stremlau 
2014). It has been said that practitioners rarely examine media effects 
but act under the assumption that the media will contribute positively to 
a conflict environment (Bratic 2006); the positive effects of media are 
thus only asserted but not proven (Stremlau 2014). Many studies lack 
independence as they were published by iNGOs and other stakeholders 
(Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; Stremlau 2014); they claim success not 
because of the programme's achievements but rather on the basis that 
programmes were executed (Rhodes 2007, p.10). The dynamics that 
western-led media initiate in a non-western environment are thus 
under-researched; in particular, how the local population understands 
and perceives the media barely receives consideration (Stremlau 2014). 
In placing the inquiry firmly on the local understanding of the media, this 
thesis contributes to filling this gap. Media supposedly has a positive 
effect on democracy and on relations between groups in a divided society 
and in the aftermath of a conflict. It is assumed that the free-flow of 
information allows the population to hold governments accountable and 
make informed choices in upcoming elections (Kumar 2006; UNESCO 
2008; Coronel 2010, p.111; Stremlau et al. 2015, p.1510). Furthermore, 
by providing objective information on the ‘Other’ in society, the media 
helps to overcome mistrust and contributes to reconciliation (Lynch and 
McGoldrick 2007, p.256; Staub 2013, p.580). To investigate these claims, 
the three key concepts under investigation are ‘the media’ itself, ‘the 
state', and ‘groups’, as the latter two are what media supposedly affects. 
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In the context of this thesis, ‘groups’ are not exclusively understood as 
different ethnicities but also as different social entities, namely the 
political elite, the international community, and regular people. I 
investigate, first, whether the media is differently understood by the 
South Sudanese. This is followed by an investigation into how ‘the state’ 
is understood in South Sudan. Together, these results allow for a 
conclusion on whether the media can reasonably function the way it is 
supposed to according to western thinking. In a third step, I examine 
media’s contribution to group relations. This is a twofold examination. 
Peace radios operate under the assumption that group divisions, often of 
an ethnic nature, are at the heart of the conflict (Eyeradio no date; United 
States Institute of Peace no date) and that these can be overcome by radio 
broadcasts. I first explore the relations between different ethnic groups 
in Juba to ascertain whether the underlying idea of peace radios matches 
the social reality in the country. Second, I examine the relations between 
the South Sudanese and the international community, and the South 
Sudanese opinion of western-led media stations. Taken together, a 
comparison of the ideas on which media development operate with the 
results from South Sudan with reference to the key concepts of ‘the 
media’, ‘the state’, and ‘groups’ allows for conclusions about the 
dynamics and processes that western-led media initiates.   
 
Furthermore, the thesis also contributes to the discussion on concepts. 
My results show that concepts are not fixed entities that can be 
operationalised and measured (Sartori 1984), but rather that they are 
instead substantive and flexible. For Frederic Schaffer (Schaffer 2016), 
the problem with the former, positivist approach is that it creates 
concepts that are fixed in how they view the objects or ideas they aim to 
describe; they are one-sided, as they only take the one view into account. 
The statement that, “Concepts are theories about ontology: they are 
theories about the fundamental constitutive elements of a phenomenon” 
(Goertz 2006, p.5) delivers an example of this view. In deciding what 
something essentially is a certain direction and worldview is 
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presupposed. I show that neither ‘the media’ nor ‘the state’ are 
conceptualised the same way in the West and in South Sudan, and these 
different understandings have consequences for the way media 
functions in a different context. This discussion on concepts and whether 
they can travel between contexts is important for statebuilding. In 
externally led statebuilding processes “purposeful attempts at 
establishing state institutions are ‘bent’ by the complex social processes 
they provoke and the compromise they require” (Bliesemann de 
Guevara, 2012, p.5). The same can be said about the media as part of 
statebuilding. While ‘the media’ can certainly be understood as a mere 
technical entity (wires, switches, and electricity), its actual functioning is 
dependent on the culture and history of the country in which it operates. 
This adds to the argument that concepts needs to be elucidated upon 
(Schaffer 2016); and also supports the world view that ‘reality’, while 
measurable, is still experienced, interpreted, and constructed 
(Danermark et al. 2002, pp.15, 16).  
 
Coming from a professional background in media development myself, 
and drawing on the experience of such work in South Sudan, I was 
interested in the questions: (a) if national and local agents understand 
'media' differently to western ones, and (b) if this has an impact on how 
media development projects play out in a given environment. Doing 
research in South Sudan, however, it became clear relatively fast that 
‘research’ is a concept, too; a concept with potentially different 
connotations and dissimilar understandings. I became interested in the 
question (c) if and how research, and in particular research methods, 
work in a specific environment, most notably one of which the 
researcher is not a ‘cultural native’. If research methods were mere data 
gathering tools (Aradau and Huysmans 2014), the answers to the 
question regarding the effects of western-led media in a country of the 
global South should be roughly the same no matter which method is 
applied. To investigate whether research methods enact different 
realities or shape reality in different ways (Law 2004) I use three 
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different methods – observations, a survey, and unstructured interviews 
– to explore the effects of media in South Sudan. Each method at first 
stands alone in answering the research question before they are 
compared with each other and then combined to provide a more 
complete answer in the conclusion. Based on this, I argue that methods 
function with reference to context; that is, to the environment, people, 
and circumstances. In particular, each research method focused on a 
specific social group in South Sudan, not because of a conscious choice 
but because of technicalities and social reality. Furthermore, only after 
experiencing the country and its ways of life did some answers gathered 
in interviews become meaningful; questionnaire questions needed to be 
elucidated upon until a shared agreement on meaning was reached, and 
interviews provided background for further observations. In short, the 
research process was disordered and confusing; answers and insights 
were contradictory. Every research method delivered slightly different 
answers, showing that methods are not mere data gathering tools but 
that method choice is a political intervention.   
 
In consequence, I argue that in a complex environment, understood as a 
location where the researcher is not a ‘cultural native’ and which is 
marked by multifaceted social realities and composed of distinctive 
social groups with different values and coming from various 
backgrounds, , a combination of research methods offers the best chance 
to answer a research question. In this thesis, the approach used is this of 
the bricoleur (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, pp.2, 3), as the “Jack of all trades” 
(Lévi-Strauss 1966, p.17) who uses what is at hand and what is 
necessary. This is because this investigation is exploratory, not only 
because of the way the question is phrased but also because “any large 
social process or event will inevitably be far more complex than the 
schemata we can devise, prospectively or retrospectively, to map it up” 
(Scott 1998, p.309). With a complex question and a complex 
environment, bricolage allows the investigation to be pushed in different 
directions and to include surfacing additional questions. It is a guarantee 
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against perspective-induced one-sidedness and allows for context to be 
included and illuminated.  This stands in contrast to the claim that there 
is one logic of inference, which is the “process of using the facts we know 
to learn about the facts we do not know” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 
p.46) that applies theories to avoid being overwhelmed by observable 
facts. Focusing on one predefined theory or hypothesis and on fixed 
concepts bears the risk of overlooking or misunderstanding potentially 
important facts. The illumination of social processes and negotiation of 
concepts in complex environments is necessary to deliver meaningful 
answers.  
 
South Sudan was chosen as the location, as it provides what has been 
named a critical case. These are cases that “have strategic importance in 
relation to the general problem” (Flyvbjerg 2006, p. 229). With the 
general problems being the question of what effects western-led media 
has had in a country of the global South and if western-led media is able 
to contribute positively to democracy and reconciliation, the strategic 
importance of South Sudan can hardly be doubted. The country became 
independent in 2011, following a referendum in which the South 
Sudanese overwhelmingly voted for independence. The creation of South 
Sudan was thought to put an end to one of the bloodiest and longest wars 
in Africa, and the new country was greeted with joy by its citizens. The 
creation of the country came with a massive development campaign, 
including media development, by the international community. South 
Sudan had favourable starting conditions, yet it plunged back into violent 
conflict in December 2013 and has not yet been able to overcome this. 
With the favourable starting conditions the country was enjoying, the 
media’s tasks of strengthening democracy and aiding reconciliation 
should have been easy to fulfil if the theory that western style media can 
aid democracy were true. Surely, it would be far-fetched to hold media 
solely, or even predominantly, responsible for the success or failure of a 
statebuilding project. Still, with the massive approval of the young state 
by its citizens and the enormous help received from the international 
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community, traces of media development reaching some goals should be 
discoverable. If it did not achieve its aims under the favourable 
conditions it enjoyed in South Sudan, this might suggest that the way the 
concept of media is translated into a different context needs to be 
rethought. I do not claim that the way western style media functions in 
South Sudan is universal. Rather, I claim that if it is not acting as expected 
in a country with rather favourable conditions, it shows that the theory 
that western-led media supports democracy independent of the context 
in which it acts, is not sustainable. In consequence, the way media is used 
in countries of the global South needs to be tailored to the specific 
context.   
 
In investigating the effects of media development with three different 
methods, this thesis answers the question if a concept can ‘travel’, or 
whether it can function the same way and deliver similar results in a 
distinctive environment. More concretely, the question is whether media 
that is underpinned by western values is able to function in a non-
western country with different traditions and culture. This breaks down 
into some sub-questions. First, do different research methods, applied to 
the same environment and at the same time, answer the same question 
in the same, a similar or a different way? Second, while media in western 
thinking has a specific task and is understood in a specific way, can this 
understanding be transferred to another context, here to a country 
experiencing violent conflict in the global South? Is media acting in such 
a country acting as it does in the West? In short, the questions are 
whether research methods are independent of context, and the effects of 
internationally-led media in a country of intervention. Answers to these 
questions are significant for scholarship and practice, and this thesis 
makes an important contribution to the literature on ‘doing research’ 
and on ‘doing media development’. At the theoretical level, the results 
provide empirically based results if and how methods are acting in and 
with an environment. This has implications for the praxis of conducting 
research on complex and policy-relevant questions in countries where 
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the researcher is alien. Furthermore, I show that media is indeed 
understood differently in South Sudan and in the countries in which 
media development originates. In addition, the entities it ‘works on’ – the 
state and group relations – are also differently understood. This means 
that other ways to do media development need to be found, and that 
media interventions need to be tailored to the country in which they are 
about to take place. If the concepts are not at least fairly similar to each 
other and if the implementers are not able to negotiate the divide 
between them – something which Schaffer (2016 p.10) names the central 
conceptual task of many interpretivist scholars – then, in the best case, 
the project is useless. In the worst case, trouble is ahead. This thesis 
makes an important and original contribution to the way media in a 
statebuilding project needs to be understood and it may have 
implications for improvements in the praxis of media development.  
1.1. Chapter overview 
 
Following this chapter, in chapter 2 I provide an overview of the 
assumptions under which ‘media development’ is currently operating 
according to practitioners and the academic literature. The chapter is 
organised in three parts. ‘Media’ introduces the ideas behind media 
development and the underlying understanding of the media in the West. 
It also presents the puzzling difference in opinion and assessment of the 
effects of western-led media in the global South held by practitioners on 
the one hand, and by academics on the other. While many policy papers 
and project evaluations exist, the academic engagement with the subject 
is just starting to emerge, especially with ‘media’ as part of statebuilding. 
In treating media as an institution of a functioning state, notwithstanding 
its essential independence from the government of the day, I aim to 
contribute to this emerging literature. Consequently, in the second part 
of chapter I introduce the western idea of the state and the principles of 
statebuilding. While the first two parts focus on media and its political 
function, the last part, ‘groups’, investigates the role media supposedly 
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plays in peacebuilding and reconciliation processes in a divided society. 
This part draws on the literature on social psychology, in particular 
social identity theory. Chapter 2 provides the point of departure for the 
later comparison of the concepts with the South Sudanese understanding 
thereof. 
 
In chapter 3, the methodology is introduced. I define ‘methods’ and 
provide details on the two tiers of the research design. First, it is a 
comparison of research methods, showing (1) that concepts are not 
universally valid but are created depending on their environment; that 
(2) methods interact with the environment, because ‘research’ is a 
concept, too; and that (3) every one of the methods applied here is only 
able to investigate a subpart of South Sudanese social reality. This draws 
on the work of Christian Greiffenhagen, Michael Mair and Wes Sharrock 
(2015), and Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans (2014), who all see 
methods as performing in a particular environment instead of painting 
an exact picture of said environment. I argue for a combination of 
research methods when it comes to policy-relevant questions in complex 
environments. This thesis is both a comparison of methods, and a 
multimethod design working on one case: media development in South 
Sudan. Chapter 3 defends the choice of a single case study, justifies the 
use of mixed methods studies, and introduces the three methods 
employed. 
 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are devoted to the presentation of the research 
findings. Each chapter starts with a detailed account of how the method 
in question was employed in South Sudan, what insights it provided, and 
what the specific problems with it have been. Following this, the findings 
are presented, again using the concepts introduced in chapter 2, ‘media’, 
‘state’, and ‘groups’. Chapter 4, ethnography, kicks off this round. It 
provides the insights gained while working as a part-time lecturer at Juba 
University, while engaging in more or less regular chess games, and 
during the deliberately sought-for interaction with everyday life in South 
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Sudan. Chapter 5 presents the quantitative section. Two social surveys 
were conducted and analysed using SPSS. The chapter provides insights 
into the process of data gathering in Juba, and then investigates possible 
relationships between media usage and attitudes towards the media, the 
state, and different groups in the society. Chapter 6 presents the insights 
from unstructured interviews conducted with 28 participants in Juba. As 
before, I investigate the process of data gathering, as well as benefits, 
advantages, and disadvantages of the method, before turning to the 
findings on media, the state, and groups. While aiming for a broad 
sample, most of my interviewees come from an educated middle-class 
background, which opens a discussion on which voices are heard and 
how representative interview studies done in a country of the global 
South can be. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes by first delivering a summary of the findings and 
arguments. Following this, I compare the results from the three 
antecedent chapters on the question of the effects of media development. 
I look for coherency and congruency among the findings from the 
different methods and show that they act in and react with the 
environment. Looking at the question regarding the effects of media 
development in South Sudan, I then combine the results from the three 
methods. This shows that in South Sudan western-led media acts 
differently than intended by policy makers. The differences lie in 
distinctive understandings of the state and distinct former experience of 
the media. This leaves western-style media with its goal of acting as a 
control mechanism on the state in a problematic position and contributes 
to deteriorating relations between nationals and international donors. 
Furthermore, investigating media development's second claim that it 
contributes positively to peace and reconciliation, my results show that 
radio programmes for peace act under wrong assumptions regarding the 
causes of the conflict, once more underpinning the argument that media 





2 – Assumptions about media development 
 
Media campaigns are an important part of any foreign intervention. 
Hardly a peacebuilding mission comes without a media component 
(Hume 2004; Paris 2004 p.31, p. 39; Dobbins et al 2007, pp.202-207; 
Himelfarb and Chabalowski 2008; Hoeglund 2008 pp.87-89; Orme 
2010). The UN and iNGOs such as Internews, Free Voice Unlimited, and 
Foundation Hirondelle, to name just a few, specialise in media 
development. This is because, “a free media has the ability to impact a 
number of critical areas in a given society - education, government 
accountability, health practices, empowerment of women and 
minorities, the economy, and more” (CIMA 2008, p.6). The popularity of 
media development initiatives is evident in the fact that access to 
information has been included in the United Nation’s post-2015 
Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations 2015a). The importance 
given to media campaigns stems from its assumed ability to better a 
situation in a so-called weak or failed state. Its job is to hold governments 
accountable and strengthen citizens’ participation in governance 
(Rozumilowicz 2002, p.13; CIMA 2008, p. 12; Coronel 2010, pp. 111, 112; 
Stremlau et al. 2015), hence adding to democratisation efforts. Secondly, 
by broadcasting information that informs in a conflict-sensitive way on 
the perceived ‘Other’ in a society, the media is assumed to contribute to 
peace and reconciliation. (European Center for Conflict Prevention 2003, 
p. 7; Allen and Stremlau 2005; Lynch & McGoldrick 2007; Orme 2010, 
p.8). Empirically, the record of such initiatives is relatively poor (ICG 
1997; Laue 2005; Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014), or, as Nicole 
Stremlau (2014, p.2) notes, “the ‘evidence’ seems to be elusive”.  The 
media’s stated ability to contribute positively to democracy and peace is 
based mostly on assumptions (Allen and Stremlau 2005) and on the 





To add to the emerging discussion about the media in foreign 
interventions, I investigate the effects western-led media has in South 
Sudan. In this chapter, I examine the conceptions of ‘media’, and of ‘the 
state’ and of ‘relationships between groups’, as the latter two are the 
areas media development supposedly has an effect on. The chapter 
provides the background against which the empirical findings from 
South Sudan are later compared.   
2.1 Media 
 
'Media assistance’, in the context of a country experiencing violent 
conflict or the aftermath of it, is a contested concept. Its meanings range 
from communication for development and reconciliation attempts to 
developing a free press in a country of intervention. The lack of a clearly 
defined definition has in the past led to discussions and confusion among 
practitioners and  donors1. In this thesis, ‘media development’ refers to 
the creation of a free press following the western model in a country of 
intervention. Such a press is seen as a cornerstone of democracy 
(Howard 2002, p.4; Coronel 2010; Stremlau et al., 2015). It is expected 
that journalists will hold governments accountable and that by providing 
fair and objective information citizens are enabled to make informed 
decisions in elections. Furthermore, a reformed media system is sought 
to be able to enhance economic structures to the society at large 
(Rozumilowicz 2002, p.11). 
                                                        
1 In a private email (see Appendix 1.2, p.4) David Hoffman, founder and President 
Emeritus of the iNGO Internews, remembered a huge debate at the Global Forum for 
Media Development (GFMD), a network of more than 180 organisations working on 
media assistance, whether to call the endeavour ‘media development’ or ‘media for 
development’. The debate, he recalled, took hours; the following discussion took a 
couple of years. The former, ‘media development’ indicates the development of the 
sector in a country, ‘media for development’ indicates the dissemination of messages to 
initiate behaviour change. The difference is not clear-cut and the two fields are 
morphing into each other. Organisations that develop the media sector itself – by 
training journalists, building and sustaining radio stations and transferring technology 






The literature on the subject is relatively narrow. It has been said that it 
is “remarkable how the role of the media has often been ignored” (Allen 
and Stremlau 2005, p.2). Ten years after this remark, nothing much has 
changed, as “existing scholarship is very limited, often dated and (…) 
presently insufficient to address the growing needs and complexity of 
current efforts within the field of activities” (Hoffmann and Hawkins 
2015, p.4). The literature tends to center on isolated case studies of 
individual projects, used by “the project’s organisers in funding 
applications” (Bratic 2013, p.2). There is a lack of evidence on the effects 
media has in fragile states (Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; Stremlau 
2014) Scholars stating that literature is scarce, however, often work to 
fill the gap (see Price 2002; Price et al. 2002; Allen and Stremlau 2005; 
Bratic 2006; Bratic 2008; Coronel 2010; Rodriguez 2011; Bratic 2013; 
Hoffmann and Hawkins 2015; Stremlau et al. 2015).   
 
2.1.1 History of media development 
Media’s tasks in the western world are to check on government, to inform 
and to engage citizens in public debate. This conception of media is based 
on the idea of the public sphere (Habermas 1974), a space to discuss 
issues of social and societal importance, independent from the state and 
its institutions2. It can be located between the government and the 
domestic sphere (Boyd-Barrett 2001, pp.236, 237) and its role has been 
described as analogous to that of entrepreneurial classes in the face of 
royalty and aristocracy who, despite ruling at the time, were losing their 
power fast. The public sphere reshaped the relationship between the 
classes and played an important role in developing new forms of 
government. Of particular importance were the newspapers that 
informed readers on everyday issues of interest (Habermas 1974). The 
public sphere stresses the participation of people in politics. It is opposed 
                                                        
2 Habermas described the public sphere as emerging from the 18th century 
coffeehouse: a place where citizens shared information and discussed issues of the day. 
(Habermas, 1989, pp.32, 33, 42, 59; Cowan, 2004). 
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to the former idea of government by an elite that was born into their 
position. The public sphere provided a room and a backbone for 
democracy. In the 19th and 20th century, however, media changed into 
what today is known as mass media and this eventually destroyed the 
public sphere; although the idea of media as a fourth estate and a check 
on government is still prominent. It also underpins media development 
projects in the global South, where it is understood as a necessary means 
towards a democratic liberal government (Coronel 2010). 
 
Media interventions in the global South gained momentum in the ‘Era of 
Development’, with modernisation theory the main theoretical 
framework for international development by US-American 
policymakers. It states that economic growth in developing countries 
would inevitably lead to liberal democratic capitalism and to stable 
polities, modelled on western examples (So 1990). When reality refused 
to confirm theory, lack of capital and entrepreneurial spirit in the 
developing countries were identified as the two main reasons for the 
failure. The former was healed by loans from the World Bank; the latter 
was thought to be solvable by an attempt to change values, attitudes, and 
belief systems of the citizens (Sreberny 2000). Drawing on the work of 
most prominently Daniel Lerner (1958), the assumption was that in 
order for a country to develop, its people would need to overcome 
traditional beliefs. Modernisation and hence development was 
conditioned upon a state of mind possessed by individuals and the 
Lerner-model understands the ‘modern citizen’ foremost as being able to 
learn and train to achieve necessary skills (Sparks 2007). For changing 
and eradicating traditional belief system, mass media was understood to 
be the perfect tool. With media, society was to be transformed and 
widespread social change initiated3. The idea to use mass media, in 
particular radio, to alter attitudes, change belief systems, and promote 
                                                        
3 Colin Sparks (2007, p.23) points to the formal education system as another possible 




modernity was adopted by UNESCO (Sreberny 2000). Despite critics and 
some changes it is still visible and prominent today. It is the rationale 
behind communication campaigns as well as underpinning media 
development initiatives in the global South (Fraser and Restrepo-
Estrada 1998). 
 
Modernisation theory was criticised on different grounds. Empirical 
evidence showed a disappointing record of the idea to use mass media 
for modernisation: “After many decades of employing the modern mass 
media as tools for development, the records in many African countries 
show that very little has been achieved in such critical areas as political 
mobilisation, national unity, civic education, and the diffusion of new 
agricultural techniques and products” (Okigbo 1995, p.4). It has been 
argued that this disappointing empirical record is to an extent caused by 
the way communication interventions are evaluated4. Furthermore, it 
was noted that although people gained knowledge and shifted attitudes, 
this did not translate into behaviour change (Rogers 1973, pp.366-396; 
Sparks 2007, p.40). Communication interventions based on 
modernisation theory assume a linear and relatively simple cause-effect 
trajectory: knowledge is missing, and once this deficiency is healed the 
desired outcome will occur. This is an oversimplified view of human 
behaviour, but still prominent in some radio for peace programmes5. 
                                                        
4 The argument has been made that social change cannot be evaluated using the rather 
strict framework of project cycle management, the dominant framework in M&E in 
international development. Project cycle management determines outcomes before the 
initiative and compares the expected outcome with the real results (Lennie and Tacchi 
2013). Instead of this, Lennie and Tacchi (2013) argue that it would be more reasonable 
to use a participatory framework which allows for flexibility in the outcome. This, in 
their view, would suit the idea of 'social change' better, as social change happens over 
time and in a non-linear way. While this might be true, it seems hard to argue that a 
campaign with the aim to change certain behaviour – like ending FGM or increasing 
voter rates - should be evaluated without taking the decrease or increase of this 
behaviour into account. 
5 Quite on the contrary to the simple assumption of modernisation theory, Martin 
Fishbein and Icek Ajzen (2010) identified three main conditions for behaviour change: 
behavioural beliefs, perceived beliefs, and control beliefs. In short, people form beliefs 
about the positive or negative consequences of a certain behaviour, secondly they form 
beliefs about the approval or disapproval of important others about the behaviour, and 
finally, they form beliefs about helping or impeding factors when carrying out the 
behaviour. Thus, if a conduct is seen to bring a positive outcome, if important others 
17 
 
Modernisation theory also comes with a distorted view of the global 
South, and it was criticised for its assumption that the transition to 
market democracy would go in an easy and self-assembling way, 
bringing with it stable states, operational administrations, and a general 
end to poverty (Packenham 1973). In line with the argument that 
‘development’ was in general only done to permit the West to continue 
its dominance over the South (Thomas 2000a), the attempt to modernise 
societies did not always bode well for aid recipients. Lerner hat stated 
that “what America is... the modernising Middle East seeks to become” 
(Lerner 1958, p.79), assuming a general superiority of western ways. 
Daya Kishan Thussu (2000, p.59) criticised early modernisation 
theorists for their ethnocentrism and their assumption that traditional 
societies wanted a modern way of life, that ‘modern’ equalled ‘western’6, 
and that tradition and modernity were mutually exclusive. Some 
adjustments were made. It was acknowledged that the concept of 
modernity and the foreign experts who communicated it were alien to 
the targeted societies (Beltran 1976, p.108), and development came to 
be seen as a process (Huesca 2003, pp.184, 185). Still, the changes made 
did not present a huge departure from the old paradigm (Sparks 2007, 
p.54). Despite this new understanding, the problems of the concept being 
alien and the foreign experts are still present. John Postill (2006) notes 
both the influence of modernisation theory and the tendency of 
Americanisation in the Malaysian media as late as the 1990s.  
 
                                                        
approve of it and if it can be conducted without hindering circumstances, a person’s 
intention to behave in this way will increase, but it is still unclear to what effect; it is 
unclear how much weight the different entities carry. In radio programmes for peace, 
work under the assumption that conflict can be overcome by providing listeners with 
positive role models (United States Institute of Peace no date).  
6 Daya Kishan Thussu (2010, p.59, p.203) cites the example of Islam, and especially the 
Iran revolution of 1979. This movement was explicitly directed against former 
modernisation efforts driven forward by Mohammad Reza Pahlawi, the then Shah of 
Iran. Although backed up by the country's political elite, the modernisation attempt still 
failed, and the religious leaders openly directed the revolution and the masses against 




There are also critiques referring specifically to the media as a tool for 
modernisation and information distribution. Media is understood to be 
necessary in a democracy to enable citizens to participate in governance 
and in society. The idea that the media indeed functions in this way has 
been challenged. It has been said that “the formidable amount of time 
that people devote to receiving mass media messages leads most 
observers to assume that all this exposure must be having a considerable 
impact on the public’s thoughts, feelings, and actions” (McGuire 1986, 
p.175). This ‘considerable impact’ cannot, according to McGuire, be 
confirmed, neither in political campaigning nor in changing lifestyles. In 
more recent academic literature, it has also been confirmed that 
evidence for the effects of media development is hard to find 
(Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; Stremlau 2014). Furthermore, 
evidence has been called invalid, as is remarked with reference to media 
support in the Balkans: “Failure is rarely reported or framed in a 
‘politically correct’ language. Yet the assessments (…) claim success 
based mainly on activities completed (‘output’). The rationale is that 
training was provided, therefore the project was successful” (Rhodes 
2007, p.10). 
 
2.1.2 Media development contestations  
There is no doubt among practitioners of the importance of a free press 
in countries in transition. Shantil Kalathil, writing for the World Bank, 
names media “a key part of governance reform” (Kalathil 2011, p.3) and 
the European Center for Conflict Prevention calls media “an instrument 
of conflict resolution, when the information it presents is reliable, 
respects human rights, and represents diverse views” (European Center 
for Conflict Prevention 2003, p.21). The United Nations routinely 
establishes radio stations in countries of intervention and claim that 
“these UN-stations have helped end violent conflict and made political 
transition possible” (Orme 2010, p.8). The iNGO Internews describes 
itself as an organisation “whose mission is to empower local media 
worldwide, to give people the news and information they need, the 
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ability to connect and the means to make their voices heard” (Internews 
2015b). Deutsche Welle (DW) Akademie, Germany’s agency for media 
development, states its goal as “to enable all people to freely inform and 
express themselves” (DW Akademie 2015). The importance given to the 
task is further apparent in a policy paper from the German Ministry of 
Economic Cooperation and Development, where freedom of expression 
is named a “cornerstone of democracy and economic progress” (BMZ 
2015). In general, the notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘independence’ feature 
prominently among practitioners. Scholars, on the other hand, have 
warned of the dangers of an unregulated press:  
 
Those who have been working on the dilemmas of statebuilding 
tended to argue that a considerable degree of constraint over 
freedom of speech was usually necessary, both, to contain 
violence and to promote a degree of social integration. In 
contrast, those who have worked as journalists or have been 
active in supporting media organisations tended to view 
censorship as counterproductive, even when it is well-
intentioned." (Putzel and van der Zwan 2006, p.13). 
 
Allen and Stremlau say that “when it comes to war zones, the ‘received 
wisdom’ seems to primarily focus on arguing that the only way to 
counter divisive speech is to allow for more speech, rather than to 
impose restrictions” (Allen and Stremlau 2005, p.30). This, they go on, 
might be so because “the starting point here is the benefits of the media 
at ‘optimal performance’- i.e. in rich democracies” (Allen and Stremlau 
2005, p.4). A media in a rich and established democracy with a rule of 
law, thus a media protected by secure regulations, is indeed different 
from a media in an environment that does not enjoy these features. Rapid 
press freedom has been described as counterproductive, “from the 
French Revolution to Rwanda, sudden liberalisations of press freedom 
have been associated with bloody outbursts of popular nationalism” 




A related question is, to what extent, if at all, the state should be a player 
in media reform in a crisis state (Putzel and van der Zwan 2006, p.10). 
Thus far, the state is absent from media reform. This omission is 
attributed to “mainstream thinking in the international community 
regards the role of the state in transitions” (Allen and Stremlau 2005, 
p.30). Also, donors are often discordant with each other as to how a 
media sector reform should look. This seems to stem from the different 
media systems in the donor countries. The USA operates media as a 
business and understands the business model as a guarantor of press 
freedom. Many countries in northern Europe understand public media to 
deliver the best value as it is not under financial pressure (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004). The underlying question thus seems to be what makes 
for a free and independent press and from what should a press be 
independent. In the West, there is a clear division between the public and 
the business model to finance media. The former includes ties to either 
social or political groups; the latter is characterised by commercial 
interests. Hallin and Mancini (2004) distinguish between a liberal, a 
democratic corporatist, and a polarised pluralist model (Figure 1). In the 
current neoliberal climate, and with the liberal democratic model 
underpinning peacebuilding, the commercial model is usually seen as the 
most desirable for media development initiatives. The reason for this is 
the assumption that a new and assumedly weak state with new 
institutions needs a strong watchdog, which in turn necessarily needs to 
be independent of the state. In addition, the bulk of media development 
is financed by the US, which has a strong commercial tradition, following 
the rationale that “a press that is licensed, franchised or regulated is 
subject to political pressures when it deals with issues affecting the 
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Figure 1: Media systems (Hallin and Mancini 2004, p.11) 
 
Further support for the commercial system comes from a study that 
concluded that the countries that are the most effective economically all 
have strong commercial media systems (Coyne and Lesson 2009), which 
is also seen as having the most power to hold governments accountable7. 
The conclusion that a commercial system is the best remains 
questionable. First, the causal connection between economic success and 
a commercial media system is not proven. Many of the countries in Coyne 
and Lesson’s data set have not a purely commercial but a mixed system. 
The question remains also whether the connection between the two 
variables is causation or merely a correlation.  
 
                                                        
7 An example for this is the case of Peru, where the corrupt government of Alberto 
Fujimori was brought down through the repeated broadcast of video footage showing 
one of Fujimori’s main advisors bribing a leader of the political opposition. The channel 
showing the video was a small commercial channel, the only one not having been bribed 
by Fujimori’s advisor. Still, this is questionable. The one TV station in Peru broadcasting 
the evidence of corruption did not do so because it was a commercial broadcast, but 
because Fujimori’s advisor did forget to bribe it, or decided to do so due to the station’s 
diminutiveness. Using the counterfactual assumption that it would have been bribed, 
the chances are that it would have stayed silent on the issue. 
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The commercial system has been criticised on various grounds. First, the 
emergence and strengthening of the media's bonds to the economy 
concerns its task as a provider of neutral information. If media, in 
particular news, is treated as a commodity, it loses its independence 
(Elliot 2001, p.262). Topics that are assumed to have no market will not 
be covered. Minorities are excluded. There is a fundamental and 
probably unsolvable contradiction between the media being a provider 
of independent and inclusive information which shall enable the 
individual to exercise public rights, and the media as an economic 
enterprise in which the individual is seen as a producer and consumer of 
goods and services (Garnham 2001, pp.246, 247). 
 
Empirical evidence underpins these problems regarding the commercial 
system. In Kosovo, following the war in the 1990s, the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was in charge of developing 
the media landscape. Following a ‘the more media the better for media 
freedom’-approach, a plethora of commercial media was licensed. As of 
2005 the media sector in the country did suffer from over-licensing of 
radio and TV-stations, which put stations under immense pressure to 
generate revenue from their efforts. This resulted in cutting payments 
for journalists, who left the media as soon as a better-paid option was 
available. The high turnover of employees led to stations being mostly 
staffed with inexperienced people. Media acted as a mere jukebox, 
playing music instead of providing information (Laue 2005). In Bosnia, a 
similar outcome could be observed (ICG 1997). The sheer number of 
media projects, too many for the size of the country, led to donor rivalry, 
and to a run towards every possible funding source. Nationalist media 
did widen the ethnic divisions in the country. Long-term strategies for 
developing the media were mostly absent, and the development of the 
media sector in Bosnia was partly named a failure (ICG 1997, p.i). 
 
Thus far, there is little substantial evidence that media assistance as it is 
at present contributes positively in countries in crisis. Instead, the 
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positive anticipation of such initiatives seems to rest on the assumption 
that media, a free press, and the freedom of expression all support 
democracy. In industrialised countries and developed societies in the 
West, the benefits of free media and freedom of expression are cemented 
beyond any doubt. This strong belief in the benefits of media is 
surprising. Critical literature exists stating that the concept of the public 
sphere, where equals could come together for rational discussions and 
participate in governing (Habermas 1974), was destroyed by mass 
media. Mass production turned newspapers and magazines from 
providers of information in the interest of the public good into 
enterprises that serve the interests of a few powerful individuals. With 
regards to media as part of the toolbox of international development, 
statebuilding, and regime change, there is a disappointing empirical 
record of media initiatives.  
 
Nevertheless, the belief in media as a supporting tool for democracies in 
the making and countries in transition is still going strong as is evidenced 
by the many media assistance projects done in the global South. This 
might be for once simply because of intervenors' and experts' 
assumptions. The power of assumptions that develop from the shared 
culture of western experts has been described by Séverine Autesserre 
(2014; 2017). It has also been noted that "left to their own devices, 
intervening powers will tend towards replicating their own institutions, 
while local populations will be inclined to opt for a system with which 
they are familiar, even if that system has served them poorly in the past” 
(Dobbins et al. 2007, p xxxiv).  The same can be said about peace builders 
or media development practitioners. Also, global media networks and 
nongovernmental organisations are not above self-serving motives and 
conflicts of interests. Media development is foremost a market (Allen and 
Stremlau 2005, p.30), and to apply successfully for grants and funding, 
media organisations of the industrialised world need to convince donors 
not only of their expertise but also of the universal validity of the western 




In summary, media development is a contested concept. Based on 
modernisation theory, the aim of media interventions is to strengthen 
democracy by implementing a media following western understanding. 
This is problematic as the media in the West is not only a protector of 
democracy but a beneficiary thereof. Furthermore, the ‘free press’ is a 
contested concept even among international donors. Still, freedom of the 
press is one of the most important features in media development. 
Academics have, however, pointed to the need of regulations in newly 
emerging, weak states.  
2.2 The state 
 
When media operates in a country undergoing a statebuilding project, its 
position becomes complicated. Western media is seen as a cornerstone 
of democracy and in the West it enjoys the benefits and security a stable 
democracy brings with it. In a state-in-the-making, it is supposed to 
strengthen democracy in acting as if the rule of law and democracy were 
already in place when in fact they are not. This makes media vulnerable. 
Nevertheless, media development practitioners act with the concept of a 
media “’at optimal performance’- i.e. in rich democracies” (Allen and 
Stremlau 2005, p.4). In other words, they act with an ‘as if’-state, without 
considering the present state. This part of the chapter starts by defining 
the modern state, which provides the background for the performance of 
western style media; it examines how the state came into being, why it 
did not emerge in non-western countries, and what the ideas and 
problems of statebuilding are.   
 
2.2.1 The modern state  
It has been said that “scholars have generally assumed the coherence, 
integrity, and autonomy of the modern state (…). They have all started 
with the state having a fixed set of boundaries and a unified set of rules 
that circumscribe its realm” (Migdal and Schlichte 2005, p.2). This is the 
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state as described by Max Weber (1919), with the main feature being the 
monopoly of the use of physical force8. The people oblige because of the 
legitimacy of the state – a legitimacy based on rules and bureaucracy:  
 
(…) by virtue of the belief in the legal validity of the statute and 
functional ‘competence’ based on rationally created rules. In 
this case, obedience is expected in discharging statutory 
obligations. This is domination as exercised by the modern 
‘servant of the state’ and by all those bearers of power who in 
this respect resemble him. 
(Weber 1918/1919, in Gerth and Mills [translated] 1946, p. 79) 
 
The legitimacy of a state is connected to its ability to function. For a state 
to function it needs money, and consequently state capacity was first 
defined as the ability to make revenue (Tilly 1985). Later the definition 
was extended to the state’s ability to protect property, contracts, and in 
general the market, and to deliver public goods (Besley and Persson 
2009). These skills are inextricably interlinked. Without the means to 
pay no health or education system, no national defence and no justice 
system can be sustained; no state can fulfil its tasks9.  
 
                                                        
8 „Staat ist diejenige menschliche Gemeinschaft, welche innerhalb eines bestimmten 
Gebietes – dies: das »Gebiet« gehört zum Merkmal – das Monopol legitimer physischer 
Gewaltsamkeit für sich (mit Erfolg) beansprucht. Denn das der Gegenwart Spezifische 
ist: daß man allen anderen Verbänden oder Einzelpersonen das Recht zur physischen 
Gewaltsamkeit nur so weit zuschreibt, als der Staat sie von ihrer Seite zuläßt: er gilt als 
alleinige Quelle des »Rechts« auf Gewaltsamkeit.“ (Weber 1919) 
9 Economists hence often measure state capacity using economic determinants, such as 
income level and growth rates (Savoia and Sen 2012); and in economic research on 
state capacity, the presence of able institutions and quality of governance is mostly 
assumed (Besley and Persson 2009).This might be reasonable in research focusing on 
the global North; however, looking at developing and conflict countries, variables like 
‘corruption’ and ‘quality of bureaucracy’ cannot and have not been left out (Baeck and 
Hadenius 2008). The state exercises sound management of its resources through 
institutions; and their presence cannot be taken for guaranteed in new and unstable 
states emerging from a civil war in the global South. In fact, building these institutions 
is a core task of the statebuilding endeavour. 
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2.2.2 How to make revenue 
States have not many possibilities to make revenue. In principle, their 
only source of income is taxation. Historically, European leaders started 
to tax their subjects in order to be able to go to war (Brautigam 2008), 
or: 
 
Rulers were – according to this history – essentially not 
different from Mafiosi bandits. They sold protection – having 
first ensured that people needed protecting. Once they had 
sufficient power they redefined their activities and rewrote 
their past. Thus these rulers could call the protection money 
they raised ‘tax’; and they could hide their own sordid origins 
behind the glamourous notion of rule by divine right. (Cramer 
2006, p. 180) 
 
The same argument is made by Tilly (1985), the same behaviour can be 
observed in Afghan warlords (Giustozzi 2009). 
 
While the beginnings of taxation lie in extortionate robbery, in Europe it 
led later to the building of modern states with stable and capable 
institutions. Brautigam (2008) states that taxation was at the very heart 
of statebuilding. It enforced a social contract between the state and 
society; rulers that expected payment needed to start negotiation about 
the money owed with their elites. Elites stressed the provision of public 
goods in exchange for their tax money, and they demanded a say in 
government. Taxation fostered representative democracy (Brautigam 
2008; Moore 2008). Furthermore, collection and administering taxes 
promoted a need for institutions and a numerate and literate workforce, 
which consequently led to the creation of a public education system. This 
mechanism extends the theory of the public sphere (Habermas 1974), 
named as the point of departure for media as a fourth estate. According 
to this, media informs citizenry which then holds governments 
accountable. Here, however, the triggering mechanism is missing; the 
question why people should react to a government’s action is not 
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answered. It can reasonably be assumed that as long as no own interests 
are hurt or injured, action will not follow. A tax-paying and informed 
citizenry, on the other hand, might demand delivery of public goods and 
held governments accountable, simply because they have paid for 
services. 
 
Weber never intended for his conceptualisation of the state to be applied 
beyond Europe (Migdal and Schlichte 2005, p.3). Indeed, the trajectory 
from rulers’ taxes to elite demands did not occur in modern day Latin 
America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. One reason for this 
seems to be that governments had other sources of income. In the case 
of Latin America, states turned to borrowing instead of taxation (Centeno 
2002; Thies 2005; Brautigam 2008), which resulted in the creation of 
notoriously weak states: 
 
Latin American states have regularly failed to establish their 
institutional autonomy; their scale and scope remain a part of 
daily political debate; and their legitimacy is often called into 
question. We consistently also find that the Latin American state 
has not had the required institutional capacity to perform even 
a limited set of tasks. While noting some significant expectations 
(for example, Chile and Costa Rica) authors of every report 
describe a generic failure to provide the basic social services 
associated with a modern state.   
(Centeno 2002, pp. 2, 3) 
 
In African states, natural resources provided income; thus proving the 
‘resource curse’: states are less democratic when they can fall back onto 
natural resources for income and consequently do not have to tax their 
citizens. The antidemocratic effects of natural resources have been 
described by Chaudhry (1997), and they have been explicitly linked to a 
rentier-effect: states with natural resources using tax rates and high 
spending to dampen demands for representation and democracy (Ross 
2001). Notwithstanding the failure of the concept under circumstances 
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other than in pastime Europe, the modern western state with its 
technical functionality became the blueprint for statebuilding, 
understood as “the strengthening of state capacity through external 
intervention” (Bliesemann de Guevara 2008, p.349).   
 
2.2.3 Statebuilding 
Statebuilding has become “a core concept in international discourse and 
western policy” (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2008, p.349). The 
responsibility of states is explicitly affirmed as a guiding developmental 
principle, in the OECD Principles of Good International Engagement in 
Fragile States and Situations (OECD 2007) and in the Good Humanitarian 
Donorship initiative (GHD 2013/2003). The state that shall be built or 
whose creation is supported is “characterised by its technical, functional 
nature. The state is understood as a set of institutions that can be built 
and strengthened by external actors, or alternatively, taken over 
temporarily by international administration.” (Bliesemann de Guevara 
2008, p.348). Statebuilding “is a crucial issue for the world community 
today. Weak or failed states are close to the root of many of the world’s 
most serious problems, from poverty and AIDS to drug trafficking and 
terrorism” (Fukuyama 2004, p.17). The lack of state capacity, understood 
as the lack of functioning state institutions, has been named as the main 
reason behind state failure:  
 
Countries become failed states not because of their geography 
or their culture, but because of the legacy of extractive 
institutions, which concentrate power and wealth in the hands 
of those controlling the state, opening the way for unrest, strife, 
and civil war. Extractive institutions also directly contribute to 
the gradual failing of the state by neglecting investment in the 
most basic public services, exactly what happened in Sierra 




A functioning state, on the other hand, is understood “through the sheer 
physical force at its disposal and ultimately, through the moral power 
that it generates (…), the state tames or mediates the unruly differences 
that bring members of society into conflict and threaten their individual 
and collective survival and well-being” (Migdal and Schlichte 2005, p.5). 
A functioning state provides security for its citizens and for the 
international system. Drawing on Paris (2002), Bliesemann de Guevara 
(2008, p.360) points out that “international interventions contribute to 
the reproduction of the form and idea of the modern state”. This is a 
consequence of the underlying idea of liberal peacebuilding. A state 
modelled on the image of the western state fits into global governance 
and is a reliable partner, while a state with no clear boundaries that does 
not command the monopoly of force but shares it with a multitude of 
small groups is a potential danger.  
 
However, the endeavour comes with problems. Statebuilding is a social 
engineering process, where one system of governance is replaced with 
another. This is a hegemonic attempt, as “the weeks immediately 
following the arrival of foreign troops tend to be a time of maximum 
possibility. The appearance of an intervening force normally produces a 
combination of shock and relief in the local population. Resistance is 
unorganised, spoilers unsure of their future. The situation is highly 
malleable” (Dobbins et al. 2007, p.xxiv). Written from the intervenor’s 
point of view, this extract seems to be about possibilities. Seen from the 
point of view of the intervened, it is about an alien force deciding about 
future governance. Paris (2002, p.305) names five “core contradictions” 
in the statebuilding endeavour: (1) it is intrusive thus creating a 
legitimacy problem, (2) local ownership can only be established through 
international control, (3) it promotes universal values, (4) it requires a 
break with the past that might lead to confrontation with the national 
elites, and (5) short-term and long-term objectives might be in conflict 
with each other. Furthermore, in societies emerging from civil war, the 
majority of public goods – such as education and health services – are not 
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delivered by the state but by international donors and iNGOs, thus 
weakening the state by supporting a neoliberal conception of it (Christie 
2013). Legitimacy is highly problematic: by the very presence of external 
statebuilders, the legitimacy of the state is threatened (Bliesemann de 
Guevara and Kuehn 2013, p.222).  The view that legitimacy is created 
through the provision of public goods has, however, also been 
questioned with Claire McLoughlin naming this “a leap of faith” 
(McLoughlin 2015, p.342). She states that the creation of legitimacy is 
also dependent on the population’s expectations as to what the state 
should provide, hence linking the creation of legitimacy to local culturally 
grounded expectations (McLoughlin 2015).  
 
Furthermore, problems arise from the process of intervention. Local 
actors are not passive recipients of aid and although the intervenors 
claim impartiality, statebuilding takes place in political circumstances. It 
either in- or excludes actors (Duffield 2001, pp.7, 8; Bliesemann de 
Guevara 2010, p.118, Bliesemann de Guevara and Kuehn 2013, p.220). 
The external statebuilders have different perceptions and 
understandings and are “driven by the need to reduce complexity and to 
set up manageable categories, [thus] the interventionists tend to 
establish images of local politics based on the basis of selective 
interpretations of local society structures and of globalised ideas about 
the causes of war, terrorism and economic underdevelopment” 
(Bliesemann de Guevara 2008, p.352). The shared mindset of 
international experts has been described (Autesserre 2014). The 
common cultural background of international experts and their 
experiences ‘in the field’ results in interpretations of needs assessments 
that point in a – probably unconsciously – pre-decided direction and 
consequently shape projects in that way (Smirl 2015; Koddenbrock 
2016).   
 
All this results in the question what the consequences of western 
statebuilding are. Bliesemann de Guevara (2012, p.4) points out that 
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statebuilding does not result in a technically adapt, mostly western state, 
but rather that “state institutions tend to adopt a ‘western’ form under 
the influence of the internationalised norm, but keep functioning 
according to other social logics.”  In the case of the media, this is all the 
more problematic as the understanding of the external media experts 
and the local actors, in particular the national government, are 
contradictory. While the western experts come with the belief in the 
necessity of a free media, the national government has its legitimacy and 
sovereignty to defend and thus aims to keep control over the media and 
the international actors pressuring for a free media. It might be that the 
media is experiencing what Snyder (2000) describes with respect to 
democratisation and marketisation in fragile or failed states. These 
attempts led to violence instead of to peace because they unleashed 
competition with no institutions in place to regulate it. “Democratisation 
produces nationalism when powerful groups within the nation not only 
need to harness popular energies to the tasks of war and economic 
development, but they also want to avoid surrendering real political 
authority to the average citizen” (Snyder 2000, p.33). Thus, a vicious 
circle would be created with elites in a partially democratised state with 
hybrid institutions using their control of the media to kindle nationalism, 
and then referring to press freedom and claiming that nothing could be 
done against hate speech. In this way, the very tool implemented to 
strengthen democracy would be used to undermine it. At the same time, 
the media with its watchdog-task is a device for kindling confrontations 
between groups in society, including the international community as a 
new actor in the mix (Bliesemann de Guevara and Kuehn 2013). As such, 
it seems that it cannot act the way it is intended to in a non-western state.  
 
To summarise: the modern western state is the blueprint for today’s 
statebuilding projects that are performed in the interest of an emerging 
global system and out of security interests. Still, statebuilding does not 
result in western states or modes of governance. Instead, the mix of 
different interests between local actors, different international experts, 
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and the citizenry leads to hybrid forms of states that might look like 
modern states but follow their own cultural logic. For the media this is a 
problematic situation and it finds itself between the proverbial rock and 
a hard place. Tasked to hold government accountable but without the 
protection a stable democracy brings it simply cannot work as it is 
supposed to. Furthermore, it can easily be used to incite nationalist ideas.  
2.3 Groups 
 
‘Groups’ is the third concept in this thesis and the second thematic field 
which media development supposedly affects. The idea is that “without 
reliable news and information, people in conflict zones have to rely on 
rumours; and rumour invariably spreads the distrust and stereotyping 
which feed war” (European Center for Conflict Prevention 2003, p.7). 
The broadcast of objective, neutral information that supports peace 
(Lynch and McGoldrick 2007, p.256) and the promotion of nonviolent 
behaviour through mass media is thought to reduce intergroup bias and 
help reconciliation (Staub 2013, p.580). The evidence of this is limited. 
First, it cannot be predicted how attitudes change10. In Rwanda, listeners’ 
perceptions of social norms were changed with a media campaign but 
only if people listened in a group. Furthermore, their personal beliefs did 
not change, which gives rise to questions about the durability of these 
changes (Paluck 2009). In Burundi, intergroup beliefs were changed 
through media intervention but obedience towards leaders was not 
(Bilali et al. 2015). This points to the problem that the successes of such 
interventions are, among other things, dependent on a tailored approach. 
In the remainder of this chapter I unpack the idea of media as a 
reconciliation tool in peacebuilding, starting with the concept of 
‘ethnicity’, which is at the heart of the idea of media interventions 
targeting reconciliation and unfavourable attitudes towards another 
                                                        
10 Hameiri et al. (2014) have investigated the use of paradoxical thinking as a pathway 
to promote peace in the context of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Participants were 
exposed to a long-term paradoxical intervention campaign, which expressed extreme 




group. Following this, I present a different psychological explanation for 
the building of group membership in divided societies, which would call 
for an alteration of media interventions.  
 
2.3.1 What about ethnicity? 
The conflict in South Sudan has been described as an ethnic conflict. 
Many newspaper articles or radio reports explicitly mention ethnic 
tensions (see, for example, BBC 2011; Maru 2013; Joak 2014; The 
Guardian 2015). In March 2017, the Human Rights Council of the United 
Nations published a report in which it explicitly warned of ethnically-
based violence in South Sudan. It stated that “since the outbreak of 
violence in 2013, civilians have been deliberately and systematically 
targeted on the basis of their ethnicity by armed forces and groups” 
(Human Rights Council 2017, p.7). In many intrastate conflicts, ethnicity 
seems to be at the heart of the problem. The concept of ethnic conflict 
gained attention among policy makers with the Yugoslav war in the 
1990s. Following the massacres in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the term ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ came into use widely and was brought to public attention, 
although mass murder and forced migration to ‘clean’ a territory was 
nothing new, neither in Europe (Thum 2010) nor in the rest of the world. 
The genocide of the Armenians at the start of the 20th century as well as 
the mass killings in Cambodia in 1975 all fall under the heading of ‘ethnic 
conflict’ (Hannum 1989, p.85; Midlarsky 2005). Horowitz stated in his 
seminal book Ethnic Groups in Conflict that “ethnic conflict is a worldwide 
phenomenon” (Horowitz 1985, p.3), and he defined ethnicity as the 
sense of belonging to a group based on, among other attributes, language, 
religion, culture, and race (Horowitz 1985, p.53). This is arguably a 
rather vague listing of possible dividing factors.  
 
‘Ethnic conflict’ is defined as an episode of violent conflict in which 
national, ethnic, and religious or other communal minorities challenge a 
dominant group to enhance its own status in society. The main question 
asked in the academic literature is why ethnic conflicts occur. One 
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explanation is that “the world is becoming a smaller place. The 
interactions between peoples of different civilisations are increasing” 
(Huntington 1993, p.25). This is a rather problematic statement, as more 
groups live peacefully with each other than engage in violent conflict. In 
fact, civilisation differences are not an indicator for the occurrence of 
violent conflict (Fox 2002; Russett, Oneal and Cox 2000). Most rebellions 
and violent crimes occur “within rather than between communities, and 
so group identities appear to play a less important role” (Collier 2000, 
p.8.40). A second hypothesis claims a connection between the 
availability of resources; groups fight when they feel access to resources 
denied by a dominant group (Humphreys 2005). This is supported by the 
Robbers Cave experiments and the study of intergroup conflict (Sherif et 
al. 1988). Drawing on the definition given above this would, however, 
hardly count as ethnic conflict as the aim is not to enhance status but to 
secure survival. Other theories exist, including the role of religion (Fox 
2004), spatial effects and contagion (Gurr 1993; Hill and Rothchild 
1986), and an internal security dilemma (Roe 2005). 
 
Although hardly shared by scholars (Varshney 2009), in policy circles, 
ethnic conflict was mostly seen as a consequence of a supposedly 
‘ancient’ hate between groups, which unfortunately shared a territory. 
This is said to have been responsible for the late and reluctant 
international response to the Bosnian war. Sarajevo-based newspaper 
editor Kemal Kurspahic wrote that: 
 
At a time of crucial decisions, [President Clinton] simply read 
the wrong book, or more precisely, drew the wrong conclusions 
from ‘Balkan Ghosts’ by Robert Kaplan, which led to the 
comforting thought that nothing much could be done in Bosnia 





Another consequence of the essentialist view was the attempt to 
separate the warring parties as stipulated in the Dayton agreement 
(Caplan 2000; Malik 2000). The way a conflict is understood and how 
group identity and relations are seen, has important consequences for 
the way it is handled by international actors. Spitka (2016, pp.38-40) 
shows how the way group identity is perceived by international actors 
determines the intervention strategy. If group identity is seen as fluid 
and transformable, interventions aim at promoting transformation of 
hostile group identities into peaceful ones. If group identity is seen as 
fixed, intervention strategies aim at keeping groups apart, thus creating 
a ‘cold peace’. It is debatable whether the idea behind the Dayton 
agreement was to divide regular people or political leaders. For Horowitz 
(1985), ethnic conflict was mainly about elites. Ethnic Groups in Conflict 
hardly notes the grassroots. The view on ethnic conflicts being mainly 
elite-driven changed with the genocide in Rwanda. Varshney names 
three main forms of collective violence: riots, pogroms, and civil wars. 
Important for the distinction is the stance taken by the state: 
 
Riots refer to a violent clash between two groups of civilians, 
often characterised as mobs. While, in riots, the neutrality of the 
state may be in doubt, the state does not give up the principle of 
neutrality. In pogroms, typically a majority community attacks 
an unarmed minority, and the principle of neutrality is for all 
practical purposes dropped by the state. The state 
administration either looks away, or sides with the attacking 
group. (Varshney 2009, p. 279) 
 
In Rwanda, violence took the form of riots and pogroms – the genocide 
was widely portrayed as having been carried out by civilians and against 
civilians. Mass killings were executed by ordinary people whipped into a 
killing frenzy by hate speech on radio stations (Shabas 2000-2001; 
Dallaire 2003; De la Guardia 2012). With these two events, the ethnic 
cleansings in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the genocide in Rwanda, ethnic 
conflict is primarily understood as grounded in hate between groups 
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because of different ethnicities, and as conducted by civilians against 
civilians. On this basic understanding, iNGOs started their work on ethnic 
conflicts in the mid-1990s. Examples are the iNGO Radio 
LaBenevolencija HTF, who names the events in Bosnia, in particular 
Sarajevo, as a starting point for their work (LaBenevolencija HTF no date 
a) and the iNGO Search for Common Ground. The latter had started their 
work of overcoming conflicts through media interventions during the 
Cold War, but opened their first office in Africa in Burundi, a 
neighbouring state to Rwanda that was severely affected by the Rwandan 
genocide and wave of refugees, in 1995 (Search for Common Ground no 
date). Both iNGOs use media interventions in countries experiencing the 
aftermath of violent conflict.  
 
Media programmes for peace can be divided into two categories: radio 
dramas that aim to provide positive role models and enable listeners to 
choose nonviolent behaviour and factual programmes that follow the 
principles of peace journalism. Peace journalism has been described as: 
 
…a kind of journalism and media ethics that attempts, as well as 
possible, to transform conflicts from their violent channels into 
constructive forms by conceptualising news, empowering the 
voiceless, and seeking common grounds that unify rather than 
divide human societies. (Theranian, 2002, p.79, 80) 
 It is: 
 
…when editors and reporters make choices – of what stories to 
report and about how to report them – that create opportunities 
for society at large to consider and value nonviolent responses 
to conflict. (Lynch and McGoldrick 2007, p.256) 
 
In both cases, programmes are aimed at people on the ground. There 
seems to be the assumption that if regular people can be convinced to 
withstand manipulations and react non-violently, this will be a step in 
the direction of peace. This seems to make sense, as with no foot soldiers, 
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violence and fighting cannot be executed. The aim at the grassroots is 
probably also part of why media initiatives are attractive for 
international donors. There is growing consensus that local and bottom-
up resolutions and measures are crucial for overcoming violence 
(Autessere 2010; Anderson and Wallace 2013; MacGinty and Richmond 
2013; MacGinty 2014). While attentiveness to the grassroots is in general 
to be welcomed, attention to the local does not mean merely to 
implement a project on the local level. It means paying attention to the 
country’s circumstances, customs, and culture – which is what the above-
cited scholars point out. Also, the aim of making regular people resilient 
to manipulation would only be reasonable if a so-called ethnic conflict is 
indeed based on ethnic hate and carried out by civilians. This is not 
necessarily the case.    
 
2.3.2 A different explanation for ethnic violence  
Drawing an identity from an association with a group is standard human 
behaviour. Under what conditions people get attached to a group was 
thoroughly researched by Tajfel et al. (1979). They formulated the 
minimal group paradigm after assigning schoolboys randomly to one of 
two group based on preference for the one or the other modern painter, 
and although these group memberships were completely random, once 
assigned to a group the participants discriminated positively against 
their fellow group members, and negatively against members of the 
outgroup (Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1982; Dovidio et al. 2005). Several further 
social psychology experimental studies exist that show this 
phenomenon; the most famous one probably being the Robbers Cave 
experiments11 (Sherif et al. 1988). 
                                                        
11 In 1949, 1954, and 1961, Sherif et al. (1988) conducted these experiments in a boy 
scouts camp in the Robbers Cave state park in Oklahoma, USA. Well-educated, non-
aggressive schoolboys from stable, middle-class background were randomly assigned 
to two groups in the camp. Without knowing about the existence of a second group, the 
boys were first engaged in group building activities within their assigned groups. 
Although not known to each other before, they bonded quickly with their fellow group-
members; and they discriminated fiercely against the other group when competition 




In treating states as groups, Mercer (1995 p.230) applied the findings of 
social identity theory to world politics, and he makes the point that while 
self-interest and group egoism are unavoidable between states, violent 
conflict is not. A state’s interest can alter12, and alliances and cooperation 
are possible. This also provides an explanation for the fact that more 
ethnic groups live peacefully together than engage in violence and 
conflict: 
 
There is nothing inherent about ingroup processes that tend to 
either ill or good. Indeed, the same underlying psychological 
processes can lead to both good and ill. Which of these 
eventuates has nothing to do with the nature of either humans 
or groups. Rather, it has to do with choices people make about 
the way they define their group. (Reicher et al. 2008, p.1326) 
 
This points towards a different explanation for so-called ethnic conflicts. 
People might engage in violence against another group because they feel 
they have something to gain from this, because they hate each other, or 
because they feel obliged to do so - they might follow a leader or an 
order13. There is scarcely any doubt that authority plays a role when 
                                                        
the Robbers Cave experiments Sherif formulated realistic conflict theory, which names 
scarce resources as a cause for groups to start hostilities.  
12 An example used by Mercer (1995) is collective security. Organisations such as NATO 
and, to an extent, the European Union, are based on the self-interest of member states 
to defend themselves, and be protected from each other – the EU was explicitly formed 
with the idea in mind to develop economic ties with Germany so strong, that war would 
simply be too costly (Herz and Jetzlsperger 2008).The formation of NATO benefited 
additionally from the creation of the Warsaw Pact, which was understood as a mutual 
adversary. Cooperation in both cases was made possible by the common goal of security 
in military and economic terms. In the Robbers Cave experiments, Sherif et al. (1988) 
had already found that the introduction of superordinate goals eased tension between 
groups. Groups showed a tendency to cooperate once a goal was introduced which no 
group could reach alone. This is congruent with the remark that “in a large number of 
ex-colonial states, the independence rally gave way to the ethnic riot.” (Horowitz 1985, 
p. 5) 
13 The interest on obedience to authority sparked following World War II. In 1961 
Professor Stanley Milgram of Yale University started a series of experiments that 
resulted in his “Behavioural Study of Obedience” (1965). Milgram’s obedience 
experiments set out to investigate people’s obedience to authority and their willingness 
to do unknown others harm. Participants were asked to administer what they believed 
were progressive electric shocks on another person. They could not see this unknown 
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people decide on their actions. The Nazi-Propaganda broadcast during 
the Third Reich in Germany, and the hate speech broadcast prior to the 
Rwanda genocide and during the Bosnian war were all voices of 
authority, either government or other political elites. On the contrary, 
during the Nazi occupation in Bulgaria, Jews were included in the 
Bulgarian national identity, the ingroup, by official voices. Bulgaria 
became “the only case where Jews largely survived within a country that 
was in the pro-German camp and where, at the end of the war, there were 
more Jews living than before it had started” (Reicher et al. 2006). People 
might choose to act in one or other way depending on how trustworthy 
they believe the messenger is and to what extent they are free to make a 
decision. This reasoning is also supported by Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory 
of reasoned behaviour (2010). People chose to act in a certain way 
depending on the attitude they held towards the behaviour, the approval 
of authority figures and important others, and the difficulties they need 
to overcome when engaging or refusing to engage in the behaviour. 
Finally, Tajfel and Turner (1979 p. 35) point out that when people feel 
trapped in their group status or when they cannot change their status as 
individuals, they show a tendency to act with their group. This also offers 
an explanation for group behaviour in violent conflicts other than 
primordial hate towards ‘the Other’.  
 
To sum up: In this part of the chapter I have first unpacked the concept 
of ethnic conflict. For the question of the effects of media this is 
important, because media supposedly contributes positively to peace 
and reconciliation by providing information on an assumedly feared 
                                                        
other but could hear moans, screams and pleas to stop. 65% of participants went on to 
administer electric shocks. Milgram interpreted this as an inclination inherent in 
human beings to obey authority no matter what. The results of the study, however, are 
contested. Instead of an experiment about obedience to authority, it was also 
understood as an experiment about trust (Harré 1979). Participants were repeatedly 
told by Milgram’s assistant that they had to obey, that the administering of shocks was 
crucial for the success of the experiment and that everything was under control; that 
the other person “is suffering no tissue damage” (Harré 1979, p. 105). Participants did 
not obey the experimenter willingly or indifferently. Instead, they showed huge signs 
of distress and unwillingness.   
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‘Other’ and by providing people with alternatives to violent behaviour. 
This, however, assumes that hate between groups, based on ethnicity, is 
present in the population. In the second part, I have provided different 
possible explanations, especially obedience to leaders, as an explanation 
for so-called ethnic conflict. 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter presented the assumptions on which media development 
acts. In summary, media is understood to be a watchdog. It holds 
government accountable and provides citizens with information. Thus, 
citizens can make informed decisions in upcoming elections. The 
population is expected to demand good governance and public services 
because they pay taxes; taxation is the trigger to hold government 
accountable, and media provides the information the citizenry needs. 
Still, this is a western understanding of the media functioning in a 
western state. It cannot necessarily be applied to a non-western state. In 
fact, statebuilding projects tend to create hybrid states that might have a 
western façade but follow another social logic, in which case western-led 
media may not contribute positively to democracy and peace. Lastly, I 
have argued that academics and policy makers understand the concept 
of ‘ethnic conflict’ differently. The academic literature is concerned with 
what triggers conflict between groups, while policy makers see the 
presence of different ethnic groups as the condition for violent conflict. 
Radio programmes for peace building purposes thus focus on the 
grassroots and hope to prevent and heal conflict by providing 
information on the perceived ‘Other’. Thus, fear can be overcome, and 
reconciliation and peaceful cooperation become possible. Other 
explanations for group behaviour, however, are obedience towards 
leaders and the impossibility of social change. In both cases, radio 
programmes would be less helpful as it would be neither fear nor hate at 




The following chapter explains the research design used to investigate 
the South Sudanese understandings of media, the state, and groups.    
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3 – Methodology 
 
The previous chapter explored the ideas behind media development. 
This chapter details the research design. The thesis has two aims, the first 
being to find out what kind of answers different methods deliver when 
applied to the same research question. The second is to investigate the 
effects of media development in a country experiencing violent conflict 
or the aftermath thereof. Consequently, the research design is twofold. 
For part one, I compare the research process and the results delivered by 
three different methods. Following this, the three methods are combined 
to provide an answer to the question regarding the effects of western-led 
media in South Sudan. The three methods employed are ethnographic 
observations, a social survey, and unstructured, in-depth interviews. In 
step one, the comparison, the aim is to find out what kind of answer each 
method delivers and how each one is distinctive. With regards to part 
two, there is some discussion on whether and how methods can be 
combined (see King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Ahmed and Sil 2012; 
Goertz and Mahoney 2012). Still, the combination of different methods is 
neither new nor unusual; there is a fair understanding that we should 
apply more than one research method to a research problem, with 
Eugene Webb et al. (1966, p.1) especially resolute advocates of the 
employment of more than one method. For them, method-induced biases 
and cross-validation through the use of another method is the main 
justification. For Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (1994) the use of 
multiple methods adds to the rigour of a scientific study (see also Flick 
1992). With reference to this study, the wide scope of an exploratory 
inquiry in a complex environment, as well as the insights gained through 
the use of different methods show the importance of the use of a mode of 
inquiry that is not ideologically narrowed. I will now first define 
‘method’, and then provide details of the strategies for comparison and 
combination. Following this, I explore the three methods employed. The 




3.1 What is a method?  
 
Aradau et al. (2015, p.6) say that ‘method’ stands “for the more lowly 
work of putting theory into practice”.  Methods are foremost tools and 
Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (2015, p.147) name them 
either data gathering or data generating tools. The distinction points to 
either an objectivist worldview where data is “an independent exercise, 
like some exotic fruit just waiting for the researcher to come and discover 
and pluck it” (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2015, p. 147) or a worldview 
which sees data as generated through interaction between the 
researcher and the researched. Subsequently, methods are generally 
classified as either quantitative or qualitative, the former being 
concerned with quantification and numbers14, the latter with meaning 
and words. Both “represent different research strategies (…) that each 
carries with it striking differences in terms of the role of theory, 
epistemological issues, and ontological concerns” (Bryman 2001b, p.21).  
 
There is disagreement about the scope of attention methods get or 
should get. Andrew Sayer (1992, p. 2) laments that “it is quite 
extraordinary to compare the attention given in social science courses to 
‘methods’ (…) with the blithe disregard of questions of how we 
conceptualise, theorise, and abstract". Two decades later, it seems that 
not much has changed and, “methods have increasingly been placed at 
the heart of theoretical and empirical research in IR and social sciences 
more generally” (Aradau and Huysmans 2014, p.597). Contemplating 
what John Law (2004, p.40) described as the disciplining function of 
methods, however, they go on to say that “it is perhaps therefore not 
surprising that critical debates in IR have shifted either towards ontology 
or towards epistemology” (Aradau and Huysmans 2014, p. 597). This 
disciplining function is connected to the “claim that their [interpretivist 
and qualitative researchers] scholarship is neither rigorous nor 
                                                        
14 Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2015) point out that the term ‘qualitative’ was mainly 
used as a counter-distinction to ‘quantitative’ methods but that increasingly the term is 
not capturing the full range of what they name ‘interpretive’ methods.  
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objective” (Yanow, 2015, p.98). Besides the rebuff of qualitative 
research, this accusation also indicates that if research is not executed in 
an exactly defined way of engaging its tools, then it is neither rigorous 
nor objective, and hence not research.  
 
Law argues for a more open, generous methodological view that 
acknowledges that a complex world cannot be grasped by strict, 
standard social science research. He states that “methods, their rules, and 
even more methods practices, not only describe but also help to produce 
the reality that they understand [emphasis in original]” (Law, 2004, p. 5). 
The argument that methods are performative is also made by Aradau and 
Huysmans (2014, p.598) who say that methods: 
 
(…) are not simply techniques of extracting information from 
reality and aligning it with – or against – bodies of knowledge. 
Methods are instead within worlds and partake in their shaping. 
As performative, methods are practices through which ‘truthful’ 
worlds are enacted, both in the sense of being acted upon and 
coming into being.  
 
This is the starting point of my investigation. If methods are performative 
and within worlds, then they should react with the environment in which 
they are unleashed. This should result in the creation of different 
‘worlds’, showing distinctive answers to the research question. These 
worlds must not necessarily be contradictive, they can be 
complementary; the question is if, and if, how, they are distinctive of each 
other. I will now explore the two designs; one for comparing, the other 
for combining. 
3.2 Comparing and combining 
 
Part one of the research design (Figure 2 below) is the comparison of 
worlds produced by the three research methods. As will be detailed 
below, these three methods originate from different research traditions. 
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Observations are underpinned by ethnography, the survey is 
quantitative, and the interviews qualitative. While observations and 
interviews share, to an extent, ontological beliefs and epistemology, the 
same is not true for the survey (Bryman 2001b, p.20). For the 
comparison, this does not matter. The aim of the comparison is to 
investigate whether different methods provide distinctive answers and 
enact different worlds. The use of three methods underpinned by 
different strategies and traditions strengthens this design. Each method 
investigates the three concepts of ‘media’, ‘the state’, and ‘groups’. 
‘Media’ explores how media is understood in South Sudan compared to 
the western tradition. It looks at media’s history and, where possible, 
examines how much of a part of everyday life media is in South Sudan. 
This allows conclusions about the first assumption in media 
development: media is a tool with the power to reach people on the 
ground and initiate behaviour change (Hume 2004; Bonde 2006; Orme 
2010). ‘The state’ is shorthand for the investigation of the second 
assumption: through media democracy is strengthened and the 
government is held accountable, which increases trust in the state and 
its institutions (Hyden and Leslie 2003, p. 5).  ‘Groups’, finally, stands as 
an umbrella term for people’s interethnic attitudes, but also for the 
relationships between the government and the people and the 
government and the international community. This is to investigate the 
third assumption: through reliable, neutral and peace-oriented reporting 
fears against ‘the Other’ can be quelled and reconciliation becomes 
possible (Galtung, 1998, p.97; Bonde 2006; Himelfarb and Chabalowski 
2008; Lynch and McGoldrick 2007, p.256).  
 
The comparison of methods makes a contribution to the literature on 
knowledge production concerning statebuilding and conflict 
management or conflict resolution. It shows that methods are not 
innocent tools but affect the research outcome. Policy and policy-
relevant research in this realm often face the problem that they need to 
prove a point or show that a project succeeded (Rhodes 2007; 
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Bliesemann de Guevara 2014). The ‘grey literature’ (Stremlau 2014, p.4) 
of project reports provides a basis for assumptions about the effects and 
the usefulness of policy interventions, here the media. The comparison 
of three methods shows that method choice is political in that a method 













Figure 2: Research design, part 1 
 
Turning to the second part of the research design (Figure 3 below), I 
combine the three methods to determine what the effects of western-led 
media in South Sudan are and what they are not. There is some 
discussion about the combination of research methods. Besides some 
profound critique of social science research, Webb et al. (1966, p.1) have 
one fundamental criticism on the way research methods are applied: “the 
principal objection is that they are used alone” [emphasis in original]. 
Webb et al. might be early with this criticism but they are certainly not 
alone. Evan S. Lieberman (2005) proposed the combination of statistical 
analysis on a large-n with an in-depth investigation of one or more cases 
drawn from the large sample with the rationale that the two strategies 
“can inform each other to the extent that the analytic payoff is greater 
                                                        










Research question: Do different methods deliver distinctive answers?  
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than the sum of the parts. Not only is the information gleaned 
complementary, but also each step of the analysis provides direction for 
approaching the next step.” (Lieberman 2005, p.436). Opposing this, 
Amel Ahmed and Rudra Sil (2012, p.936) argue that the combination of 
methods can only be used to validate and triangulate results, if the 
methods employed share ontological beliefs. Gary King, Robert O. 
Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994, p.3) focus on epistemology instead of 
ontological beliefs and state that “the two traditions [quantitative and 
qualitative methods] appear quite different; indeed, they sometimes 
appear to be at war. Our view is that these differences are mainly ones of 
style and specific technique. The same underlying logic provides the 
framework for each research approach.” This is rejected by Gary Goertz 
and James Mahoney (2012, p.1), who state that the two traditions 
“contrast across numerous areas of methodology, ranging from type of 
research question, to mode of data analysis, to method of inference.” The 
same point, even further driven, is made by Norman Denzin, who shows 
the divide in writing about interpretive interactionism and stating that 
this “is based on a research philosophy that is counter to much of the 
traditional scientific research tradition in the social science” (Denzin 
2001a, p. 1).  
 
Nonetheless, four strategies for applying more than one method to a 
research question can be used. Bricolage is the fusion of disciplines, 
methodologies, and theories, resembling the work of the bricoleur, a 
French craftsman who uses what is at hand to fabricate an object (Lévi-
Strauss 1966, p.11). The intellectual bricolage is the “combination of 
multiple methods, empirical materials, perspectives and observers in a 
single study [and is] best understood, then, as a strategy that adds rigour, 
breadth, and depth to any investigation” (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, p.2). 
Writing in the Sage Handbook of Qualitative Methods (1994) and 
lamenting the “academic and disciplinary resistance to qualitative 
research” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, p.4), it is not entirely clear to what 
extent they see quantitative methods as a possible part of bricolage. Still, 
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survey research is named as used by qualitative researchers (Denzin and 
Lincoln 1994, p.3). Furthermore, the bricoleur uses what is ‘at hand’ 
(Lévi-Strauss 1966, p.11) and the description of bricolage as an 
experiment “to bring out relations that otherwise remain largely 
invisible” (Aradau et al. 2015, p.7) can be understood to include 
quantitative data. Analytic eclecticism, on the other hand, places the 
emphasis on the analysis. It “seeks to extricate, translate, and selectively 
integrate analytic elements – concepts, logics, mechanisms and 
interpretations – of theories or narratives that have been developed 
within separate paradigms, but that address related aspects of 
substantive problems” (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, p.10). As such, it does 
not share the aims of either triangulation or multimethod research, but 
instead it aims at explaining policy-relevant phenomena focusing on 
theoretical constructs that are normally enacted in different paradigms. 
The aim of triangulation is to overcome method-induced bias, increase 
validity, and provide multiple perspectives. It is the application of 
multiple methodologies to study one phenomenon (Denzin 1970; Jick 
1979). Finally, mixed methods “use qualitative and quantitative data 
collection and analysis techniques in either parallel or sequential phases” 
(Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003, p.11). A main difference of the strategies 
is thus whether a combination of methods is used to strengthen one 
finding, like triangulation, or to illuminate a research problem that is 
understood to be more complex16. This is the case for bricolage or 
eclecticism. As my aim is to study a complex question in-depth, the 
approach to combining methods is that of the bricoleur. Bricolage 
illuminates the context of a question; it is by definition exploratory. It is 
not so much solely answering a research question but exploring a 
research area. In this thesis, this was most apparent when the results of 
observations and of the survey directly contradicted each other. 
                                                        
16 Suda Perera’s (2017) account of what she calls ‘Bermuda Triangulation’ illustrates 
the functioning and usefulness of a research project informed by bricolage. Perera 
gained valuable and unforeseen insights into how people understand reasons of conflict 
in the DRC through embracing the different knowledge claims and investigating them 
with different perspectives. 
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Embracing this messiness and questioning further the reason behind this 
contradiction allowed valuable insights about South Sudanese social 
reality and doing research in South Sudan to surface. A research 
approach other than the bricolage would either have failed to uncover 
this or would have dismissed one method’s result as simply false.     
 
The problem of compatibility of research paradigms remains, most 
notably the question whether reality is objectively measurable or 
socially constructed. The answer to this question necessarily affects the 
epistemic practices employed. However, Charles B. Teddlie and Abbas M. 
Tashakkorie (2003, p.xiii) list six different positions, including a 
pragmatic, a-paradigmatical stance that advocates the view that in real 
world practice methods can be seen as independent from epistemology, 
a view that had been also put forward before on the basis that “questions 
about methodology (…) ought not to be framed in a way that installs 
abstract epistemology as a tyrant” (Howe 1988, p.15). Aside from the 
pragmatic stance and the illumination of a research area that asks for a 
bricoleur approach, my justification for the combination of methods is 
that a complex problem is not only offering room for answers from the 
qualitative and the quantitative perspective, it demands answers from 
both. The incompatibility of qualitative and quantitative methods is in 
general rejected by Berth Danermark et al. (2002, p.151). They state that 
“this discussion and polarisation is not only fruitless, but that it is also 
misleading to oppose the quantitative to qualitative method”, and they 
name as one justifying purpose “the use of quantitative method to 
examine how common a certain phenomenon is” (Danermark et al. 2002, 
p. 154). This is the case here; by definition, mass media is thought to 
work on the masses. If it cannot reach them, it can hardly be effectual. An 
investigation into its effects or lack thereof without examining how 





















Figure 3: Research design, phase 2 
 
The next part of this chapter provides the justification for the selection 
of South Sudan as the case.  
3.3 Case selection and settings 
 
Case study research is described as “an intensive study of a single unit 
with an aim to generalise across a larger set of units” (Gerring 2004, 
p.342). Barbara Czarniawska defines a case study as “a study of the 
occurrence of a phenomenon – a chain of events, usually limited in time, 
usually studied retrospectively” (Czarniawska 2014, p.21). They have 
been described as “intensive analysis and descriptions of a single unit or 
system bounded by space and time” (Hancock and Algozzine 2017, p.9). 
The term “has been used in a variety of different ways, not all of them 
clear” (Platt 2007, p.100). One question is whether a case study is a study 
based on one case or the comparison of more cases. Platt names the latter 
rather common, but points to the need for a previously agreed research 
Research question: What are the effects of media development 












design and coordination of the cases (Platt 2007, p.107).  Following a 
period of blatant reproach (see Flyvbjerg 2006), case studies are today 
seen as more useful. It has been said that “case studies are essential for 
description, and are therefore, essential to social science” (King, Keohane 
and Verba 1994, p.44). One particular strength was mentioned in that 
they “allow a researcher to achieve high levels of conceptual validity, or 
to identify and measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical 
concepts the researcher intends to measure.” (George and Bennett 2005, 
p.19). Despite this praise, Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) still identifies “five 
misunderstandings”, with the two main accusations being the presumed 
impossibility to generalise from it and to generate context-independent 
knowledge. With regards to generalisation, Flyvbjerg rejects the notion 
that it is impossible to generalise from the case study. Quite the opposite, 
he states that case studies are well suited to counter general claims 
because of the in-depth knowledge they provide: “Falsification is one of 
the most rigorous tests to which a scientific proposition can be subjected: 
if just one observation does not fit with the proposition, it is considered 
not valid generally and must therefore be either revised or rejected.” 
(Flyvbjerg 2006, p. 228). Concerning the production of context-
independent knowledge and the general superiority of such over 
context-dependent knowledge, Yvonna Lincoln and Egon Guba (2000, 
pp.31, 32) point out that human knowledge is rapidly updated and that 
because of these changes generalising is impossible. Lee Cronbach (1975 
p.125) says that “when we give proper weight to local conditions, any 
generalisation is a working hypothesis not a conclusion.”  
 
The two phases of the study employ both case study strategies. I compare 
three different methods to establish whether research methods act with 
the environment or are context-independent, mere technical data 
collection tools, and I also investigate the effects of media in Juba, the 
capital of South Sudan. Thus, at first the methods are the cases. They took 
place over a limited time in a certain environment, and their acting and 
outcome were intensely studied. The three cases – observation, survey 
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research, and interviews – were chosen partly because of their 
popularity. Jaber Gubrium et al. (2012, p.1) have noted that “the 
interview remains unquestionable a staple of social-scientific research”, 
and it has been estimated that as much as 90% of social sciences research 
employ interviews (Holstein and Gubrium 1995, p.1). The importance of, 
but also the troubles with, collecting numbers in countries of the global 
South have been identified by Martin Bulmer (1993, pp.3-5). 
Unstructured interviews and survey research are not only common 
methods used to investigate countries of the global South and policy 
projects such as media development initiatives, but they also present 
methods from both sides of the qualitative/quantitative divide. 
Ethnography is becoming more and more popular in IR, and it offers 
again a different underpinning methodology. All three methods work 
through direct contact with the South Sudanese, which was important. 
South Sudan is a severely underdeveloped country, which ruled out text- 
or document analysis. While I draw on some documents - namely the 
constitution and some newspaper articles in the observations part – in a 
more oral society direct contact is superior to the analysis of the 
relatively few documents and written texts. Experiments have also been 
ruled out for this study. They are sometimes conducted in media effects 
research17 (Livingstone 1996) to negotiate the causality problem: Does a 
research participant become interested in politics and the running of her 
country because she listens to the radio, or does she listen to the radio 
because she was interested in politics and governance in the first place? 
To negotiate this problem, radio programmes have been broadcast to an 
experimental group and a control group and attitudes have been 
measured with a questionnaire or focus group discussion before and 
following the broadcast. This has been ruled out here as it creates a 
highly artificial environment. More often than not, participants are 
                                                        
17 ‘Media effects’ in media and communication studies refers to events or 
consequences that occur as a result of media influence or exposure (Perse 2001; 
Potter 2012). The focus is on what people do or think because of something they saw 
or heard in media. In this thesis, I am investigating the effects a specific concept of 
media – the western concept - has in South Sudan. 
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drawn from a very small pool - the so-called listening groups, with whom 
the implementing organisations are regularly working. Participants then 
know what the 'right' answer is, and they give this 'right' answer. 
Transportation costs are typically paid for in these settings, and food is 
normally provided. In the usually shattered economies of countries in 
crisis, participating in research is a welcomed chance to earn, which 
makes a participant even more likely to provide the answer the 
researchers want to hear. This problem was overcome by interviewing 
or questioning people repeatedly and in naturally occurring settings.   
 
South Sudan, finally, was chosen because the young country presented 
an exciting case study. It is what Flyvbjerg (2006) names a critical case; 
and it is well suited for drawing conclusions from a single case. In his 
defence of case study research, Flyvbjerg (2006, p.230) states that the 
choice of a critical, extreme, or atypical case might reveal more 
information on underlying causes of the phenomena. Furthermore, those 
cases help to identify wrong generalisations. The reasoning is that if a 
theory cannot be confirmed although the case offered the best possible 
circumstances for endorsement, it is very likely that the theory will never 
be valid. Media development is expected to support peace and citizens' 
participation in politics through fair and balanced reporting. South 
Sudan seceded from Sudan following a yearlong civil war and a popular 
vote on the secession. The referendum took place in January 2011. Over 
97% of voters took part in the referendum, and of those over 98% voted 
for the secession (SSRC/SSRB 2011). With this overwhelming approval, 
it was assumed that agreement to the new state and government and 
unity among the groups in the new country would be a given. The UN and 
the international community saw South Sudan as a country in need of 
development, not as a country in need of conflict management. Western 
media development should have had a field day in the country; but 
instead of national unity and a relatively easy process of statebuilding, all 
hell broke loose with the outbreak of internal conflict in December 2013. 
South Sudan is hence well suited for studying the effects of media 
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development, or lack thereof. Furthermore, South Sudan has a plethora 
of media operating within its borders. The study took place in Juba. While 
community radio stations exist in the provinces, the majority broadcast 
in the capital where logistics are a lot easier to handle. Only Juba offered 
the possibility to investigate the effects of differently financed and 
managed media. Figure 4 provides an overview of the radio stations of 
importance in this thesis.  
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Figure 4: Radio stations in Juba (selected) 
 
I will now provide detailed accounts of the three chosen methods and 
how they were applied.  
3.4 Methods 
 
Data were collected in Juba between November 2014 and August 2015. 
This period included a break of two months in February and March 2015; 
the fieldwork spell thus was eight months long. During this time I also 
worked as project coordinator for the Dutch NGO ‘LaBenevolencija HTF’ 
and as a part-time lecturer at Juba University. Both occupations allowed 
for further insight into South Sudanese everyday life18. 
 
The aim was not to measure a predefined effect on the listener. Instead, 
I look at various parts of social reality in South Sudan and conclude from 
there whether, and if so, what, kind of an effect media can possibly have. 
First, assuming that media indeed has an effect, to work its magic it 
would need listeners. I thus ask if it can reach an audience in everyday 
life on a relatively regular basis and in a fairly easy way. Second, detached 
from asking about a particular media station, I examine how people 
understand (a) government and (b) media; and I compare these 
understandings with what I name in short 'the watchdog concept': the 
tasks and activities of liberal, 'western' media. Lastly, I examine group 
                                                        
18 Although ‘LaBenevolencija HTF’ is utilising radio for their work, there was no conflict 
of interest. I was in South Sudan at the start of their programme, my work was entirely 
organisational, mostly consisting of opening up an office, finding national employees 
and organising the registration of the organisation as an iNGO in South Sudan. Insights 
presented in this thesis are to an extent also based on two former stays in the country. 
I was working in South Sudan’s Upper Nile state for a French NGO in September and 
October 2012 and from April 2013 to August 2013 for a German organisation in Jonglei. 
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if possible.  
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relations in the country in asking about people’s circle of friends and 
their opinion about the conflict in formal interviews and in everyday life 
chats. The three methods I use are thus the subject of analysis, but they 
also are expected to provide an answer to the question of media effects, 
and in working with the three different methods, I add both perspective 
and weight to the argument. Also, in working above and across dogmatic 
paradigms, there is the possibility of stumbling over what Webb et al. 
(1966, p.2) named “measures that do not require the cooperation of a 
respondent and that do not themselves contaminate the response”. 
These measures avoid the problems caused by the researcher’s very 
presence (Webb et al. 1966; Kellehear 1993; Lee 2000). To find and 
understand these connections and possible measurements one needs to 
be familiar with the environment. Because of this, ethnography emerged 
as the backbone for the other methods and of this thesis. Beginning with 
this, I now present rationale, settings, and processes of analysis for each 
of the methods I applied. 
 
3.4.1 Ethnography 
The name of this subchapter is a bit of a misnomer, due to the contested 
character of ethnography. Martin Hammersley andPaul Atkinson (2007, 
p.1) say that “there is considerable overlap with other labels, such as 
‘qualitative inquiry’, ‘fieldwork’, ‘interpretive method’, and ‘case study’”. 
Ethnography has been defined as a methodology with participant 
observation its preferred method (Bray 2008, p.295). Alan Bryman 
(2001b, p.291) states that the term ethnography refers “to both a method 
of research (…) and the written product of the work”. Finn Stepputat and 
Jessica Larsen (2015, p.5) understand ethnography as “a collective term 
for method and methodology, that is, data collection techniques on the 
one hand and the consideration of epistemological and ontological issues 
in the research process on the other.” (Stepputat and Larsen 2015, p.5). 
It is a holistic approach whose “value lies in the flexible process by which 
it takes place” (Bray 2008, p.295), its tasks have been described as “the 
description and interpretation of the meaning particular groups of 
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people (cultures) make from their interaction with the world around 
them: how they understand the world” (Mitchell 2007, p.61), and it has 
been named a fitting “approach for studying meanings and effects of 
policies” (Stepputat and Larsen (2015, p.5).  In “the researcher 
participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily life for an extended 
period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said and/or 
asking questions (…) in fact gathering whatever data are available” 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, p.3), they draw conclusions about the 
phenomena under study. The focus is on ‘being there’ and studying 
people in their natural habitat, and attempting a “comprehensive 
understanding” (Agar 1980, p.2) by gathering a multitude of data in a 
relatively unstructured way on usually small cases (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 2007, p.3).    
 
For this thesis, the appeal of ethnography lay in its flexibility that allowed 
to incorporate multiple data (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Bray, 
2008, pp.304, 305; Schatz 2009). Observations, to a small extent 
documents, informal chats, and insights gained through personal 
experience19 can all be used.  It has been said that “arguably, the best way 
to understand an activity, and the ideas or incentives that motivate it, is 
for the researcher to engage in it him- or herself” (Gerring 2012, p. 176). 
A similar point is made by John van Maanen (2011, p.1). If the importance 
of context is accepted and if methods perform in an environment, it 
follows that a researcher needs to gain an understanding of the 
environment. Ethnography means an immersion into the environment. 
It came into being carrying the promise of understanding social reality 
by coming into close contact with people in their everyday life. There was 
an objectivist worldview behind it; with researchers believing that there 
was one independent reality that could be described and explored. A 
strand of ethnographic research, however, early on supported the idea 
                                                        
19 To give just one example: The availability of electric power was such a normality for 
me that the experience of repeated power outages and a fuel shortage were necessary 
to understand that there might be a major hindrance for media to become a part of 
everyday life.   
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that people construct their social worlds (see, for example, Blumer 1969, 
Geertz 1984). By observing, listening and participating in a situation, 
important insights are gained. 
 
Using ethnography in politics, although it originates in anthropology and 
is concerned with culture, is not a new endeavour. Edward Schatz says 
that “ethnographic approaches have long informed political science – 
albeit from the margins – and especially so among those comparativists 
who conduct field research abroad” (Schatz 2009, p.3). The reason 
behind this is that a political science, or an International Relations, that 
investigates ‘the abroad’ – issues important between and within 
countries, nation states, and the people that make these up – needs an 
ethnographic understanding. “If the study of justice, freedom, democracy 
or order is to mean anything, it must take into account individuals’ lived 
experience and how they perceive these abstractions” (Schatz 2009, 
p.10). Schaffer (2016) makes a similar point when he says that concepts 
cannot be transferred from one context to another but need elucidation. 
Stepputat and Larsen (2015, p. 4) point out that “closely associated with 
the study of context and conceptualisation, ethnography can help to 
show how the encompassing, abstract and mobile templates of global 
policies are articulated in contingent, unstable and messy 
interrelationships that make up the ‘lives’ of policies.” Ethnography 
makes a contribution to understanding the effects of media in a country 
of the global South that was important in itself but also for the conduct 
of the social survey and for the understanding of the unstructured 
interviews. With its naturalistic, holistic, and flexible approach it is a 
fitting approach for the question of the effects of western-led media in a 
non-western country. 
 
The increasing popularity of ethnography in IR (Stepputat and Larsen 
2015, p.4) is apparent in the growing literature on the ‘ethnographic 
turn’ (Vrasti 2008; Murray Li 2011; Sande Li 2013). This 
notwithstanding, there is also considerable criticism. Wanda Vrasti 
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(2008, p.279) accused IR-ethnographers that “the complexity of 
ethnography has been reduced to (1) an empiricist data-collection 
machine, (2) a writing style, or (3) a theoretical sensibility.” (Vrasti 2008, 
p.279). She argues that ethnography has been used as a band aid, without 
paying attention to the criticism that has been phrased in its native 
discipline, anthropology, and without consideration of its underlying 
political principles. Being rooted in anthropology, ethnography has been 
connected and criticised for its colonial stance (Said 1978; Pels and 
Salemink 1994; Steinmetz, 2003). Although today’s political 
ethnographers describe it as “an approach that cares” (Schatz 2009, p.5), 
the question to what extent ethnography is still bound to hegemonic 
intentions is reasonable, in particular when research is conducted on 
questions of peace interventions20.  This is a value-laden question, but 
eventually one that is necessary for all research. Ethnography might, 
because of its history and origins, be more sensitive to it than other 
approaches, leading to greater reflexibility.   
 
Ethnography took place in three main and some minor sites: First, at Juba 
University, where I was teaching a class in the Department of Mass 
Communication; second, in a small corner shop close to my apartment 
where I played chess on a regular basis with neighbours and 
customers21; and third in a local bar also in the neighbourhood. There 
were also hundreds of additional encounters with South Sudanese: 
driving to my office or the university, rummaging in local bookstores, or 
grocery shopping on Konyo Konyo market. Ethnography took place in 
                                                        
20 In my defence, this thesis investigates to what extent media development, which is 
grounded in modernisation theory and the belief of the West’s superiority (see chapter 
2), fulfils its surely good intentions in a country of the global South. The intention 
behind this was to find out if, and if, how, media development can be done in a way that 
suits the country where it is done.  
21 A more precise, but also more embarrassing way to describe my activity would be: 
Where I played and spectacularly lost at chess on a regular basis, I do not enjoy losing, 
but the regular chess games provided a wealth of insights into my partners’ thoughts 
and impressions. The participation in an everyday life activity turned me from a 
stranger and a researcher into a partner, a neighbourhood acquaintance. My chess skills 
are mediocre at best, and following the chess experience in South Sudan, I have given 
up the idea that I ever will improve as a chess player. Notwithstanding this, the activity 
of playing while researching seems to be promising as a research method.   
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some open and some closed systems (Bell 1969, p.418). Most notably, the 
university was a closed system, whereas the local market, the bar, and 
the corner shop were all public places and thus open systems. Still, in the 
bar and the corner shop access had to be gained. Everyone could enter 
these places but in order to start my research I needed to be accepted as 
a neighbour, a chess player, and an acquaintance. Colin Bell’s (1969) 
classification is thus not clear-cut. This indefiniteness was also present 
when thinking about my role in the field. According to Raymond Gold 
(1958), participant observation can be categorised as complete 
participation; the participant as an observer, the observer as participant, 
and complete observer. Herbert Gans (1968) classifies participant 
observers as a total participant, researcher-participant, and total 
researcher.  The levels of detachment behind these categories oscillated 
between the total observer and total participant. When I was visiting the 
local bar, I was sometimes meeting acquaintances, giving me a status 
more towards the ‘total participant’ end of the spectrum; sometimes I 
was consciously just observing; and sometimes I was waiting for an 
opening to participate in a chat. These changes in position were also 
present at the university and at the shop. While I had roles there – as a 
lecturer and a neighbour and chess partner – at times, I was fully engaged 
and immersed in my role, while at others I mainly observed. Bryman 
(2001b, p.305) classifies field notes as mental notes, jotted notes or full 
field notes. While being on the scene, my focus was always on the 
experience, and my notes were always mental notes. I wrote full, 
narrated field notes when I was back in the privacy of my apartment.     
 
My ‘life as an ethnographer’ was not a 24/7-affair. I engaged the 
relatively short time of roughly eight months with the field, and I was not 
constantly involved in a local setting. I lived in an apartment house for 
international expats; I lived an expat lifestyle in a place where foreigners 
“exist in cosseted bubbles, living and interacting only with those who 
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share their nationality or language” (Mayberry 2017)22.  A total 
immersion in the South Sudanese lifestyle would have carried the danger 
of losing my eye for the details of South Sudanese life, as these details 
would have become my normality (Bryman 2001b, p.100). Ethnography 
has been named an “arrogant enterprise” (Agar 1980, p.41) because of 
the claim of understanding another’s culture or practice after a relatively 
short period of time. Personally, I find the idea of claiming an 
understanding about another’s everyday life without sharing it to an 
extent more arrogant. Furthermore, maintaining a place on the side line 
has its merits, as “all ethnographers have to resist the very ready 
temptation to try to see, hear, and participate in everything that goes on. 
A more selective approach will normally result in data of better quality, 
provided the periods of observation are complemented by periods of 
productive recording and reflection” (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, 
p.37). I have found that experiencing the divide between the two 
lifestyles rather sharpened my eye for the contrast. Checking into one of 
Juba’s popular expat hang-outs like James Hotel, with its constant 
electricity supply, whirling fans, music, and ice cubes in the drinks felt 
different when coming from dinner at a South Sudanese friend's place 
where drinks were cooled with a giant ice block we had bought, and 
where cooking was done on a kitchen fire.  
 
My ethnographic experience in Juba with its three fieldwork sites 
connects to questions that have entered ethnography only recently. 
Traditionally, fieldwork was understood to take place in a relatively 
closed area; it was bound in time and space (Mitchell 2007, p.63). 
                                                        
22 The hardships of living conditions in South Sudan are well known to me from former 
fieldwork spells in Jonglei and Upper Nile state. I am certain that diving into a South 
Sudanese living experience 24/7 would not have helped but hindered data collection, 
as at least half of my time I would have been busy with the organisation of basic living 
needs. This would have seriously limited the time for observing and writing field notes. 
It made more sense to maintain an expat lifestyle and dive into South Sudanese social 
life on a regular basis. Besides this, due to health and safety reasons 'living native' was 
not an option to consider seriously, as Juba was experiencing a Cholera outbreak during 
my stay. Water is brought from the Nile and bought and sold in the streets, and there is 
no clear allocation of containers and vans to either ‘water’ or ‘sewage’. 
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Increasing processes of globalisation made identifying such a ‘bounded 
field’ complicated (Stepputat and Larsen 2015, p.6). In consequence, the 
concept of multi-sided fieldwork was introduced with ethnography 
moving out “from the single sites and local situations of conventional 
ethnographic research designs to examine the circulation of cultural 
meaning, objects, and identifies for itself an object of study that cannot 
be accounted for ethnographically by remaining focused on a single site 
of intensive investigation” (Marcus 1998, p.79, 80). The effects of media 
can hardly be observed in a single location. It certainly can be observed 
how media is produced in the radio stations in Juba, but how people 
understand media is unobservable. My approach was thus to participate 
in people’s everyday life and to try to understand how they interpret the 
rather abstract concepts of the media itself, and the two issues media is 
supposedly working on: the state and group relationships in the country. 
This rather encircling approach has become more widespread in political 
science and IR in the past (Kubik 2009, p.40; Weden 2009, p.84, 85).    
   
In summary, ethnography, understood as both a methodology and a 
method, was chosen because of its focus on long-term observation and 
immersion in the everyday life of a people. With this, it produces 
empirical data usually lost by methods with a more short-term, on-the-
spot focus, such as interviews and surveys. By focusing on everyday life 
and people’s interpretation of the thematic fields media is supposed to 
improve, ethnography is a fitting approach to answer the question about 
media’s effects in South Sudan. Furthermore, it is a contrasting approach 
for the comparison of methods.  
 
3.4.2 Survey research 
“Quantification is seductive. It offers concrete, numerical information 
that allows for easy comparison and ranking of countries, schools, job 
applicants, teachers, and much else” (Merry 2016, p.1). Furthermore, 
quantitative social research is “concerned with cause – with questions, 
whether some intervention works” (Turner 2007, p. 121). Surveys are 
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tools to produce quantitative descriptions of people’s demographics, 
their attitudes and beliefs, and their actions and behaviour (Fowler jr. 
1984; Balnaves and Caputi 2001). They are mainly categorised as public 
opinion polls, attitude surveys, or surveys that obtain factual information 
(Weisberg and Bowen, 1977). The differences, however, are not clear-
cut. It has been detailed that “almost every survey seeks some factual 
data” (Weisberg and Bowen 1977, p. 4), and attitude surveys ask quite 
often for opinions. The survey I have conducted collects basic 
demographic information, such as age, gender, and tribal affiliation, and 
it asks for respondents' opinion on e.g. the media’s neutrality, the 
government’s work, and journalists’ education. Finally, it inquires the 
attitudes people hold towards people from another tribe23. It thus has 
elements from all categories. Still, the aim is to find out about people’s 
attitudes towards their government and people from other tribes, and 
whether these are correlated to a preference for the one or the other 
radio station. An attitude, as opposed to an opinion, is defined as “a 
relatively enduring organisation of beliefs, feelings, and behavioural 
tendencies towards socially significant objects, groups, events or 
symbols” (Hogg and Vaughan 2005, p.150). This is not an unproblematic 
definition, as it is unclear for how long an opinion must be held to count 
as 'relatively enduring'. Still, surveys always gather data at a particular 
moment in time. The emphasis here is thus firstly on the ‘organisation of 
beliefs’ and second on the social significance (Hogg and Vaughan 2005). 
The questionnaire thus included not just one but a number of questions 
surrounding the attitudes towards government and people from other 
tribes, and it did not ask narrow questions. To give an example, there is 
no question asking ‘Do you think President Kiir is doing a good job’, 
instead the question is ‘Do you think the government is working in the 
best interest of all South Sudanese?’     
 
                                                        
23 The questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2.1. 
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Media development is done with the aim to strengthen democracy and 
add to the legitimacy of a government, and to contribute to 
reconciliation. It is thus done to strengthen a positive attitude towards 
the state and the government and towards people from a different tribe 
than one’s own. An attitude survey is thus a suitable method to 
investigate what attitudes on these two matters respondents hold. As I 
have stated before, one of the main problems of researching media 
effects is establishing the link between a preference for a radio station – 
or listening to radio at all – and an attitude or belief system. This is why 
survey research is a dominant method when it comes to media effects24. 
Measuring preferences and attitudes is easier done with a questionnaire 
than establishing them through interviews. Conclusions about the scope 
of a phenomenon in the population are possible. Even more importantly, 
a link between the two can be established with (for example) a simple 
correlation. This by no means denotes the establishment of a causal 
relationship, but it is at least a start even if doubts remain about the 
veracity of such results with regards to causality (Gunter 2000). Lastly, 
the quantitative approach with its focus on measurements and 
objectivity is still understood to be the traditional and scientific approach 
to research in political science (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013). It comes, as 
Sally Engle Merry (2016, p.1) and Theodore Porter (1995) both have 
pointed out, with the air of objectivity and thus trustworthiness.   
 
The above notwithstanding, there are problems. When research is 
conducted in developing countries, specific problems are acknowledged. 
Bulmer (1993) says that: 
 
A major issue in the use of social science methods to provide 
social data for Third World governments is: how can such 
methods produce data which those who use the data can trust? 
Do the procedures and techniques used give an adequate 
                                                        
24 See, for example, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1994) on measurements of media 
effects on public opinion and Dietram Scheufele (1999) on framing. Steven Chaffee and 
Joan Scheuder (1986) conducted a longitudinal study on attention to media news. 
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picture of the state of society (or one aspect of it) at the time of 
the study? (p. 4) 
 
Often, numbers collected in countries of the global South are of poor 
quality.25 A major problem is correct sampling – drawing a subset from 
the population that resembles it on key characteristics as closely as 
possible (Fowler jr. 1984; Weisberg and Bowen 1977; Sapsford 1999). 
Drawing a probability or simple random sample is desirable for accuracy 
and generalisability but they require knowledge about the population to 
be studied (Weisberg and Bowen 1977) and in the case of countries of 
the global South, a census does not necessarily exist. Another problem to 
overcome is bias (Weisberg and Bowen 1977; Fowler 1984). Finally, 
“accuracy limitations” (Zarkovich 1993, p.103) need to be considered, 
such as misunderstandings, confusions, and errors because concepts are 
understood differently by researchers and respondents.    
 
Despites all these hurdles, two main points remain. Surveys show the 
scope of a phenomenon, and no other method used here can do this. Also, 
questions regarding media preference, media consumption time, and 
attitudes towards the topics of interest can be asked and answered 
directly. This is problematic, as - especially when it comes to self-
reporting on media consumption time - it is highly likely that answers 
are mere guesses (Slater 2004). Still, the statement of a long media 
consumption time indicates that a respondent understands media as 
important. Furthermore, with surveys it is possible to establish a link 
between preferences for a radio station with the attitudes one wants to 
investigate.  Thus, valuable information and insights can be yielded by 
                                                        
25 This question is further elaborated on by Morten Jerven (2013) who shows how poor 
numbers have misled understanding of economic development in Africa. One of the 
benefits of using quantitative research designs is that it shows the scope of a problem 
or an issue. How widespread a phenomenon is can hardly be answered by qualitative 
research. However, if the data on which results are based are of poor quality this 
advantage vanishes into very thin air. Jerven's (2013) account gives examples why data 
collected in developing nations are often poor.  Sometimes they are just estimates as 
collecting data and being in the field earns employees in national statistic offices 
allowances while organising and analysing the numbers does not. This leads to many 
fieldtrips but hardly to organisation and analysis of data. 
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survey research. Surveys are also the ‘bread and butter’ in international 
development practice, with donors requiring answers that are objective, 
scientific, transparent, and which can be held to a global standard (Merry 
2016). The use of quantitative data to answer a policy-relevant question 
– about the effects of media development campaigns in a country of the 
global South – is justified. 
 
Data were collected in December 2014 for the first survey and in July 
2015 for the second survey26. Prior to the first data gathering, the 
questionnaire was run through a panel of experts – a group of three 
South Sudanese nationals. Following this, a small pilot of 20 
questionnaires was run, and in consequence, some questions were 
rephrased. Despite the execution of a pilot study, there were massive 
problems with the data from the first survey, which led to the execution 
of the second survey six months later. A detailed account of this will be 
given in chapter 5. In brief, the problems I encountered were caused by 
power relations and missing knowledge about context and social rules 
that governed the environment. The insights needed to navigate this 
particular minefield were not available to me before I had heard the 
'click'; and I could not have gathered this knowledge by the execution of 
the pilot study. A longer stay, observation, and trial and error were 
necessary. The execution of the first survey provided thus valuable 
insight into the ‘acting’ of methods in a certain environment, and it 
underpins current arguments about the disadvantages of a strict 
qualitative/quantitative divide in the social sciences (Teddlie & 
Tashakkorie 2003; Latour 2010; Gane 2012; Mair, Greiffenhagen, 
Sharrock 2016). While the results from the first survey are indeed not 
well suited to answer the question what the effects of media 
development are, the experience of executing it and encountering these 
problems are highly significant for the question of how methods act in 
                                                        
26 The questionnaire used for the second survey – whose results were analysed and are 
reported in this thesis – can be found in Appendix 2.1. 
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particular environments, and underpinned the importance of thinking 
about context. 
 
For survey number one, the questionnaire was distributed by 25 
students from Juba University’s Department of Political Science; for 
survey number two, 25 students from the University’s Department of 
Mass Communication were chosen as interviewers. In both cases, a 
snowball system was used – students distributed the questionnaire to 
friends, acquaintances, and family. This was done for the protection of 
the interviewers. In South Sudan, it is in general not advisable to discuss 
the government and the media, two highly sensitive subjects, openly with 
strangers, and even if my research had been on less sensitive topics, 
security forces would have objected to data collection on the streets. 
Employing students from Juba University meant that governmental 
procedures, in particular the question of whether my data collection 
would need to be approved by the government, had been cleared by the 
university. Nevertheless, a possible confrontation with security forces is 
something everyone in South Sudan tries to avoid. Distributing the 
questionnaire in private and to friends and acquaintances meant that the 
vast majority of respondents are students. Paying this price was, 
however, a necessity for the security of the interviewers27. Another 
problem, and also a threat for the representativeness of both samples, 
was calculating sample size. For both surveys I had calculated sample 
size with a margin error of 5%, a confidence level of 94%, and a standard 
derivation of .5. The population size, however, was sheer guesswork, as 
Juba’s last census was done in 2008, before independence. The validity 
of this census is questionable at best, and to make matters worse it is 
unclear how much the population has changed since 2008. I estimated 
population size at 1.5 million people. Sample size was calculated (Z-
score)² * StdDev*(1-StdDev) / (margin of error) at 354 (Israel 1992). For 
both surveys, 500 questionnaires were distributed. Data cleaning was 
                                                        
27Kristen Himelein et al. (2016) have described sampling problems in conflict countries. 
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done on the sample from survey 2 – survey 1 was unusable for my 
statistical analysis. It is used in chapter 5 solely as a reference point to 
demonstrate the importance of knowledge about the context of an 
environment in order to achieve meaningful results. For findings about 
media development campaigns, only survey two is relevant. Following 
data cleaning, 372 questionnaires remained for analysis, which was done 
using SPSS. 
 
Descriptive statistics were used to describe peoples’ attitudes towards 
the three categories, media, the state, and groups. I also tested if 
participants’ attitudes are dependent on a preference for the one or the 
other media station. The test chosen is the Kruskal-Wallis H test, as I 
wanted to determine differences in the distribution of beliefs. The 
Kruskal-Wallis Test, developed by William Kruskal and Allen Wallis 
(1952), is a rank-based nonparametric test that can determine whether 
there are statistically significant differences between groups. It was 
chosen because the independent variable (‘Which radio station do you 
listen to?’) consists of more than two groups, and because the dependent 
variables (the different attitudes people hold towards the government 
and towards people from other tribes) are ordinal. Data are non-
normally distributed. Thus, the data fail the assumptions for a one-way 
ANOVA. Beliefs and attitudes were measured on a 5-point Likert-scale, 
ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’, including the 
category ‘I do not know’ (Likert 1932). This is a between-subjects design, 
as the categories of the IV are independent groups. 
 
While gender and age are relatively close to what is supposedly South 
Sudanese reality, having been collected by students the majority of 
respondents are students. This is far away from reproducing Juba’s 
population. South Sudan is a country with a high illiteracy rate, school is 
not free, and sometimes fees are hefty. The majority of people in South 
Sudan do not have access to higher education. Still, the focus on students 
in the survey is not as problematic as one might think. First, the number 
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of illiterates is so high because it refers to the whole country. The 
educational situation is much worse in the rural areas of South Sudan 
than in Juba. What is more, in social psychology the point has been made 
with reference to surveys that: 
 
To the extent that social psychological phenomena are universal 
across different types of people, it makes little difference 
precisely with whom social psychological research is conducted 
– even data collected from samples that are decidedly 
unrepresentative of the general population can be used to draw 
inferences about this population. (Visser et al. 2000, p.223) 
 
Media effects are presumed to be universal effects; if they were not 
media development would be useless in the first place. It is precisely its 
assumed ability to reach everyone and cause the same effects in attitudes 
and beliefs that makes media a tool for democratisation attempts. The 
reliance on students as respondents is thus not a huge problem. Taking 
into account that education in South Sudan is costly – school fees are to 
be paid from primary school on, and money is also due for transport, 
books, and stationery – it can reasonably be assumed that students come 
from a more affluent background than the average South Sudanese and 
thus are more likely to have regular access to media. Media effects thus 
should be more visible in this group. 
 
In summary, surveys have been chosen as a method to investigate media 
effects in South Sudan, because they allow the establishment of a link 
between attitudes hold and media listenership. Furthermore, they allow 
conclusions about the scope of attitudes and their link to media 
preference in the population. Problems that either needed to be 
overcome or limited the results from this part of the study were validity, 
accuracy limitation, and sampling problems. Nevertheless, the survey’s 
usefulness in both investigating media effects and allowing an 
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investigation in the performativity of methods far outweighed the 
limitations.    
 
 3.4.3 Interviews 
An interview is “a conversation with a purpose” (Cannel and Kahn 1968, 
p.530), with the purpose being to find something out. It is a widely used 
method; it has been estimated that 90% of all social research comes in 
one or the other form with interviews (Holstein and Gubrium 1995), and 
it is named “an essential tool for making sense of political phenomena” 
(Mosley 2013, p.2). To an extent, all methods employed here can be said 
to be based on or come with an element of interviewing. Survey research 
employs structured interviewing, a form of interviewing where “an 
interviewer ask each respondent a series of pre-established questions 
with a limited set of response categories” (Fontana and Frey 1994, p. 
362). The ethnography part relies not only on observations but also on 
conversations, with the main difference being that these were naturally 
occurring conversations. An interview, as understood here, is a specific 
form of conversation with the explicit aim of knowledge production 
(Kvale 2007). It is an arranged, not a naturally occurring conversation.  
 
Interviews can be distinguished either by how or by with whom they are 
conducted. Types of interviews using the first mode of differentiation 
include the already mentioned structured interviews, semi-structured, 
and unstructured interviews. Whereas structured interviews follow a 
strict questionnaire with almost no variation, unstructured interviews 
have a set purpose or themes but “the interviewer acts freely in this 
context, on the basis of certain research points, (re)formulating 
questions as required and employing neutral probing” (Sarantakos 2013, 
p.278). The semi-structured interview covers the middle ground 
between the two extremes, it “incorporate[s] both open-ended and more 
theoretically driven questions, eliciting data grounded in the experience 
of the participant as well as data guided by existing constructs” (Galetta 
2013, p.45). Following this first labelling, interviews are also classified 
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by with whom they are done. One main distinction would be if an 
interview is done with an individual or a group. The group interview “is 
an option that deserves consideration because it can provide another 
level of data gathering or a perspective on the research problem not 
available through individual interviews” (Fontana and Frey 1994, p.364). 
Besides this, interviews can be done with experts and elites, they can be 
biographical, inquiring, analytical, or neutral (Sarantakos 2013, p.279). 
All these categories are, however, rather fluid. An expert might be a 
professional in a certain field, but when the interview is about a person’s 
or a group’s everyday life circumstances, the category is a lot more open.  
 
I chose to conduct unstructured, in-depth interviews. They were chosen 
because of the interviews’ connection to the everyday. Conversations are 
a cornerstone of everyday life, and although interviews are not naturally 
occurring but arranged they have the advantage that they can be 
directed. It is possible to probe and zoom into an area of interest, a 
possibility that is not as prominent in ethnographic, informal interviews.  
Furthermore, I was interested in the question to what extent ‘just asking’ 
would deliver answers to my research question on media effects. 
Kellehear (1993) and Webb et al. (1966) both voice disagreement with 
the idea that truth can be uncovered by interviews. Kellehear (1993, p.1) 
rejects “that important ‘truths’ about people are best gained by talk” 
more in general, while Webb et al. do not object to the interview per se, 
but that it is used alone (Webb et al., 1966, p.1). Comparing research 
methods, my aim was to investigate whether interviews, the most 
widespread method in social science research, were able to give a 
relatively full answer to my research questions. I decided on 
unstructured, in-depth interviews because my research question is 
exploratory and descriptive. As has been said before, the question of the 
effects of western-led media in South Sudan is not one that can be 
answered by a direct approach; to gain a relatively grounded 
understanding it was necessary to break the question down into several 
sub-questions. These were what people thought about the media in the 
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country, and what they thought about the two fields media is supposedly 
working on, namely the state and relationships between groups. My 
questions were, ‘What do you think of the media’, ‘How do you 
understand the conflict’, and ‘What do you think about the state’. In this 
frame, I wanted to allow interviewees room to choose where to zoom in. 
I was looking for a deep understanding of these questions, “the same 
deep level of knowledge and understanding as the members or 
participants” (Johnson and Rowlands 2012, p.101). With this, 
unstructured, in-depth interviews were a suitable method.   
 
The main problem with interview research comes from what is also its 
main strength. It is a social situation, and “knowledge is produced 
through the interaction between an interviewer and an interviewee” 
(Kvale 2007, p.xvii). This means that the answers gained through 
interviews are shaped by the dynamics of the research situation. John 
Johnson and Timothy Rowlands (2012) mention the cases of Margaret 
Mead’s (1928/1960) Coming of Age in Samoa, and Freeman’s (1983) re-
examination of Mead’s interviews. Derek Freeman expected that Mead 
had been misled by her participants out of mistrust and for cultural 
reasons. Instead, he found that respondents had lied to Mead because 
they “told her what they thought she wanted to hear” (Johnson and 
Rowland 2012, p.100). This points to two, although connected, issues in 
interview research. One, that cultural differences might play out in a 
misleading way; the other that content is created in the relationship 
between interviewer and participant. Zoe Morris (2009) summarises 
participants’ tendency to mould the truth under the heading ‘dishonest 
respondents’.  Still, in interview research it might be more often the case 
that they fall prey to biases and to what has been named ‘interviewer 
effects’: 
It is old news that the characteristics of the interviewer can 
contribute a substantial amount of variance to a set of findings. 
Interviewees respond differentially to visible cues provided by 
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the interviewer. Within any single study, this variance can 
produce a spurious difference. (Webb et al. 1966, p.21) 
 
This holds true also the other way around. Interviewers have a self-
serving bias. Johnson and Rowlands (2012, p.101) state that “they [in-
depth interviewers] don’t necessarily ‘hear’ what their informants tell 
them but only what their own intellectual and ethical development has 
prepared them to hear.” Doing my interviews, I realised a tendency to 
believe respondents who confirmed my pre-phrased theory and to reject 
information that pointed into another direction. I found myself more 
than once giving the answers of a respondent an easy ride when they 
confirmed my assumptions. On the contrary, I found a lot more reasons 
why someone was not telling the truth (downright lying, having 
misunderstood something in the situation, and more) when their answer 
would have meant that my assumptions might be wrong. I noticed two 
stumbling blocks when it comes to interviews: one when the interview is 
conducted and the social dynamics between interviewer, interviewee 
and environment shape what is said, and another when the interview is 
transcribed and ready for interpretation, and the lone researcher on the 
desk starts to look for common themes and asks what it all means. This 
does not mean that conducting interviews is useless in social research or 
that the problems outweigh the advantages. It only means that one needs 
to be aware of these tendencies. Interviews are a way to find out what 
meaning people allocate to topics and issues; it is a way to uncover 
people’s understandings of their social world (Alvesson 2011; Schaffer 
2014), if the difficulties and stumbling blocks are taken into 
consideration.  
 
I conducted unstructured interviews with 28 participants that had been 
recruited from as wide a range of South Sudanese society as possible. 
These were cross-cultural interviews. Although I had been living in South 
Sudan frequently and for durations of between two and ten months, I was 
a stranger in the culture. The interviews were also multi-purpose. I 
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wanted to gain factual knowledge and conceptual clarification, and to 
gather narrative information. My main interest was to understand how 
my participants understand their lifeworld. My approach to interviewing 
was hence phenomenological, following the ideas of Edmund Husserl, 
who states the inseparability of the world that forms the setting for 
everyone’s subjective experience (Husserl 1964, p.15). Following this 
approach, I asked participants for a description of their opinion and 
experience of media, the state, and the conflict. While sometimes 
probing, I left it mainly to participants to decide where they wanted to 
zoom in. In order to gain insights from as many parts of South Sudanese 
society, participants belonged to one of four groups. Group 1, ‘journalists 
and media professionals’, contains interviews with editors-in-chief, 
media managers, and senior and junior journalists. Group 2 consists of 
politicians, both, members of the current government and members of 
opposition parties, and administrative employees in the ministries. 
Group 3 is very widely composed of what might be named civil society 
members, although following a rather loose definition of civil society. 
Interviewees were church and media activists, academic staff, and 
teachers. Group 4, for lack of a better word, looks at ‘listeners’, which 
here means South Sudanese who are not activists, journalists or 
government officials. I interviewed a driver, national NGO-staff, students, 
a restaurant manager, and security guards. The groups represent 
different forms of knowledge on the media and on society. Journalists are 
involved in producing broadcasts and have in-depth information on the 
practices of journalism in South Sudan, government and government 
employees possess an understanding of how journalism is seen by the 
leadership of the country. Civil society members represent an elite in 
society, often educated in the US, the UK or Australia where they have 
experienced media and the functioning of a society in the West and were 
thus thought to contribute insights on how well the concept can traverse 
between the spheres. Group 4, regular people, are the majority in the 
country; they are the audience, the people the media is thought to 
function on. Unexpectedly, they were also the people that were the 
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hardest to gain access to, pointing to another problem with interview 
studies.  
 
‘Regular people’ in this context means people who are what in an 
industrialised country would count as either working or low middle 
class: handymen, farmers and agricultural workers who do not own land, 
people with no university education, but maybe an apprenticeship, blue-
collar workers, salesmen, and tea ladies, who own the equipment 
necessary to brew tea and coffee on the sidewalks and run a small 
business. Figure 5 shows a tea lady serving tea outside the offices of the 
local government in Bor, the capital of Jonglei state. This picture mainly 
serves the purpose to mark the cultural difference and hence navigate 
indexicality, which refers “to the amount of shared background 
knowledge necessary to understand a message” (Agar 1980, p.5). Access 
to such people was hard to gain, first because of the language barrier. 
Although English is an official language in South Sudan, it is mostly 
spoken by the elite. Secondly, my requests for interviews with people like 
this tea lady were turned down because of perceived power relations; 
people who talked to me without problems at the local bar or when 
drinking tea were unwilling to agree to a real interview because they 
feared they would not understand my questions. The official interview 
situation has been said to come with power relations that are hard to 
overcome (Kvale 2006; Plesner 2011). Steinar Kvale (2005, p.90) 
explicitly points out that “interviews give voice to the many; the 
marginalised who do not ordinarily participate in public debates may in 
interview studies have their views and situation communicated to a 
larger audience”, but points to the exploitative nature of the intrinsic 
power relations of the interview. In my case, the marginalised who do 
not ordinarily have their voices heard showed no interest in being heard. 
I asked a total of 24 regular people for interviews, and my request was 
turned down all but four times. A fifth interview was made possible after 
the intervention of a friend, who worked for the same employer than the 
interviewee-to-be but in a higher position. The other four interviewees 
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in this group are only in a generous sense ‘regular people’; with being at 
university and working as national hires in mid-range positions they can 
easily count as lower-ranking ‘elites’. This calls the use of the interview 
study as an instrument of capturing all parts of society into question, as 
I will detail in the conclusion. It might be that the interview study suffers 
from an inverted haphazard effect. In survey research, haphazard 
sampling is known to create a bias: In randomly picking respondents 
researchers try to create a random sample, but as people have a tendency 
to pick respondents they feel comfortable with, haphazard samples are 
often biased towards a middle class (Weisberg and Bowen 1977). When 
asking people for an interview, they choose if they want to trust me, and 
being a stranger they do not pick me.  
 
 
Figure 5: Tea lady in Bor, Jonglei state (personal stock) 
 
Problems with access normally are understood to refer to high-ranking 
ministers, leaders and people in power, but in South Sudan it was a lot 
harder to recruit ‘non-elites’. While there were high-ranking political 
leaders who I did not get in front of my voice recorder – namely Dr Anne 
Itto, the then acting General Secretary of the SPLM – almost everyone I 
asked agreed to an interview. When the interview still did not take place, 
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it was because of time problems. This points to an inherent bias in 
interview studies, with language problems, lacking confidence on side of 
the regular people, and an unconscious bias of the researcher to choose 
participants close to herself all playing a role.    
 
Mere technical problems with interviews were failing batteries, trying to 
concentrate on an interview while sitting in a restaurant with a lot of 
background noise, getting lost on the way to a meeting point, having a 
total of 23 follow-up phone calls and mails to ask if an interview was 
possible (“Maybe. Can you call again?”), and, after a very dull interview, 
receiving a phone call from my interviewee telling me that he had been 
so close-lipped because security police had been sitting on the table next 
to us, and if we could repeat the interview. Interviews lasted roughly 
between 30 and 90 minutes. They were conducted where the 
interviewee proposed: I visited offices in office buildings, secured 
compounds and in governmental buildings, interviewed people in my car 
while it was parked in a yard, safe compound or a quiet street. Some 
interviews took place in my apartment, other in people’s working places. 
Some were conducted in restaurants. All participants were informed 
about the aims of the study and their right to withdraw from it at any 
time. Informed consent was always asked for and always given, although 
signing a consent form was something, no one but three interviewees 
wanted to do. I thus asked for informed consent orally and recorded it at 
the beginning of each interview. Literally everyone I interviewed for the 
interview part asked for anonymity. Due to the fact that the fighting 
meanwhile has reached Juba and that during a direct attack on a 
considered safe hotel, which was frequented by South Sudanese and 
humanitarian aid workers, a South Sudanese had been shot point-blank, 
I have decided to anonymise also the very few people who have given me 
permission to mention their names. 
 
In summary, unstructured, in-depth interviews were chosen because 
they provide insights into people’s experience of the media and the 
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government, and how they understand the conflict. An expected problem 
with interviews is that knowledge is produced between interviewer and 
interviewee, thus raising questions about the data’s validity. An 
unexpected problem was the recruitment of regular people, which gave 
rise to fears about a recruitment bias inherent in the method.    
3.5 Chapter conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I introduced the research design. As this inquiry had two 
aims, finding out about the performativity of methods and investigating 
the effects of western-led media in a country of intervention, the 
research design comes in two parts. I employed three different methods 
and compared the results they delivered as well as their strengths and 
weaknesses in a first step. Following this, I combined the results to 
deliver an answer to the question of media effects. In the course of the 
inquiry, it became clear that the research question was not so much a 
research question but rather a set of interconnected questions connected 
to the everyday life and hence to the question about methods’ 
performativity. Three methods were employed: ethnography, a survey, 
and unstructured interviews. These three were chosen because of their 
different underpinnings, which makes them suitable options for the 
comparison. Furthermore, all three are tested methods for research in 
countries of the global South. However, due to its flexibility, ethnography 
emerged as a bridge, delivering insights that explained curious or 
contradictory results from the other two methods. In the course of doing 
research in South Sudan, it became increasingly clear that for a complex 
question in a complex environment, a bricolage was the research 
approach of choice, as it gave the best chance to make sense of messy and 
sometimes contradictory results. These were not ‘wrong’ results but 
provided insights into different facets of South Sudanese reality, a reality 
that is multifaceted, diverse and layered, and too rich for an ideologically 




With the following chapter 4, the core study begins. The subsequent 
three chapters present the empirical findings from South Sudan. Chapter 
4 explores the question of media effects using ethnography; the chapter 




4 – Ethnography  
 
Leaving the plane at Juba International Airport I follow the passengers to 
a tent where a nurse takes my temperature; after that I proceed into the 
arrival hall. This is new, a precautionary measure because of the Ebola 
epidemic that at this moment, in spring 2015, haunts West Africa. In the 
hall, luggage handlers unload suitcases; they are put on the ground for 
their owners to find. To my left, people are queuing in more or less 
orderly lines. Far left is the queue for foreigners with an entry permit. 
Two lines are for South Sudanese nationals and one is for visa holders. It 
does not take long before it is my turn. “How are you”, asks a smiling 
immigration officer, stamps my passport and wishes me a nice stay. So 
does the police officer who draws a chalky cross on my carry-on bag as a 
sign that it has been checked. With another “Have a good day!” I leave 
Juba Airport.  
 
While this might sound like a normal airport experience, it was rather 
extraordinary. By far it was the fastest and friendliest arrival I ever 
experienced when coming to South Sudan. In the past, I had fought my 
way to border control through a crowd with massive use of elbows; 
luggage had been thrown through an opening in the airport wall and then 
hand-checked by a security officer; one had to push through the crowd 
of fellow travellers and heave a 20kg heavy suitcase on a desk, where 
airport security rummaged through clothes and toiletries. The 
immigration officers had not been welcoming but intimidating. Only a 
year ago, I had entered the country after a long discussion with security 
that had included the threat to be sent back to Egypt immediately. The 
new and much-improved behaviour might be caused by training 
provided by the European Union Aviation Security Mission in South 
Sudan (EUAVSEC). It might also be that these specific members of the 
security forces just had a very good day; but it is also possible that the 
South Sudanese perception of how a public servant should behave is 
finally changing. The behaviour of state employees and how they treat 
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citizens (and foreigners) tells a story about self-perception and about 
governance and government of a country. In western thinking, the state 
is a provider of basic services, among them security, education, and 
health (Weber 1919; Besley and Persson 2009). Government is 
legitimised by the peoples’ vote, and it is accountable to the people. If the 
state does not provide, it loses its legitimacy and almost certainly the 
people's support and vote. Until my above described experience, the 
South Sudanese state employees had been threatening rather than 
supportive. The new experience led to the question whether this was 
changing and to what extent the western conceptualisation of the state 
was congruent with, or at least similar to, the South Sudanese 
understanding.  
 
With this, ethnography started pretty much from the minute I arrived in 
the country. While I had former experiences of South Sudan and was 
hence able to compare new impressions with expectations, even without 
these former experiences of the country the significance of some 
observations would have been hard to miss. In the following, I present 
my results from ethnographic observations in South Sudan. The chapter 
is organised around the three concepts of the media, the state, and 
groups. It starts with insights into ‘doing ethnography’, and its strengths 
and weaknesses when conducted in the complex reality of South Sudan.  
4.1 On doing ethnography  
 
Ethnography is “a commitment to adopt the perspective of those studied 
by sharing in their day-to-day experiences” (Denzin 1970, p.185). As 
detailed before, my participation in everyday life took place at three 
fieldwork sites and only at certain times of my stay. In the literature, a 
major concern regarding ethnography is gaining access (Bryman 2001a, 
p.xviii; Bryman 2001b, pp.292 – 298; Feldman et al. 2003; Harrington 
2003, p. 593; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, pp.42 – 43; Sarantakos 
2013, p.220). In Juba, this had not been a problem. It certainly helped that 
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a network of contacts was already in place and that the area of enquiry 
was relatively open. Researching practices of media production, to give 
an example, would surely have been more complicated as access to radio 
stations would have been needed. My interest in understandings of and 
opinions on media and the state, and in the relationships between groups 
in the country required “ongoing interaction with the human targets of 
study on their home ground” (van Maanen 2011, p.2). The three sites 
where I engaged in such interaction were Juba University, where I taught 
a class in the Department of Mass Communication, a corner shop, and a 
local bar, both in Haj Malakal, the residential area where I was living. 
 
Researching the everyday meant that contact could be made as in every 
other city, town, or environment a researcher is moving to. My main 
distress came from the fact that I expected a more dramatic, distinctive 
starting point for ethnography, a ‘Now I am doing ethnography’ moment; 
whereas the immersion in the everyday meant that this was exactly what 
it was not. I was not a researcher behind a clipboard but part of the 
environment. Access to the fieldwork sites was gained over time: 
shopping at the corner shop, a typical shop selling soft drinks, chocolates 
and alcohol, toilet paper and detergent. Regulars came over in the 
afternoon for a chat, a tea or a beer, and a game of chess. It did not take 
long until I was invited to a game, and this became a regular installation. 
Chess is a slow game that offers ample space for drink and chat. Equally 
undramatic was starting my stint at Juba University. Visiting the 
university to enquire about an Arabic teacher, I found myself in a 
discussion with one of the professors who asked if I would like to teach 
a class. A few weeks later, I started teaching. Although I first wondered 
how to connect with South Sudanese everyday life, very soon I realised 
that there was in fact not a moment when I did not connect with it. Daily 
lunch breaks in a cook shop not far from one of Juba’s biggest churches, 
doing my grocery shopping at Konyo Konyo market, visiting the local 
hang-out around the corner from my apartment, and soon starting to 




However, how could I be sure that my experiences were not filtered and 
caused by my background and status and that my interpretations were 
correct and not a result of preconceptions? The short answer is that I 
could not. Having engaged in nearly constant discussions of my 
interpretations with South Sudanese friends, I feel confident enough to 
write my insights down. Still, this question is closely connected to 
problems of representation and the ethical dilemma of speaking for 
those researched. Ethnography in IR has been critiqued sharply, among 
other things, on the basis that it presents merely the researcher’s 
interpretation and omits the voices of the participants (Vrasti 2008)28. 
Ethnography has been accused of ignoring reflexivity and a return to its 
patriarchal, positivist past (Vrasti 2008). It seems to me that reflexivity 
is not only important in ethnography but is a general demand in research. 
Similarly, in any other research it is as much the voice of the researcher 
that is heard. It is the researcher deciding on the questions in a 
questionnaire and it is also the researcher who decides which interview 
extracts to use. Engaging in ethnography, a researcher engages in the 
environment. This, together with ethnography’s commitment to 
reflexivity and accompanying attention to positionality provides 
measurements against incorrect representations. Furthermore, 
ethnography is a slow method. This is a weakness because policy-
relevant research often happens under time constraints. It is, however, 
also a strength as it helps to get to know the environment.  
 
Researching in a context such as South Sudan often means that identities 
need to be protected. Naturally in such cases, no information on who 
speaks, with whom, why, and where are disclosed. This is all the more 
important as not everyone was aware of me as a researcher, which was 
a consequence of me doing my observations in everyday life and over 
time. While I always did mention that I am a researcher, besides my 
                                                        
28 Vrasti’s critic goes much further than this. She argues that IR uses ethnography 
practices to maintain a scientific perspective in the discipline. 
84 
 
students I did not encounter everyone regularly. That reflexive thoughts 
on my status and standing and on power relations are not always 
mentioned does not mean such reflection did not take place. Where the 
identity of people I encountered could be disclosed through such 
reflection, this reflection is omitted. This lack of reflection is not a sign of 
unawareness - quite the opposite. 
 
The main problem with doing ethnography was thus not gaining access, 
the main problem was protecting participants. Names and any features 
that could lead to identification were omitted with the utmost rigour. I 
turn know to the presentation of my research findings, starting with how 
the South Sudanese use and understand the media.    
4.2 Media 
 
You students leave the schools 
pen can no longer liberate the Sudan 
But with guns, such as Kalashnikov 
The government of Garang will 
liberate the country with blood. 
(Dinka War song on Radio SPLA, 
quoted from Arop 2006, p. 92) 
 
 
As detailed in chapter 2, media is an important, although not 
unproblematic component in countries experiencing intervention. 
Media’s task is to provide neutral, unbiased information to enable the 
population to make informed choices in elections, thus holding 
governments accountable (Howard 2002; Hume 2006; Kumar 2006; 
Coronel 2010; Orme 2010) and to help people overcome mistrust and 
hostilities (Galtung 1998, Lynch and McGoldrick 2007). Both tasks are 
grounded in a western understanding of the media; it is assumed that it 
will act that same way in a non-western country. The idea that western 
institutions can be transferred to non-western contexts is prominent in 
statebuilding, with international experts working in the endeavour 
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having a ‘Yes, we can’ attitude that Bliesemann de Guevara (2012) 
amusingly compares to Bob the builder, the main character of a British 
children’s TV show. It has been shown that the transfer and implication 
of western institutions to non-western environments is, however, not as 
simple (Koddenbrock, 2016), precisely because of different 
understandings and social logics of the interveners and the intervened. I 
argue that this is no different for western media in a non-western 
country. 
 
4.2.1. Media history 
Judging from a western viewpoint, media is not in a good state in South 
Sudan. Freedom House (2017) assesses the country as ‘not free’. Reasons 
are security forces’ attacks on journalists and media houses; these 
harassments mostly occur when a journalist or media outlet comes 
under the suspicion of siding with the SPLM-IO or another so-called rebel 
group29. While the transitional constitution guarantees media freedom30, 
in reality the government has a firm grip on media. Oppression and 
intimidation by security forces have led non-government-owned radio 
stations to engage in self-censorship and exclude non-government 
viewpoints from their programmes. The informalisation of such radio 
stations is evident in this behaviour. While they are set up to strengthen 
democracy, they act in a fairly different way. The government-owned 
outlets SS-TV and SS-Radio openly act as a governmental mouthpiece. 
From the government’s viewpoint media is a means to communicate 
with the citizens; but it is a one-way communication. This is not a new 
development. The first newspaper in the Sudan, the Sudan Gazette, was 
established in 1899. It was a mouthpiece of the colonial government; as 
                                                        
29 SPLM-IO is the abbreviation for ‘SPLM in opposition’, the name Riek Machar’s splitter 
group gave itself. In publications, newspaper reports, and official statements the group 
is mostly coined ‘the rebels’. This seems, however, not a helpful label for the country’s 
situation. I hence use the group’s chosen name. 
30 “All levels of government shall guarantee the freedom of the press and other media 
as shall be regulated by law in a democratic society” (Transitional constitution South 
Sudan, 2011, No 24 (2). For an extract see Appendix 1.1, p.3. 
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were the subsequent newspapers31. The first radio station in southern 
Sudan was Radio Juba in 1961. The SPLM/A launched their radio station 
shortly after founding the movement in 1983. Radio SPLA was 
broadcasting from Ethiopia and it was “a useful propaganda tool 
intended to divert Khartoum’s misrepresentation of the movement as a 
southern movement rather than a national one” (Arop 2006, p.92). It also 
“filled the airwaves with politically charged commentaries, war songs 
and poems that depicted the heroism of the revolutionary army, the 
SPLA” (Arop 2006, p.103). Radio SPLA was used for recruitment 
campaigns, mobilisation, and political propaganda. With this history, it 
seems rather congruent that influential parts of the government and the 
SPLM/A still understand media as a governmental mouthpiece and not 
as a provider of independent information. It raises the issue of how the 
population understands today’s media. Can it reasonably be expected 
that media can function in the western sense in the newly built state?  
 
4.2.2 An independent media or institutional affiliations? 
A plethora of media houses exists in Juba, and the overview given here is 
by no means exhaustive. Juba is home to several newspapers, some 
published in English, others in Arabic, and also to a number of radio 
stations. The newspapers The Citizen, The Juba Monitor and The Juba 
Telegraph are the biggest English dailies. The Citizen and the Monitor 
were both published by veteran journalists, who have been working for 
foreign media houses before, and both have been around since before 
independence. Both have also been notably outspoken. In 2014, the Juba 
Telegraph was launched32. It is published under the theme of ‘Promoting 
Integrity and National Sovereignty’ and has links to the government; the 
president’s speaker Ateny Wek Ateny is the proprietor of the paper. 
                                                        
31 Throughout the 20th century, newspapers were either government-owned or under 
government control. In the South, vernacular newspapers were in circulation but due 
to a high rate of illiteracy and economic weakness they were not widespread (Wani 
2014, p. 7, 8). 
32 At the time of writing, the Citizen and the Monitor have been shut down by National 
Security Forces. The Telegraph’s editor-in-chief has been removed from his post. 
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‘Direct links’ are, however, denied by others in government (Machol 
2014, Radio Tamazuij 2014). This quarrel, if the newspaper is to be 
understood as tied to the government, shows that the concept of 
‘independent press’ is either not clear defined in South Sudanese 
understanding or it is differently defined. This is no wonder, given the 
already mentioned history of media in the country. The newly-
established media outlets as part of media development and 
democratisation campaigns are not truly independent either – or they 
are independent if independence from the state and government is seen 
as the only necessary feature of a free press. 
 
When categorising media systems one classically looks at ‘Four Theories 
of the Press’ (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm 1963). Media systems are 
classified as soviet, authoritarian, libertarian or social responsible, with 
the latter two roughly similar to the private/commercial and public 
broadcast model. In South Sudan, media is state-owned and privately 
owned; stations and newspapers are financed and run by the church and 
the United Nations, and supported by foreign governments (see table 5). 
Media is used to promote agendas and distribute messages. This is not 
alone done by the government; iNGOs and the international community 
use media the same way. This is clearly visible when looking at the media 
houses in Juba. The biggest and only nationwide broadcast, the UN-run 
Radio Miraya33, states as its mission: 
 
Through the broadcast of fair, balanced and accurate news and 
information, Radio Miraya supports UNMISS’ mandate by 
promoting citizen participation in the political process and 
giving a voice to marginalised groups. Through its variety of 
programming, it creates a platform for debate and dialogue 
                                                        
33 Miraya is “owned and run by the United Nation’s Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)” 
(Radio Miraya Facebook-page, no date). See Appendix 1.3, p.6. It was started in 
Khartoum in 2005 as part of the United Nation Mission in Sudan; its aim then was to 
support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended 
the civil war in the country. With the South’s independence in 2011 and the creation of 
UNMISS, the operation was relocated to Juba. 
88 
 
about the peaceful development of the world’s newest nation. 
(Radio Miraya Facebook page, no date) 
 
Internally, it is understood that Miraya’s broadcasting needs to be in line 
with the UNMISS public relations department, supporting UNMISS’ view. 
Dependency and links to an institution, be it a government or an 
international organisation, are not features of an independent media. 
Miraya is not independent but has an institutional affiliation. The same 
can be said about other iNGO-run or donor-funded media. Eyeradio is 
run by the iNGO Internews, whose mission is “to empower local media 
worldwide to give people the news and information they need, the ability 
to connect and the means to make their voices heard” (Internews 
2015b). Through Internews and USAID it is financed by the US-
government. The same is true for VoA, the Voice of America in South 
Sudan, whose parent, the Voice of America, has blatantly been named a 
propaganda tool (Uttaro 1982). These connections34 must necessarily 
weaken the international community’s attempts to convince the South 
Sudanese government of the desirability of a free and independent press. 
They also blur the definition of an ‘independent press’. The question 
arising from this is whether the South Sudanese understand media 
houses run or financed by iNGOs, foreign governments, and international 
institutions such as the UN differently than media run by the government 
of South Sudan.  
 
4.2.3 Different understandings of media 
One reaches Juba University coming from University Road. In the center 
of the yard is a clock tower whose hands are pointing constantly at five 
to nine. I park in the shade of a huge tree. Students are sitting on wooden 
                                                        
34 Another example is the fortnightly published paper New Nation, written by a small 
team of South Sudanese journalists in Juba, but supervised and overseen by a Belgian 
journalist and activist, who, as I was told when visiting the New Nation’s compound, was 
based in Kenya. The imprint of The New Nation can be found in Appendix 1.3, p.7. The 
paper was partly financed by the Belgium government. In addition, the paper runs a 




or iron benches, chatting, watching me while I make my way to the 
Center for Peace and Development Studies. This is a three-storey 
building, and I climb irregular stairs to my classroom on the first floor. 
There is no glass in the windows, but a fan on the ceiling. Power is 
switched on at 09.00 in the morning. I have a blackboard and two pieces 
of chalk. The class consists of 17 students. The university moved back to 
Juba after independence in 2011, and the first graduation ceremony was 
held in April 2015. Academics in full regalia led the parade of capped and 
gowned students through Juba’s streets (Figure 6). This first graduation 




Figure 6: Graduation ceremony in Juba, April 2015 (personal stock) 
 
The university and its student body are struggling with problems typical 
for the new country. Electricity supply is limited, classrooms are scarcely 
furnished, and there are not enough teachers. The library is not well-
equipped and printing material is costly. That a student takes six years 
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or more to graduate is not considered odd; it is rather normal. The 
students suffer from the lack of public transport; reaching the university 
in time for lectures is hard, especially during the rainy season when the 
seasonal rains convert the city’s streets into impassable mud holes. 
Reading and learning after hours is impossible, as hardly anyone has 
electricity at home. 
 
Despite – or maybe because of – these problems, students are engaging 
with the coursework on a high level. In my syllabus, I described the 
course aims: 
 
Media is deeply embedded in the social fabric and the politics of 
a society, all the more so once we turn away from looking only 
at the content a media outlet produces and investigate also 
questions of management, regulations and economy. This 
course thus borders on different areas of scholarship, it draws 
on political science, economy and sociology. Throughout the 
course you should formulate and justify your own ideas about 
why media is set up and regulated in the one or the other way 
in a given country. 
 
The course consisted of student discussions, group work, and 
presentations. It was assessed with an essay and an exam. All these 
elements were used to gain an understanding of students’ understanding 
of media and media’s role in a society. Some common themes arose early 
in the course. Discussing classifications and features of different forms of 
government, all students stated that South Sudan shows the features of 
authoritarianism. This, students said, was evident in the existence of the 
government-owned media SS-TV, in the harassment of journalists and in 
the threats against media houses. A remarkable number of students, 
however, noted that this behaviour was, if not justified, understandable. 
The media, they said, foremost Eyeradio and Miraya, were criticising the 
government’s actions unjustly and harshly and the government only 
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reacted to the media’s hostility. Asked if this was a perceived or an 
actually present hostility, they said it was an actual hostility.  
 
I heard the same from my chess partners. There is an understanding that 
“journalists fulfil an important part in helping the society prosper, but 
they need to do it with the government, not against it”, as one student 
said in class. The idea of a media acting as a watchdog was mostly 
rejected by the students but for contradicting reasons. Some felt 
uncomfortable with the idea of media, especially ‘foreign’ media, 
criticising the government. Others stated that media cannot fulfil this 
role because, “the government is too powerful and the media is not 
powerful enough”. When asked what a powerful media would be or how 
powerful the media would need to be, students specified that journalists 
were not sufficiently educated to criticise the government. This was the 
starting point for an especially heated discussion. Part of the class 
rejected point-blank that journalists in general lacked training and 
education. In their view, journalists were underpaid, and furthermore, 
media houses employed too many people that were not properly trained. 
This is of course contradictory. It seemed that these students wanted to 
keep blame away from individual journalists and put it instead on the 
media houses. The other group acknowledged the lack of trained, 
professional journalists; they blamed short-term trainings done by 
iNGOs and the lack of a long-term, accredited training, preferably done 
at the university. Notably, this group wished for international money but 
for national trainers. They did not want international trainers.  
 
Probing deeper into the idea of ‘independent media’, it was confirmed 
that there is a different understanding in South Sudan. In the western 
model, media’s independence from government is of prime importance 
because of its role as a watchdog, “the news media should serve 
democracy by providing a check and balance on powerful sectors of 
society, including leaders within the public and private domains” (Norris 
and Odugbemi 2010, p.16). A media that is not independent of those it is 
92 
 
supposed to check on cannot fulfil its role. Independence is connected to 
how media is funded. The USA is a strong supporter of a commercial 
system while the Nordic European countries, including Germany, finance 
media through a public fee (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). The differences 
are not clear in South Sudan. In their exams, students stated that public 
broadcast is financed through public fees, taxes, or directly by the 
government. In discussions on the topic it was repeatedly pointed out 
that public fees are not a possibility in South Sudan due to the weak 
economy and the high number of unemployed people. During a 
workshop and student presentations under the heading ‘Which media 
system for South Sudan’, the United Nations, other donors, and also the 
South Sudanese government were repeatedly named as sources of 
funding. Media’s independence from the government was not high in 
demand with my students, and they understood the government as a 
legitimate source of news. Only two of 17 students named ‘independence 
from government’ or ‘financed through a public fee’ in their exams when 
answering the question on what the features of the public system are. Six 
students mentioned ‘government control’ as a feature of this system. 
 
Another topic that emerged repeatedly in discussions was the question 
of press freedom. In a way, this was connected to the discussions of 
media independence. Students seemed to understand independence to 
mean an unregulated press that can publish and broadcast whatever 
they like with no fact check or regulation in place. In my class, this was a 
highly unpopular idea. To investigate this further, one of the essay 
questions for the end-of-term-paper35 was on press freedom. It read: 
                                                        
35 The four essay questions were: 
1. How is ‘press freedom’ understood in the public, the commercial and the 
state-owned systems? In which system do you think the press enjoys the 
most freedom 
2. Can media help a society prosper? Which system is best suited for this? 
3. How does social media change the classic model of public, commercial, and 
state-controlled media? Is social media good for democracy? 
4. Why are ‘press freedom’ and ‘freedom of expression’ important parts of a 
modern state? Why do governments agree to those principles? 
Four of my students choose the first topic, five the second, two the third, and four wrote 
on the last topic. Two did not hand in. 
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‘How is ‘press freedom’ understood in the public, the commercial, and 
the state-owned systems? In which system do you think the press enjoys 
the most freedom?’ Four of my students wrote their essay on this topic. 
All phrased the fear that press freedom, if unregulated, does more harm 
than good, although to different extents. One called explicitly for the 
government to control and regulate the press, while at the same time 
stating that the press should also regulate itself. A need for self-
regulation was also mentioned in another essay, but the point was also 
made that self-regulation does not necessarily work. Another student 
presented a list of what press freedom is not, mentioning that it is not the 
freedom to insult someone or to act badly against other people in the 
country, thus explicitly rejecting hate speech. This student also 
mentioned that government should not interfere with the press and limit 
press freedom, “unless the public interest is better served by 
interference”. All essays on this question ask for certain control of the 
press. This did not come as a surprise, as it reflected opinions phrased in 
class discussions.  
 
In the essays on the related question why press freedom is an important 
part of a modern state and why governments agree to the principle, 
students stated the need for a partnership with the government. All 
essays on this question agreed that freedom of the press and of 
expression is important for economic and social progress. It was said that 
governments need to know what people think and that “it is through 
media that government can correct its work for the well future of the 
citizens and development as a whole”. One essay called for sanitisation 
of the media landscape and highlighted the need to control the media. It 
was written that sanitisation – removal of sensitive information before 
publication – would ensure the stability of democracy. Overall, the essays 
showed a distinctive and notable fear of the media’s power, if unchecked. 
This is all the more remarkable as these were students in the Department 
of Mass Communication, of which quite a few had expressed the wish to 
work as journalists.  
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4.2.4 Access to media 
The teaching spell at Juba University provided the possibility to 
investigate students’ understanding of the media. However, a pressing 
question in the context of this thesis was how much access people have 
in everyday life to it. To have any effect, media needs an audience. The 
experience of living in the country had given rise to the suspicion that 
there might be less access to media than stated in surveys conducted by 
iNGOs. This suspicion was to an extent strengthened by the unavailing 
search for evidence stated in the academic literature (Schoemaker and 
Stremlau 2014; Stremlau, 2014) but by observations in Juba. Every 
morning, I pass by a shoemaker. Sitting behind a small desk with drawers 
that contain soles, leftovers from old shoes, needles and yarns he waits 
for customers. His stall is overshadowed by a tree, and he has a radio tied 
to one of the legs of his desk. This I took as confirmation of the 
importance of radio in South Sudan. When I passed by, I heard him 
sometimes sing along to some song on the radio36. When finally I asked 
him what radio programme he was listening to, it turned out that he 
switched the radio on very rarely because of battery costs. He kept the 
radio tied to the stall for safekeeping; he feared it might be stolen from 
the small hut he was living in. When he switched it on, he searched only 
for music, and he changed stations when the news came on. ‘I do not want 
to waste battery life’, he said. 
 
There is a problem with access to electricity and access to radio is thus 
limited. Electricity is a luxury in South Sudan. There is no city power in 
Juba. It is the comfortable apartments and guest houses for international 
expats, the luxurious mansions of members of the government, the 
governmental buildings and expensive hotels, serving the expats and the 
                                                        
36 One encounters music often in Juba. Hardly any taxi drives without blaring music, be 
it one of the ‘Yellow Taxis’, a company vetted by the UN and declared secure by most 
embassies and iNGOs, or a local car. This certainly means that music is popular, but the 
same does not necessarily hold true for media. In fact, I never heard news or another 
produced radio programme while sitting in a taxi; it was always just music. When I 
asked my drivers, the usual answered that it was not radio we listened to but music 
loaded on an USB-stick. 
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country’s elite that possess generators and have the means to acquire 
fuel to have them in use. Even that is not a given: In my time in Juba 
electricity was limited several times to the early mornings and the 
evenings, due to a fuel shortage that made buying fuel not only overly 
expensive but at one point impossible. At the university, my class started 
at 08.00 in the morning. Like in most public buildings, electricity was 
only switched on at 09.00. The first hour of my lecture took place without 
electricity. As the classroom’s only electric appliance was a ceiling fan 
that did not matter to me. The students, however, always plugged in their 
phones for charging the minute they entered the classroom, eagerly 
waiting for the moment the generators were switched on. They also 
complained regularly about the problems of studying, foremost because 
of the lack of light in their homes. They could not read or study in the 
evenings, and so the working day ended with sunset. Solar lamps are 
sometimes sold in Juba but they were dismissed as too expensive. It is 
not only students who have this problem. Figure 7 below shows a typical 
suburb of Juba at dusk and no trace of electricity can be spotted. An 
acquaintance of mine, who has a rather stable and relatively well-paid 
job as an administrative worker with an iNGO, showed me his apartment. 
It consisted of one room; shower, toilet and a place to cook were outside 
in the yard and shared among six households. The costs for the 
apartment were SSP75037 without electricity. He could have rented the 
apartment to include three hours electricity per day, but this would have 
cost SSP1200, a sum too expensive for most South Sudanese, including 
my friend despite his good position. 
 
There are of course high-earning South Sudanese who do own 
generators. Among these is another acquaintance of mine, who works for 
an international company as a local senior manager. He also owns land 
                                                        
37 In 2014/2015 the official exchange rate for South Sudanese Pounds to the US-Dollar 
was fixed at 2.96 SSP for one US-Dollar. The black market rate, however, was around 5 
SSP in November 2014 and approximately 15 SSP for one US-Dollar in August 2015. In 
December 2015 the Sudan Tribune (2015) reported that the government gave the fixed 
official rate up. Following this move, KCB, the Kenyan Commercial Bank, set the 
exchange rate to 20:1. 
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and earns rent. The compound, where the family – he, his wife, and three 
children – lives, consists of three shanties: a combined living room and 
bed chamber for the couple, another contains the room for the children, 
and one entails the kitchen with a large fireplace for cooking, some 
shelves and a chests of drawers, and space for two large washing pans 
that are filled at a water point outside the compound. 
 
 
Figure 7: Suburb of Juba (Personal stock) 
 
The family does own a generator, and electricity is used for light and a 
boom box when they have guests, and, if necessary, for the freezer. The 
freezer, however, is rarely in use; usually a big block of ice is bought at 
an ice shop, and drinks are chilled with the ice in a big bowl. Sometimes 
the family uses electricity for entertainment purposes; during one of my 
visits, the wife and children were watching ‘Tomb Raider’, the 2001 
movie starring Angelina Jolie as Lara Croft, on DVD. 
 
It is rather striking that this relatively well-off family does own a TV set 
and a DVD-player, but not a radio. A common belief in iNGOs and the 
international community is that people listen to the radio on their 
mobiles. This would be possible, but it would also come with costs, as 
mobile batteries need to be charged on a regular basis. This can be done 
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in corner shops, at costs of 2SSP per battery. While this seems little 
enough, if done on a daily basis it would add up. Experiencing everyday 
life in South Sudan raises the question of what effect media can have on 
a population that can barely listen to it. Madut Jok (2015) made the 
statement that the main source of information for the South Sudanese is 
gossip. This statement, made by the director of a major South Sudanese 
think tank, is probably not or not solely pointing to a corresponding 
inclination of the South Sudanese but to the severe problems that hinder 
the dissemination of information; gossip is what remains. 
 
4.2.5 Summary 
This section has reviewed how media is understood in Juba and if there 
are differences to the western ideas of a media. Indeed, there are. First, 
the government understands media as a mouthpiece. This is evident in 
the behaviour and broadcasting of the government-owned outlet SS-
TV/Radio, in the oppression of other media houses, and it is supported 
by South Sudanese history. Media stations established by the colonial 
powers and by the Sudan government were basically propaganda 
stations. The same holds true for Radio SPLA during the second civil war. 
In the citizenry, there seems to be confusion about the idea of press 
independence. This confusion is fuelled by the fact that media houses like 
the UN-Radio Miraya are themselves not independent but set a 
precedent for state-supported media. For the South Sudanese audience, 
however, this does not seem to present a problem. In discussions with 
students at Juba University three main topics emerged. Students 
described the harsh line the government took towards the media as to an 
extent understandable, as radio stations, foremost Miraya and Eyeradio, 
were described as being hostile towards the government. Questions of 
journalists’ education were raised and it was said that journalists needed 
to work with the government, not against it. In connection to this an 
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explicit need to control and regulate media was stated38. Lastly, I 
examined how much access people in South Sudan really have to the 
media, and the answer is: maybe less than previously thought. 
Observations in everyday life identify the lack of electricity as the main 
problem. 
4.3 The state 
 
In Juba, two faces are ever present. John Garang de Mabior, deceased 
leader of the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement (SPLM), first 
president of southern Sudan39 and father of the South’s independence; 
and today’s President Salva Kiir Mayardit, vice president under Garang 
until the latter’s death in a helicopter crash in July 2005, and then his 
successor. Portraits of both can be found in every office, every company, 
and in most shops. As a general rule, if there is a wall there are framed 
pictures of Garang and Kiir; Garang smiling friendly, Kiir wearing his ever 
present cowboy hat (Figure 8).  
 
The omnipresence of the portraits shows not only the importance of the 
two leaders, it also indicates how they are perceived in society. President 
Salva Kiir has not just been voted into an office that he can lose on the 
peoples’ will. Instead, the president enjoys the position of a patriarchal 
father figure. This status is evident in the plethora of portraits, but also 
in the congratulation advertisements placed by companies in 
newspapers. 
                                                        
38 Fear of media was also voiced by governmental officials and civil society-members 
in Bor, the capital of Jonglei, when I was working there in 2013 as project coordinator 
for the UNDP-commissioned Jonglei state radio. Stakeholders were directly referencing 
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda; and they were phrasing the fear how the new (planned) 
radio could be controlled to ensure that something like this would not happen in South 
Sudan. This took place before the events of December 2013. The fear that media can be 
abused or would not report properly and thus incite mistrust and conflict between 
groups is strong in South Sudan. 
39 In this thesis, I refer to the country as ‘Southern Sudan’ before independence, and as 





Figure 8: Congratulation advertisement on Independence Day 2015, Speed Insurance 
 
The example above (Figure 8) shows a newspaper advertisement by 
Speed Insurance, an insurance company active in South Sudan. It 
includes a picture of the president, with the cowboy hat, a distinctive 
mark. Few pictures of the president without it exist. The insurance 
company is congratulating ‘His Excellence Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit’ on 
Independence Day. Publication of such congratulation notes spikes 
around the 9th July40; but they are also placed for appointments or 
promotions of managers or senior army officers, and for inaugurations 
of new premises. Strikingly, congratulations are not, or only as an 
afterthought, addressed to the people of South Sudan - it is the president 
who is complimented, showing his importance as a patriarchal leader. 
 
                                                        
40 See Appendix 1.4, pp.14-17 
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This is a first sign of that the state, and most notably leadership, might be 
differently understood in South Sudan. Leaders in the stable democracies 
of the West are still subject to the peoples' will, and they are not above 
the law. In South Sudan this seems different.   
 
4.3.1 The wish for respect and being left alone 
I make most of my South Sudanese connections at a little shop around 
the corner from my apartment in Juba. This shop is typical for Juba. It 
offers bread, milk, detergents and toilet paper, beer and soft drinks, and 
phone-charging. A tea lady sits in the shade, ready to make tea or coffee. 
When fuel is scarce, young boys sell petrol in plastic bottles. Young men 
sit on their motorbikes in front of the shop, waiting for customers. These 
are Boda-Boda drivers, the South Sudanese equivalent of a taxi. Bodas 
are the regular transport in Juba. There are few buses and some Rikshas 
(Figure 9). Besides these options, one has feet. They are such a normal 
mode of transportation that 'footing' in South Sudan is a regular verb, 
meaning 'walking'. In the afternoon, men hang out at the local corner 
shop, drinking tea and playing chess. Every time I pass by I buy a soft 
drink or order a coffee. I am first treated with professional politeness, 
then there is a recognising friendly nod, and in time the nod comes with 
small talk. Eventually, I am invited to a game of chess. I last only half an 
hour, before I have to put my king on the board and declare defeat. This 
must have been a dull game for my partner, but nevertheless, revenge is 
offered. The games quickly become regular instalments; at least once or 






Figure 9: Riksha in Juba (personal stock) 
 
The wish, my South Sudanese chess partners phrased first when I asked 
what they expect from their leaders, is 'respect': people want the 
government to respect them. This does not mean special treatment, my 
chess partner explains, it means that one should be left alone. Most of the 
regulars here are employed. They pay 10% taxes on their salaries above 
300SSP, and they feel that with paying taxes they have bought the right 
to be left alone. They do not understand the state as a provider but as a 
racketeer: One pays taxes in order to be left in peace. This is opposed to 
the idea that it is through the payment of taxes that people develop the 
wish to hold states accountable (Brautigam 2008, Moore 2008). Here 
taxes are seen as a ransom. “The government can kill and torture you”, I 
am told, but when one pays taxes, one should be free from this threat.  
 
The difference to the literature might be explained by the fact that South 
Sudan is still a young state and in the early stages of its statebuilding 
project. Also, it can be assumed that the men here are reacting to what 
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they experience from the forces of the state, notably the security forces, 
on a daily basis. Quite regularly traffic police stop and search cars 
without reason. The checks usually end with a fine for often made-up 
offences and of course there is no receipt. Furthermore, in traffic, the 
government and the population are subject to different rules. When 
driving to a meeting in my nondescript car a traffic-jam blocked the 
opposite lane, while ours was relatively free. All of a sudden an SUV with 
tinted windows broke free on the blocked lane. Just a few metres before 
us it changed sides and drove with high speed in the wrong direction, 
coming towards us. My driver reacted with surprising speed; without 
further ado he drove onto the sidewalk – which was thankfully free of 
pedestrians. When the SUV had passed, my driver simply drove back 
onto the street. He shrugged and said, “Someone from the government.” 
If we would have hit someone on the sidewalk or would have crashed 
with the SUV, he said, we would have been blamed. “It is the 
government”, he said, “of course it would have been our fault.” 
 
Smirl (2015) shows how the environment influences how humanitarian 
aid workers understand the situation and how this influences the 
perception of the field at the headquarters of an organisation. She argues 
that the space of humanitarian aid workers has an effect on how the 
beneficiaries are seen and consequently on the provision of aid. 
Something similar can be said about the way a government interacts with 
its people. The distinction between the government and the population 
in Juba does not only show in the behaviour of the government or of 
security forces in traffic and public life. Quite literally there exists a city 
for the population and one for the government. Most roads in Juba are 
not asphalted, and if they are, one has to take care of the huge holes in 
the asphalt. Exceptions are Ministry Road and the streets in the 
presidential district, which are well-maintained, as are the ministries and 
buildings of the government. There are generators and air condition or 
at least fans. A guard of honour stands in front of the president’s palace. 
This – the guard of honour and the entrance - is as much as the normal 
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South Sudanese sees from this building. Compared to the average South 
Sudanese’s housing it resembles a fairy-tale castle. The same holds true 
for the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, the Headquarter of the SPLM, 
and other government buildings. The common South Sudanese is not 
allowed in there. While this is the same for governmental buildings in the 
West, the difference of luxury and security equipment is more noticeable 
in South Sudan. The governmental space is a very real symbol of the 
distinction between the government and the people. My South Sudanese 
acquaintances do not think about entering these buildings – quite the 
opposite, one stays away. While on my way through Juba I once noticed 
that my driver chose a longer way. Asked why, he said he wanted to avoid 
the presidential buildings, as the guards had recently opened fire on a 
civilian car. There is a drastic and noticeable difference between the 
political class and the population, and encounters are more often 
unpleasant than not. I experienced this when I took a picture of a 
billboard in Ministry Road. This led to a heated discussion with armed 
security guards, including the threat of involving national security and a 
fine of SSP200. It is this behaviour of the state forces that make up the 
everyday life experience of the common citizen. Based on such 
experiences one of my chess partners shrugged. ‘We fought for 
independence. They buy big cars’. 
 
4.3.2 A non-providing government 
In western thinking, the state is a provider of public goods, such as 
defence, welfare, education, and health care. This is financed through 
mandatory taxes, which is why citizens are thought to have an interest in 
holding governments accountable (Brautigam 2008, Moore 2008). While 
“governments as a whole or individual government agencies (…) are in a 
position to select the quantity and type of services they provide based 
mostly on their own preferences and objectives” (Bernauer and Koubi 
2006, p.3), a minimum standard of provision is thought to be expected. 
An example would be the provision of education, which is crucial for 
future well-being on an individual as well as on societal level. South 
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Sudan is a country with a high illiteracy rate. Despite the efforts of the 
international community, this problem will almost certainly grow in the 
future. Education comes with high costs and the population is 
overwhelmingly poor. School fees have to be paid, with some schools 
charging more than others, thus implementing a selection mechanism for 
future education and professional success early in life. Furthermore, 
there are costs for transport, books, stationery, and school uniforms. In a 
severely poor country, these costs are too high for many South Sudanese, 
and many parents are consequently not sending their children to school. 
When told this, I point out that school should be both, mandatory and 
free. “But who should pay for it, then?” asks my chess partner. And after 
a minute of pondering silence he asks, “The government?” And his tone 
of voice adds that this is a very confusing idea. 
 
Judging from this reaction, the idea that the state would provide public 
services is alien in South Sudan. This refusal to provide basic services has 
three interconnected consequences. First, the obstacles to education 
effectively hinder the social and economic progression of the country. 
South Sudan has experience with the consequences of such 
abandonment. Part of the reason for the underdevelopment of the South 
pre-independence, for the discontent of the Southerners and 
consequently a cause for the outbreak of civil war, was the lack of 
education (Johnson 2011). Second, social welfare not only keeps a 
population healthy and enables social progress, but it is part of a social 
contract and creates group feeling and sense of belonging. In South 
Sudan, the state is not creating this and thus a national sense of 
community can hardly develop. Third, the fact that most basic provisions 
in the country are provided by either iNGOs or UN-agencies releases the 
state from its core tasks. Christie (2013) named this one of the dangers 
of high donor and NGO involvement in developing countries. This adds 
to a legitimacy problem: how can the state be seen as legitimate when 
external agencies fulfil its tasks (Bliesemann de Guevara and Kuehn, 
2013)? This non-involvement of the state confirms the population’s 
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belief that it is at best something distant, at worst a racketeer and 
predator. Where the provision of public goods is not done by the state 
the population will not understand the provision of public goods as a 
right. For media, this effectively removes the basis for the watchdog-idea. 
If a government is not expected to provide public services, a watchdog 
has no role. The idea behind the watchdog is that information about the 
performance of the government gives the citizens the basis to make an 
educated decision in the upcoming election. Non-performing 
governments would be voted out of offices. In South Sudan, this 
mechanism cannot work as the government is not expected to perform. 
 
4.3.2 Elections 
There is, furthermore, a practical problem with the idea of voting a 
government out of office based on non-performance. In South Sudan, the 
chance to do this is missing as there have been no elections. The current 
government was voted in in 2010, when southern Sudan was still a part 
of the Sudan. Following independence in 2011 and according to the 
transitional constitution (Government of South Sudan 2011), general 
elections should have taken place on 30th June 2015 (National Elections 
Act 2012). In 2014, President Kiir announced the delay of the 2015 
general elections on grounds of the instability in the country (BBC 2014; 
Sudan Tribune 2014). A year later, with the date for the general elections 
fast approaching, Luca Biong Deng wrote in an opinion piece for the 
Sudan Tribune that “the Minister of Information (…) announced on 13th 
February that the cabinet has decided to call off the elections and extend 
the lifespan of the elected positions so as to give peace a chance.” (Biong 
Deng 2015). Shortly thereafter, William Sunday D. Tor wrote in the 
newspaper The Citizen that, “the 270 members of parliament present 
voted on Tuesday to amend the country’s transitional 2011 constitution 
to extend the presidential and parliamentary term until July, 9, 2018, 
with 264 members in favour and a handful opposing it” (Tor 2015)41. 
                                                        




The legality of this delay is unclear. The National Elections Act (2012) 
makes no provision for postponement of the general election, but it does 
mention “Postponement of the Elections of the President and or the 
Governor” (ibid, §57, p.26). According to this, 
 
The Commission may postpone elections of the president or 
governor of a state by notice to that effect, if it becomes 
impossible to conduct the election (…) provided that the 
Commission shall fix a new date for elections, as soon as 
possible, which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the 
original date established for such elections. (§57 (1), p.26) 
 
Biong Deng (2015) states that neither the president nor the cabinet has 
the constitutional power to delay the general election. Instead, no 
constitutional provision exists that explicitly forbids the president to 
amend provisions concerning its tenure. The elections are thus 
technically not postponed, rather, the tenure of the president and the 
parliament is extended. Given the long timespan between the president’s 
announcement in May 2014, the Minister of Information’s statement in 
February 2015, and the parliament’s vote in March 2015, it seems 
unclear to what extent this delay in the disguise of extension of tenure is 
owed to the situation in the country. The question can be raised if a 
government, which was not able to improve the situation within a year, 
would have been confirmed in general elections. The extension of tenure 
might have been made more out of self-interest than for the good of the 
country. Comments in informal chats on the topic ranked consequently 
from ‘A disaster’ to ‘A good decision’. The latter was always said on 
grounds of the ongoing fighting in the country and the rapidly 
deteriorating economy. There was the general question of whether 
another government could improve the situation, and there was also the 
fear that the current government would in the case of a defeat not go 
quietly. In light of this, it is questionable whether the population would 
remove the government given the chance. This connects to the 
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description of the government as patriarchal. Leadership in the context 
of South Sudan is neither limited to a certain period nor dependent on 
achievement and the idea of accountability is not very prominent in 
South Sudan. This seems to hold true for the leadership as well as for the 
population. “The leaders”, I am told, “are so used to being chiefs in African 
societies, the idea of transparency and accountability is alien to them.” 
The lack of transparency and accountability in the SPLM was frankly 
admitted at a public lecture organised by the Sudd Institute42. Dr Anne 
Itto, at this time acting secretary-general of the SPLM43, stated that the 
SPLM is in the transition from a rebel movement to political party, and 
that there are issues the SPLM better deals with behind closed doors. 
 
All this is reminiscent of the ‘Big Men Syndrome’ (Blackings 2014), a 
system of governance based on corruption and clientelism. The Big Men 
Syndrome comes with the belief that exploitation is a right of the political 
leader. Still, it is enabled by an undemanding population. Asked if they 
could vote the government out of office, my chess partner looks at me as 
if I am deranged. “The president is God”, he says. “You cannot vote God 
out of office.” The question alone makes him nervous (so much so, that 
for the first time ever I can sack his queen). “Can you criticise God? Or the 
president?” I ask. The answer is a very hesitant yes. One can, he says, but 
one cannot do so openly, open critique is a taboo. One can criticise the 
leader in private but not in public. The president is the boss, he needs to 
make things right. It is one’s duty as a citizen to treat the president with 
respect. “And what”, I ask, “would happen in case there would be an 
election and you would vote the government out of office?” 
‘”There are a lot of woulds”, he says. 
“True, but what if?” 
                                                        
42 The Sudd institute is South Sudan's most important think tank. More information can 
be found at: http://www.suddinstitute.org/ 
43 Dr Anne Itto became deputy secretary general of the SPLM when Pagan Amum 
returned to the post of secretary general in 2015. Amum had been sacked from his 
position in July 2013, when President Kiir also dismissed his Vice President Riek 




They would not accept, he finally says. They would just not leave. “Which 
is why it is better to give them a chance to make things right. Otherwise 
there would be more fighting, like in December 2013”. 
 
4.3.3 A different sense of accountability 
Still, a set of rules exists in South Sudan that does bind leaders. I am told 
that, “The president can hardly visit the area where he is from, because 
everyone expects him to provide a job”. In South Sudanese society, the 
patriarch provides for the family, but the family has a right to this 
provision. One of my chess partners told me repeatedly that he sent his 
wife to visit her sister. This always happened when his nephews came to 
Juba. Asked why he felt the need to send his wife away when his nephews 
were in town he explained that when a family member requests 
accommodation, one cannot refuse. My chess partner lives in a small 
apartment; he does not earn enough to afford the visits of his nephews. 
As he cannot reject his relatives his strategy is to make his place 
inconvenient. He achieves this by sending his wife away, which means 
that his nephews would need to cook and clean for themselves. Faced 
with this, the nephews decide to visit another relative. This system of 
provision works not only on the family-level. Still, there is a need for a 
direct link, a family, tribal or neighbourly connection. 
 
4.3.4 Summary 
Leadership in South Sudan is understood differently than in the West. 
The national government is not seen as a provider; it is a racketeer. 
However, leaders who are bound through family, tribe, or 
neighbourhood have an obligation to provide, but only on the small scale 
of kinship. A sense of public duties is not present, neither in the 
leadership nor in the citizenry, and this calls the idea of legitimacy 
created through the provision of public goods into question. This 
confirms McLoughlin’s (2015) statement that the legitimacy of a leader 
is a culturally grounded and not a universal valid exercise. Thus, the idea 
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of media as a watchdog is stripped of its foundation. People do not vote 
for or against a government on the basis of delivery. Furthermore, 
criticism is understood as a taboo. It is believed that a vote against the 
government and its defeat at the ballot box would not lead to a peaceful 
change of power, but instead to more fighting.  
4.4 Groups  
 
One of the aims of media in a country of intervention is to improve 
relationships and thus contribute to peace (Lynch and McGoldrick 2007; 
Orme 2010; Staub 2010). By providing objective and neutral 
information, media is thought to improve transparency and 
accountability thus increasing trust in state institutions (Kumar 2006). 
In this last part of the chapter, I investigate whether media fulfils this role 
in South Sudan. In the previous part, I provided insights into how the 
South Sudanese citizens see their government; this is not a trusting 
relationship but a rather mistrusting one. Governments are 
representative of the states they are leading. In a country with no 
experience of bureaucratic rule and state institutions, leadership equals 
the ‘the state’.  Drawing on Rokkan’s (1999 p. 261) model of 
plebiscitarian and corporate interests, Bliesemann de Guevara and 
Kuehn (2013 p. 220) point out that in an active statebuilding process 
three sets of actors with different self-interests exist: the population (the 
plebiscitarian interests), the corporate (local elites), and the intervention 
actors. In understanding the government, the citizens, and the 
international actors as groups and employing a social psychological 
perspective, I now provide further insights into the relationships 
between state/government and citizens, into the relationship between 
tribal groups in the country, and, finally, in the relationship between the 




 4.4.1 Citizens’ relationship with the government 
In South Sudan, the citizens have only marginal expectations towards 
their government.  Some explanations are the behaviour of the 
government and the way it presents itself, apparent in the houses they 
reside in and the cars they drive. This bunkerization of the local elites in 
countries of the global South is not a new phenomenon (Fisher 2017). It 
is all the more likely that the population is used to understanding the 
state and its leadership as something remote and rather threatening. 
This is also apparent in the country’s younger history. A prominent 
narrative surrounds the foundation of South Sudan: that the SPLM/A was 
a popular rebel movement, supported by the southern population who 
wanted to gain freedom from the predatory government in Khartoum. 
The second edition of a history book on South Sudan, primarily intended 
as a textbook for secondary schools and commissioned by the Ministry 
of Education and the Government of South Sudan, states: 
 
From 1983 to 1987 children, farmers and herders rushed to the 
SPLA’s recruitment camps where they got military training. 
Almost no one was turned down, and the result was a large 
number of child soldiers. Training was rigorous. (…) 
Nevertheless, most of the volunteers persevered till the end of 
the training sessions when they were deployed. (Breidlid (ed) 
2014 p. 286) 
 
Not everyone remembers a rush of volunteers, eager to fight for freedom. 
A young man from a village in Central Equatoria revealed to me how he 
was hidden by his mother and aunts every time SPLA-soldiers came into 
his village: 
 
They did steal everything, food and water. They just took what 
they wanted. I was 11 years old. When they found you, they 
asked you to put your arm over your head. If you could touch 
your shoulder, they declared you old enough and took you to the 
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training camps. Eventually my family arranged for me to flee to 
Uganda.44 
 
The southern population suffered especially after 1991, when the 
SPLM/A lost the support of the Ethiopian government. In consequence, 
it relied on the population for food and shelter, and this was mostly not 
given voluntarily. The South is a severely underdeveloped and poor 
country, and its population rarely had the resources to feed a hungry 
rebel movement. In the same year, probably the most severe split in the 
movement occurred. Riek Machar and Lam Akol accused John Garang of 
authoritarianism and human right violations and tried to overthrow him 
(Arop 2006; Johnson 2011). The consequence was the split into the 
Nasir- and the Torit-fraction, so named after the locations of their 
headquarters. Fighting between the two fractions led to huge loss of 
civilian life and to further fractionalisation of the movement45.  
 
The Southerners’ experience with a national, centralised government 
prior to independence was downright devastating. The government in 
Khartoum was exploitative. Furthermore, the history of the SPLM/A is a 
history of internal splits and bitter animosities, of human right violations, 
killing of civilians and forced recruitment (Collins 2008; Johnson 2011; 
LeRiche and Arnold 2012). The government of South Sudan tries to 
rewrite this history by publishing textbooks like the one cited above and 
by exhibiting huge billboards that glorify the country’s history (Figure 
                                                        
44 This measurement of age, the ability to touch the shoulder by reaching over the head, 
was mentioned a couple of times when I was in South Sudan. I cannot do this, and I have 
never met a European who can. South Sudanese, however, are usually very tall people 
with long limbs. 
45 The split was not healed before 2002 when Garang reconciled with Riek Machar. A 
year later, he settled the dispute with Lam Akol. Notwithstanding the suffering of the 
southern Sudanese, for which the SPLM/A did bear part responsibility, Garang was 
celebrated when he signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and was 
sworn in as vice president of the Sudan and president of southern Sudan. When he died 
in a helicopter crash only three weeks after having been made president of southern 
Sudan, he was succeeded by Salva Kiir. Kiir was confirmed in this role in the election in 
2010. With the vote pro-independence in 2011, he became the first president of the new 
Republic of South Sudan. For a detailed account of the splits and insights into the 
younger history of southern/South Sudan, see Arop (2006) or Akol (2003).  
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10). Still, the common Southerner has good reason to mistrust 
government and leadership and to understand the state as something to 
fear. It seems questionable if such a deep mistrust can be healed by a 




Figure 10: Billboard in Ministry Road, Juba (personal stock) 
 
4.4.2 Relationships between tribes 
“I am proud of my Dinka”, says the young man and stands up from the 
bench in the lecture theatre. It is question time after a public lecture that 
had taken place at Juba University. The young man is walking up and 
down the aisle, structuring his speech with the reoccurring exclamation 
of, “I am proud of my Dinka”. Every time he says the first syllable of the 
word ‘Dinka’ he raises his fist and with the second syllable he punches 
his chest. It is a fierce gesture, accompanied by the chanting and many 
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people in the audience nod in the rhythm of the sentence. The lecture 
was on tribalism and how the innumerable tribes of South Sudan can be 
moulded into a whole. An ongoing theme during the lecture was that all 
South Sudanese are brothers and sisters. Tribalism and ways to fight the 
war are important topics in South Sudanese society, and there are many 
lectures and speeches on this, organised by Juba University, the church, 
or peace groups. With the ongoing fighting, this is undoubtedly an urgent 
topic. Still, it is doubtful whether people understand themselves in strong 
group terms. 
 
Group attachments are strong on the one hand, weak on the other. They 
are strong because people identify strongly with their group, but still, 
one is not necessarily born a Dinka, Nuer, or Murle. It is a social identity, 
not a biological one. The first hint of this comes in a chat with some of my 
students. The rural areas of South Sudan are plagued by cattle stealing 
and abductions. When a child is abducted, it becomes a member of the 
new tribe, and this membership becomes, eventually, stronger than the 
association the child was initially born with. This has also been described 
in Edward Evans-Pritchard's (1940) famous ethnography of the life of 
the Nuer. The same, I am told, happens when a man marries a woman 
from another tribe. If a mixed couple marries, the tribal association of 
one of the partners will change. This is not necessarily the female 
partner. Men change their tribal affiliation after marriage when they are 
living with their wife and her tribe46. “You belong to the family you are 
living with”, says one of the women I chat relatively regularly on the 
market with. “How should I survive without my family?” In a harsh 
environment like South Sudan it is important that someone has your 
back, thus group affiliations are strong. There is a mutual duty of care 
that binds kin, neighbours, and families. Still, this does not mean that 
there is an ethnic hatred between the groups, or that one automatically 
                                                        
46 I have no numbers showing how common this praxis is. However, it was mentioned 
without me asking who changes tribal membership. I assumed automatically (and 
wrongly) that it would be the wife living with her husband’s family and tribe and thus 
changing her tribal affiliation. 
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mistrusts a member of another tribe. One of my students is a Nuer; he 
survived the outbreak of conflict in December 2013 by fleeing to the 
United Nations compound. Three years later, he still lives in one of the 
UN’s ‘Protection of Civilian’ sites (PoC) established in Juba. Having 
experienced the murder of family members during the conflict, he would 
have any reason to mistrust the group understood as the Nuers’ 
adversary, the Dinka. But he sits in class with Dinka, he participates in 
group work with Dinka, he takes Boda-Bodas driven by Dinka. “It was not 
Dinka”, he says. “It was soldiers. It was militia”. 
 
South Sudanese society is not divided in the way that the different tribes 
are at each other’s throats or that people automatically hate and distrust 
people from other tribes. “I don’t have a problem with Dinka”, said one 
of my chess partners, “many of my friends and neighbours are Dinka. I 
only have a problem because I cannot get a good job, and I cannot get a 
good job because you need to be Dinka, best from Bhar-el-Ghazal47, to get 
a job with the government. Or another good job. They make sure that all 
the jobs go to themselves. It is not right. We are in Equatoria. Jobs should 
go to Equatorians.”48 Similar remarks were made by others. The problem 
is the same loyalty mentioned in the first part of this chapter. As part of 
a family and/or a tribe it is one’s duty to support, employ, and promote 
members of one’s family or tribe. This leads to nepotism and exclusion. 
To a degree this is also responsible for the perception of the SPLM being 
a ‘Dinka movement’, and the government being a ‘Dinka-government’. 
Both accusations are aiming at the fact that members and people in 
power are almost always Dinka. There is clear, structurally caused 
favouritism in South Sudan, based on tribe membership, but also on 
friendship, neighbourhood, and shared experience49. 
                                                        
47 Bhar-el-Ghazal is where President Kiir is from. The comment indicated the need to 
have a connection to the President in order to get a job. 
48 Notable here is that Equatoria is itself home to a plethora of tribes and that the 
speaker is not for appointments based on merit but advocates for discrimination based 
on location. 
49 An example for this is the common narrative of ‘having been in the bush together’. 





Figure 11: Ethnic groups in South Sudan. UNOCHA, April 2009 
 
This might also explain the divide between the people of Equatoria and 
the Dinka. During chess-chats I heard regular remarks that Equatoria 
should be independent, that there are not enough Equatorians in the 
national government and that the Equatorians are the losers of 
independence. When looking at a map of the distribution of ethnicities 
(Figure 11)50 one can see that Equatoria, the southern part of South 
Sudan, is indeed not a traditional Dinka homeland. For the Equatorians, 
the Dinka took over Equatoria; now they are in Juba, driving big cars, 
living in nice houses, and preventing the Equatorians from having nice 
houses and big cars. The former fighters and liberators of the country are 
seen by some as the new oppressors. The SPLM, however, although in the 
majority Dinka, does not understand itself as an exclusive movement51. 
                                                        
South Sudan and interacting with government, be it on the local or the national level, I 
always heard statements like “He is a fine man. We fought together in the bush” or “I 
know him from when we were together in the bush”. Having fought together and been 
‘in the bush’ created an attachment stronger than tribal membership. 
50 A bigger version of this map can be found in Appendix 1.5, p.25. 
51 With reference to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, John Garang 
said that, “As a movement that has been fighting against the marginalisation of others, 
we shall not tolerate the exclusion of anybody from the process” (Garang and Khalid 
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There might be a self-serving bias at work, with people positively 
discriminating towards their kin52.  
 
While ethnicity, if understood as creating hate between groups, can 
hardly be seen as at the root of the conflict, the loyalty to one’s group has 
an effect. By the same rule which forces people to give jobs to others from 
their community, people are also bound to fight for their leaders. If a 
militia leader or local strongman asks people to fight against another 
village or tribe, this constitutes an order. People have to do so, even if 
they do not have any problem with the other group. The violence and the 
fighting, I am told repeatedly, is a problem of leadership. “The violence is 
ethnic”, said one of my interviewees, “but the conflict is not”. While there 
might be concrete problems between groups in the rural areas and on a 
community level, if it comes to fighting is down to leadership. The most 
common reasons for tensions between villages or groups are cattle 
raiding and fights over water holes and grassing grounds. These are 
conflicts over scarce resources (Sherif et al. 1988). How such conflicts 
are resolved is a question of leadership. There are uncompromising 
leaders who understand fighting to be in their interests. What is more, 
when local leaders want their people to fight they do not need a reason. 
All they have to do is order people to fight. This makes media 
programmes for peace ill-suited to the task of preventing conflict. In Juba, 
Eyeradio, the UN-Radio Miraya and the church-financed Radio Bakhita 
all are broadcasting dedicated peace programmes. Eyeradio states on its 
website, “It explores the prospects for peace in South Sudan by looking 
at the role of the citizens and leaders, well-wishers, regional leaders, and 
the international community” (Eyeradio no date). The radio drama ‘Sawa 
Shabab’, broadcast by Radio Miraya and Radio Bakhita, presents role 
models and shows how they behave in certain situations including 
                                                        
1992). In fact, the implementation was done by Garang’s favourite intellectuals, long 
time companions and friends (LeRiche and Arnold 2012); it was not at all inclusive. 
52 In social psychology, the self-serving bias is a well-researched cognitive bias that 
leads people to attribute positive events to their abilities and skills, while negative 
events are seen as caused by external factors (Campbell, Sedikidis 1999; Forsyth 2008).  
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interethnic strife (Free Press Unlimited 2014). This shall enable the 
listener to understand that they can make up their mind and work 
actively for peace. The idea behind these peace programmes is that if 
provided with reliable and neutral information and role models of 
behaviour, people will be able to overcome bias and prejudice. Peace 
programmes are thought to help listeners understanding and resisting 
manipulation; thus, they make peace possible (LaBenevolencija no date 
b). The programmes, however, assume a fear of ‘the other’ or a successful 
manipulation into hate, they do not consider a leadership order. What is 
more, researching Burundi Bilali et al. (2015) have shown that obedience 
to leadership is not changing by so-called peace programmes.   
 
South Sudan is a highly decentralised country with a plethora of regional 
and local armed actors. There is a lack of communication between the 
upper, middle, and lower echelons of government, with President Kiir 
often making lone top-down decisions (LeRiche and Arnold 2012) and 
administrative offices, ministries, and security forces sometimes acting 
without an order, consultation, or agreement. This does not enhance 
people’s trust in the state, but increases their feeling of insecurity and 
thus the importance of group loyalty. The conflict is a leadership and 
institutional problem; it is not ethnicity-based. Tribal membership 
becomes salient when political leaders order it so; in the absence of 
leaders’ orders it does not make for strong bonds. Asked if he rather 
trusted a Dinka or a political leader of any tribal affiliation, my Nuer-
student did not hesitate in saying that he would rather trust the Dinka. 
When I asked my Bari- and later a Dinka-Chess partner if they would 
rather trust a Nuer or a leader, the answer was that they would rather 
trust the Nuer. This calls into question the effects of peace programmes 
produced by media development agencies and broadcast by media 
houses. These programmes work on the assumption that a bottom-up 
approach is necessary and that hatred needs to be overcome on the 
grassroots level. Instead, it is a leadership problem; a top-down approach 
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putting pressure on the South Sudanese leadership would be more 
promising. 
 
4.4.3 Relationship between the government and the international 
community 
In May 2015, the South Sudanese government expelled the UN’s resident 
relief coordinator and deputy envoy Toby Lanzer53. The dismissal was 
because of Lanzer’s media activities; in particular caused by an interview 
given in Geneva, Switzerland, in which Lanzer had critiqued the South 
Sudanese government harshly and described it as a failed one. 
Supporting reasons were his critical tweets and other statements on 
social media where Lanzer is said to have stated that South Sudan was 
on the brink of bankruptcy (Atem 2015)54. Ateny Wek Ateny, 
spokesperson of the government of South Sudan (GoSS) said in an 
interview with the newspaper The Citizen, “These statements are 
irresponsible statements from the humanitarian coordinator, given the 
fact that they don’t give hope to the people of South Sudan”. The sacking 
of Toby Lanzer generated turmoil in the international community. 
International actors saw their opinion of the South Sudanese 
government as ruthless and authoritarian confirmed. Then UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon condemned the decision, named Lanzer 
“instrumental in addressing the increasing humanitarian needs of 
conflict-affected communities in the country” (United Nations 2015b), 
and called on the GoSS to reverse the decision immediately. He further 
urged the government to “cooperate fully with all United Nations entities 
present in South Sudan” (United Nations 2015b). 
 
Problems in the relationship between donors and governments are not 
uncommon. These are asymmetrical relationships between a provider 
and a receiver. The problem that arises is behavioural and cultural, as in 
                                                        
53 At the time, Lanzer was already at the end of his spell in South Sudan and about to 
take a new position as UN regional coordinator to the Sahel. His successor was already 
appointed. 
54 This article can be found in Appendix 1.6, pp.27, 28. 
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the Lanzer-incident. The South Sudanese government with its culturally-
based aversion against being critiqued felt unfairly criticised and reacted 
accordingly. The UN Secretary-General ordered to take the decision back 
and to cooperate with the UN, which really meant obeying the UN. This 
did not bode well with a government that sees itself as an independent 
entity in a sovereign country and in possession of the right of self-
determination. They understand the UN and the international donors 
and expat community as guests in the country; as such “they do have to 
obey the rules of South Sudan and not make their own rules. They have 
to follow our rules”, as was explained to me by a government official in 
the Ministry of Information. The international community, on the other 
hand, understands itself as helping the country. The UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) operational plan states that, “our 
strategic objective is to help South Sudan establish stronger foundation 
for sustainable peace and development” (DFID 2014) and later, “the UK’s 
long-term vision is a viable and stable South Sudan, at peace with itself 
and its neighbours” (DFID 2014). The United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) names the same objective in its 
South Sudan Transition Strategy paper: “The Transition Strategy further 
builds on USAID’s previous 2006 strategy and sets forth USAID’s plan to 
assist the government and people of South Sudan to enhance stability 
and advance their development aspirations” (USAID 2011). A civil 
servant from the European Union stated in an informal chat that 
“governments come and go. We assist the people of South Sudan”. The 
same was, phrased in different ways, stated by iNGO-workers in the 
country. There is a disagreement between the GoSS and the international 
community about what relationship is formed by the provision and 
reception of assistance. 
 
The international community feels that because of the amount of money 
they are giving they should have a say in governance and in the 
implementation of the projects they are financing. Most prominently, this 
was phrased by an acquaintance working for one of the bigger iNGOs, 
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who said: “We have literally paid for everything in this country. This 
country is functioning only because of us.” The government does not see 
a connection between receiving donor money and a say in decisions. In 
informal talks, government officials said that they are happy to get 
advice, but that advice should be only advice; they do not feel an 
obligation to take it. Asked if they get the impression of having an 
obligation it was rather vaguely stated that, “some donors are better than 
others”. The leadership in South Sudan often sees the Kawajas55 as rather 
clueless about realities in the country. An explanation for this might be 
the way the donors and expat workers live and work56. The infamous 
expat bubble makes for a tangible barrier between foreigners and South 
Sudanese and has an effect on the perceptions of the other group 
(Autesserre 2014). Still, the South Sudanese elites and members of the 
government have the same tendency of bunkerization (Fisher 2017). In 
the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs it is not just the building that is 
protected by a fence and guards but the individual offices are secured 
with fingerprint scanners. These high levels of security make for 
divisions; between government and common South Sudanese on the one 
hand but also between government and foreign donors on the other. 
Government officials repeatedly phrased a general feeling of mistrust 
when we talked about their relationship with foreign donors. The 
development of a partnership seems to be hindered by a feeling of 
                                                        
55 South Sudanese name for a white person. 
56 Expat compounds and office buildings, especially for embassies and the European 
Union, are a far cry away from the houses and offices of the common South Sudanese. 
When my research assistant came to deliver some papers to my apartment in Juba, he 
was stunned by the premises and told me later that he had never seen anything like this 
ever before. He asked how it happens that buildings like the one I was living in are not 
owned by South Sudanese but by foreigners, mostly from Kenya, Ethiopia and Lebanon 
– a question I struggled to answer. The building I rent an apartment in is owned by a 
Kenyan woman. It is a four-storey building with approximately 28 two- and three-room 
apartments. They are comfortable, but would not be considered special in a country of 
the industrialised North. In South Sudan, they are luxurious because they come with 
security, electricity and water supply. This is made possible by generators and huge 
water tanks which are filled on a regular basis with water bought from a company and 
delivered by a tank lorry. The apartments also come with internet. While this is 
luxurious compared to the huts of the local population, living conditions of embassy 




exclusion, most visible in the housing and working arrangements of 
foreign donors. The fact that government officials do have similarly 
exclusive arrangements does not make a difference. There is a feeling 
that as guests in the country foreign donors’ doors should be more open 
and more engaging in partnership; and there is also a feeling that they 
should not interfere in the inner affairs of the country. The problem was 
not just apparent in the expulsion of the UN’s deputy envoy, but also 
when the Minister for Information, Michael Makuei, threatened to close 
the UN-Radio Miraya in February 2015 because Miraya had aired an 
interview with an exiled politician. The threat against the radio station 
was taken back by the government after an intervention of Ellen 
Margrethe Løj, then Head of UNMISS. This showed the same pattern as 
with the Toby Lanzer-incident. A member or an institution of the 
international community states or broadcasts something the 
government understands as hostile; the government reacts to this and is 
rebuffed by the international actor. The Miraya-incident was interpreted 
in two different ways. While almost any international expat I talked to 
understood it as an affront of the government against press freedom, 
freedom of expression and the UN in general, South Sudanese 
acquaintances were taken aback by what they described as “another 
UNMISS-arrogance”. It was stated that no government in the West would 
allow a radio station to air rebel views and that the UN needed to follow 
the laws in the country. 
 
This struggle over predominance between the local elites and the 
international intervention actors is also apparent in the GoSS’ attempt to 
regulate iNGOs. In May 2015, the government issued a new NGO bill, 
which required NGOs to register with the government, a tedious and 
costly process but not a new requirement. Furthermore, it ordered iNGOs 
to ensure that no more than a fifth of their staff were foreigners57. This 
caused concern among the NGOs working in South Sudan. It was claimed 
                                                        
57 A press statement from the Ministry of Labour detailing the request can be found in 
Appendix 1.6, p.26. 
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that this regulation in combination with a shortage of skilled South 
Sudanese workers would result in delays of projects. The argument was 
dismissed by nationals. “We do not have a capacity problem”, I was told, 
“…we have a capacity utilisation problem”. Another statement was: “The 
international community is doing capacity building here since ten years. 
How can there not be enough capacity? Did they do something wrong?” 
The government, and many other well-educated South Sudanese, have 
long been complaining that iNGOs give too many jobs to foreigners and 
not to the local population. The NGO bill was thus seen as reasonable and 
necessary58. Finally, the struggle over predominance and mistrust is not 
only between the GoSS and foreign donors and iNGOs. It also takes place 
between iNGOs working in or on South Sudan and South Sudanese 
organisations. The main example for this is the AMDISS-incident which 
took place between the Association for Media Development in South 
Sudan, AMDISS, and Radio Tamazuj, supposedly a project of the Dutch 
NGO Free Voice Unlimited59. Tamazuij is a media organisation 
broadcasting on short wave and publishing on its website. On its 
Facebook page, it claims to be ‘an independent and trusted source of 
news covering Sudan and South Sudan’ (Radio Tamazuij no date), but 
according to The Citizen it is linked to the Dutch NGO Free Press 
Unlimited. A connection to the Netherlands is evident in the contact 
number given on Tamazuij’s webpage, which is a number in the 
Netherlands. Tamazuij seems to be a problematic case of a foreign 
organisation interfering in a sovereign country. Its unaccountability and 
lack of transparency became especially evident when it accused the 
AMDISS of helping the government to track down journalists. AMDISS is 
headed by the editors-in-chief of The Citizen and The Juba Monitor, Nhial 
Bol and Alfred Taban, the latter a former BBC-correspondent in Sudan. 
Both rejected the accusation. Indeed, the issue in question was a 
                                                        
58 The tendency of NGOs and UN-agencies to rely on foreign experts instead of utilising 
local expertise has also been pointed out by Autesserre (2014). Especially in South 
Sudan, where many former refugees were educated in the UK, the US and Australia, 
capacity might indeed be less a problem than in other severely underdeveloped 
countries. 
59 For details on the affiliation of Radio Tamazuj, see Appendix 1.3, pp.8-13. 
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registration process, something not unknown in western countries. 
AMDISS explained its decision as a move to support media training and 
structure the journalistic scene in Juba – something which is understood 
as necessary by many media professionals. Notwithstanding appeals 
from AMDISS to either support or withdraw the accusation, Tamazuij did 
neither. When contacted via their webpage, they refused to discuss the 
issue60. This is an example of the unregulated media scene concerning 
South Sudan, but also of the problems between the outlet of a western 
backed up project like Tamazuij and the South Sudanese media. 
 
The government accuses iNGOs of meddling in political and internal 
affairs. This was especially apparent when six US-based iNGOs, including 
Human Rights Watch, sent a letter to John Kerry, then US Secretary of 
State. They asked for more sanctions against South Sudan to force the 
warring parties to strike a peace deal. Surely this was well meant but it 
did not soften the GoSS’ approach towards iNGOs. According to the New 
Nation61 it was seen as a “blatant interference in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign nation.” The government said that the NGOs should rather 
“reflect on their current soft gloves approach towards the rebels and 
start to exercise more pressure on the rebels to motivate them to return 
to the peace talks” (Figure 12). 
 
 
                                                        
60 The e-mail exchange can be found in Appendix 1.3, pp.10-12. More information on 
the AMDISS-incident are in Appendix 1.7. 





Figure 12: NGOs must stop interfering. Newspaper article, New Nation 
 
Lastly, the mistrust of the GoSS towards foreign donors can be explained 
historically. Problems with international aid can be traced back to the 
second civil war, when the UN and USA did not provide relief for civilians 
outside Khartoum’s control, thus effectively taking sides. In 1986, the 
United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the World Food 
Programme (WFP) were forbidden to cooperate with the SPLA. This: 
 
…had a direct impact on the SPLA’s own attitude towards relief. 
They were unimpressed by assertions of neutrality by UN-
agencies and NGOs, seeing their activities as directly supporting 
the government’s [in Karthoum, kt] strategy and supplying 
garrison in the South. They saw that their own infractions, such 
as the 1986 downing of a civilian airliner in Malakal, drew far 
more international condemnation than the government’s [in 
Khartoum, kt] extensive and systematic abuses. The suspicion 
engendered by what appeared to be UN and NGO duplicity and 
hypocrisy lasted well into the early years of OLS [Operation 
Lifeline Sudan62], and has never been fully dispelled. (Johnson 
2011, p.147) 
                                                        
62 Operation Lifeline Sudan was established in April 1989. It was a consortium made of 




This mistrust against the UN and iNGOs has not been overcome. The 
SPLM/A learned from early experience that humanitarian assistance can 
be used to take sides. As the actors in the SPLM have hardly changed it 
seems realistic that the GoSS today is still mistrusting towards donors - 
a mistrust further fed by donor's behaviour. While this thesis does not 
investigate the donors, it stands to reason that the two groups, 
interveners on the grounds and in the headquarters, and local elites in 
the country of intervention, develop perceptions of each other according 
to their own interests (see Smirl 2015; Koddenbrock 2016, pp.28-34; 
Bliesemann de Guevara 2017).   
 
4.4.4 Summary 
This subchapter looked at the relationships between the South Sudanese 
population and the government, the relationships between the different 
tribes in the country, and the relationship between the government and 
the international community. Drawing on the Sudanese civil war, I 
provided background information concerning the predominant mistrust 
of the population when it comes to the government. I then investigated 
the relationships of the different tribes in the country and identified a 
group loyalty in South Sudanese society, which works to an extent along 
tribal lines, without being bound exclusively to the tribal association. 
Tribal affiliation, although strong when present, can be changed. It is not 
exclusively born but made. Still, in a harsh living environment such as 
South Sudan, one cannot survive without being part of a group, which is 
why people obey a leader. This means that the grassroots approach, 
favoured by many media development organisations, is unsatisfactory. It 
is the upper echelon that must be targeted by policy. Finally, the 
relationship between the government and the international community 
is also marked by a general mistrust based on an imbalance but also on 
past experiences. The government feels patronised by foreign donors, 
                                                        
throughout war-torn and drought-affected areas in the South. OLS was different from 
earlier humanitarian assistance, which targeted only government-controlled areas. 
126 
 
and the role media plays in this is especially apparent when considering 
the expulsion of the UN’s deputy envoy Toby Lanzer and the threat to 
close UN-Radio Miraya. The general mistrust of the international 
community might not be a new development but to an extent grounded 
in former experience. During the second civil war the USA and the UN 
only provided humanitarian aid to people under Khartoum’s control. The 
WFP and the UNHCR were explicitly forbidden to cooperate with the 
SPLA.  
4.5 Chapter conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have presented findings on the effects of media in South 
Sudan using ethnographic observation. Ethnography cannot answer  the 
question of whether there is a direct, causal link from listening to a 
specific media programme or radio station to a mindset or attitude 
towards the state or people with a different ethnic affiliation. Still, it can 
answer the question of whether media with a western underpinning is 
able to fulfil its role in a non-western society. Its ability to take context 
into account is what makes ethnography valuable here. While a survey 
would rely on participants’ self-proclaimed time of listening to media, 
using ethnography it can be observed how important media reasonably 
can be, which is apparent in how regular people have access to media. 
How they talk about leadership and the state when, figuratively speaking, 
they had let their hair down, was also possible to observe with 
ethnography. The observations revealed a more complex reality than 
discovered by using a questionnaire or interviews. Ethnography takes 
the context into consideration and hence looks deeper. This touches on 
the recent discussion of whether ‘being there’ is a necessary or at least 
desirable feature of ethnography (Stepputat and Larsen 2015, pp.6, 7). 
Coming from anthropology, ethnography had a taste not just for ‘being 
there’ but this ‘there’ was also usually a rather exotic place. Limited 
funding and increasing problems for researchers abroad have driven 
ethnography to places closer to home (Nader 1972; Gusterson 1997). In 
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IR, ‘being there’ is further complicated as some of the countries to do 
research in are increasingly dangerous. Another problem is that there 
might just not be a ‘there’, when studying phenomena that are not 
constrained to one location (Marcus 1995; Marcus 1998). Still, such 
difficulties do not mean that ‘being there’ is not the desirable option. 
Ethnography creates knowledge and context “through personal 
relationships bound by self-knowledge, expectation and commitment” 
(Greenhouse 2010, p.2). Thinking about Bliesemann de Guevara’s work 
regarding the practices of the International Crisis Group (Bliesemann de 
Guevara 2014) and the increasing practice of politician’s visit to military 
theatres (Bliesemann de Guevara 2017), it might be necessary to 
redefine what ‘being there’ means. Drawing on my experience in South 
Sudan, I argue that ‘being there’ is as much a situation as a place. 
Examining South Sudan requires one to dive into South Sudanese 
everyday life. Spending time only in an UN-house and a white land 
cruiser only offers a chance to study bunkerization and international 
peacekeepers. Understanding the situation by experiencing it on location 
is ethnography’s major strength.  
 
‘Being there’ allowed me to talk to people about the expectations they 
hold towards the media, the state, and the conflict and groups in the 
country, and having experienced driving on South Sudanese streets, 
water and fuel shortages, and in general South Sudanese reality over a 
longer period of time, I could put their remarks in context. Furthermore, 
in looking at the surroundings of the research question, ethnographic 
observation also negotiates the problem of the researcher’s influence on 
the research environment. It becomes closer to what Webb et al. (1966) 
call ‘unobtrusive measures’. Participating in everyday life over a longer 
period of time and being involved in situations that were not obviously 
connected to my research interest made my intervention as a researcher 
minimal. At the same time, there are also problems with ethnographic 
observation. The long duration it requires, the issues of gaining access, 
and establishing relationships make it rather unpractical for applied 
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research that requires fast answers. Furthermore, answers are country, 
or rather situation-specific. Still, Flyvbjerg (2006, p.228) has said that 
generalising from one case study is possible by using falsification. If 
media development is having different effects than expected in South 
Sudan, the theory that media can aid statebuilding and reconciliation is 
not generally valid.   
 
With regards to the effects of media in South Sudan, ethnographic 
observations have shown that the lack of electricity in Juba probably 
prevents media from playing as extensive a role as claimed by its 
supporters. Coming to the two areas that media development is 
supposed to affect, namely the state and relations between groups, the 
ethnographic part of the study showed that South Sudanese see their 
government rather as a group of robber barons who they pay (in the form 
of taxes) and thus acquire the right to be left alone. Government’s 
misdeeds, uncovered and broadcast by media, will hardly have an effect 
on the population as they know or are not surprised by them. Elections 
are not a way to change government but a potential source for trouble. 
Thus, media’s attempt to inform the population has little effect on 
people’s view of the state or on governance. The watchdog role has no 
basis in South Sudan. The media itself is understood as a possible source 
for trouble and hence a wish for tighter control of the media was 
repeatedly voiced. At the same time, South Sudanese see the government 
as a legitimate source of information. The concept of independent media 
is not clearly defined in South Sudan. Grounded in the country’s history, 
media is seen and understood as a mouthpiece of the government.  
 
A cultural rule exists in South Sudan that criticising the leaders is not to 
be done. This is in direct opposition to media’s task as a watchdog on 
government. The harsh line taught to South Sudanese local journalists by 
western media organisations leads to danger for these journalists and to 
a deteriorating relationship between the government of South Sudan and 
the international community, as evident in the expulsion of the UN’s 
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former special envoy Toby Lanzer. Finally, ethnic hatred is not the root 
cause of the conflict in South Sudan. Group attachments are on the one 
hand relatively weak and can be changed. On the other hand, they are 
strong, as people are dependent on their kin for survival. This means that 
when a leader orders people to fight, they have to. This does not make 
the conflict ethnic; instead it was repeatedly described as a power 
struggle between elites. This means that media as a peacebuilding tool 
cannot be very effective when it presupposes an ethnically grounded 
hate and mistrust and targets mostly the grassroots. 
 
In looking at the context, ethnographic observation has uncovered that 
media development campaigns' influence in the country is rather 
insignificant as people have very limited access to the media. In addition, 
the cultural context of the country is diametrical to the assumptions 




5 – The survey 
 
Dean Karlan and Jacob Appel state that “conversations about poverty 
alleviation and development are [today] much more focused on evidence 
than they were before” (Karlan and Appel 2016, p.2). Stremlau also noted 
how “international development donors have become increasingly 
preoccupied with how ‘evidence’ can ground policymaking” (Stremlau 
2014, p.1). Empirical evidence is named as especially important for 
donor decisions (Sutcliffe and Court 2006, p.2), and numbers are popular 
in social research as they seem more objective than interpretive research 
(Merry 2016; Porter 1995). Social surveys are “a feasible and relatively 
economical means of collecting social data” (Bulmer 1993, p.8) and, 
lastly, “quantitative social research is (…) most of the time (…) concerned 
with cause – with questions about whether some intervention works” 
(Turner 2007, p.121). All these were reasons to decide on a social survey 
to investigate western media in a non-western country. Still, there are 
also well-known problems with surveys. Collecting a representative 
sample in countries with no census is not only a challenge, but virtually 
impossible. Recruitment and training of interviewers might present 
problems. Phrasing questionnaire questions that make sense to the 
population studied can be complicated, and respondents might just want 
to get over with the questionnaire. Surveys simplify but social reality is 
complex. The question has been asked, “what happens when social 
science tries to describe things that are complex, diffuse and messy? The 
answer (…) is that it tends to make a mess of it” (Law 2004, p.2). The 
messiness of the research process and the complexity of the research 
results are disregarded by academics and policy makers, although “this 
‘mess’ and uncertainty reflects the reality of the situation in which peace 
builders are intervening, and should therefore be embraced by 
researchers studying these environments” (Perera 2017, p. 54). Suda 
Perera draws this conclusion from a qualitative study; but it is just as true 




I start the chapter with an account of the process of data gathering. This 
is followed by a description of the research aims and of the sample. I then 
present the results provided by survey research about people’s opinion 
of and attitude towards the media, the state, and groups in the country.  
5.1 On doing a survey 
 
Three weeks into the fieldwork, my desk was buried under 500 
questionnaires, three pages each; a total of 1500 pages. The only thing 
exempted from the flood of paper was my laptop. In the December heat 
of Juba I filled data into SPSS. I had a regular supply of tea from a 
restaurant around the corner and frequent visits from a young cat, whose 
purring mixed with the humming of the air condition to a calm 
background music. The peace and quiet were only disturbed by my 
increasing unease about my data. For reasons unknown, respondents 
had not stuck to the questions, and frequently multiple boxes had been 
ticked. Particularly problematic were the answers to the question about 
preference for a radio station. The multiple ticking had created 17 
subcategories, most containing only one or two cases. This variable was 
the independent variable (IV). 17 subcategories meant that I had too 
many cases, even if this multiple ticking probably showed how people 
listened to radio stations in South Sudan. People seldom had one 
favoured radio station but instead they listen to whatever was playing. 
How does one research if people’s attitudes were connected to a 
preference for a radio station, if there was no preferred station? Another 
issue, though more puzzling than disturbing, was that many of the 
respondents had scribbled notes like ‘Women equality is important’ in 
the margins. Others had included ‘women programmes’ as an answer 
where the questionnaire had asked for favourite programmes. It was 
unclear why that was.  
 
The process of data gathering had started at Juba University, where 
student researchers were hired for the interviewing. The questionnaire 
had been run through a panel of experts, a group of South Sudanese who 
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were associated with either my apartment house or a hotel I had lived in 
before. It had been piloted to 20 South Sudanese, which resulted in some 
rephrasing of questions. At the university, I met one of the academic staff, 
an acquaintance of mine. His position at the university was lucky, as he 
clarified governmental procedures and introduced me to a class who he 
instructed to work as interviewers. A week later, I drove again to the 
university with 500 questionnaires in my car boot. My visit had been 
announced and the lecturer gave me time to explain my research. I felt a 
little rushed by interrupting him and the class, but gave an introduction 
to my research’s design and aims, explained the questionnaire, and the 
way it should be completed. Then I handed over my 500 questionnaires. 
On the way home, I was unsure about the short amount of time I had had 
for explaining. I had talked to the students for roughly 90 minutes. I 
comforted myself with the thought that my interviewers were in their 
fourth year at university and that some of them had done this kind of 
work before. Part of a degree at Juba University involves writing a BA-
dissertation, so I calmed myself with the thought that my interviewees 
would surely have had some research training; and, after all, I had 
explained the basics of my research. I also had given my telephone 
number so that I could be reached in case of any questions. Indeed, I was 
called a few days later by two of the students. I met them and talked the 
questionnaire through in more detail. All this was reassuring.  
 
Still, when I had collected the questionnaires I discovered the multiple 
ticking and creating new categories that had happened. The directions I 
had given the students had been clear, at least so I had thought. Still, the 
returned questionnaires told a different story; obviously my instructions 
had not been clear enough. I decided to work on other parts of my 
research project for the time being. A few months later, when I met one 
of my former interviewers coincidentally, the puzzle was solved. I 
mentioned in passing that the survey would be repeated, and he asked if 
he could work for me again. Then he said, ‘I think I was the best of your 
interviewers. I always asked people for what else I should tick on the 
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questionnaire’. Some of the respondents, he admitted, did offer multiple 
answers themselves but if they did not he had asked them for more than 
one answer. Questioned further, he said that most of the other 
interviewers pressed for more than one answer, too. Asked why they 
thought that ticking as many boxes as possible was a good thing he 
answered that foreigners always wanted as many answers as possible. 
Foreigners, he went on, also always wanted to hear about certain topics, 
like gender. Why, he asked, had there not been a question about female 
equality in the questionnaire? This, he said, had confused many 
interviewers and many respondents. This was why they had included 
these answers in the questionnaires. Asked why they had not called and 
asked about this he said that they did not want to bother me with 
something so minor that they easily could solve on their own. 
 
The chat was revealing, and the insight gained from this was confirmed 
in subsequent informal interviews with my surveyors. Not only did these 
conversations provide an explanation for what had gone wrong, but they 
also underpinned the need for thinking about context when doing 
research in a country such as South Sudan. The country has been 
independent since 2011. In 2013, conflict broke out anew and led the 
economic situation to go from bad to worse. During my stay of roughly 
ten months, the South Sudanese Pound (SSP) lost value rapidly while 
prices for goods and food in the market skyrocketed. In November 2014, 
the black market rate for US-Dollars was 1:5. In August 2015, it was 1:14 
or 15. For some goods, the price increased up to 40% during the same 
period. Making ends meet became harder and harder in the country with 
a lot of people being unemployed, and a lot of jobs not paying well enough 
to make up for price increases. Being a Kawaja, a white person, added 
further to the problem. Kawajas are often perceived as working for 
iNGOs or UN-agencies and as having the power to provide well-paid jobs 
for South Sudanese. Due to my skin colour, the students thought that they 
could gain a permanent and well-paid job, if only they did good work as 
interviewers for me. What was more, I had been introduced by a high-
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ranking person from the university, further cementing the view that I 
was influential enough to initiate further projects and offer employment. 
This made the students eager to provide excellent data. At the same time, 
their idea of what ‘excellent data’ are was fairly different from what was 
needed. The question was now how this problem could be overcome. The 
research design and methods had been explained before the first survey, 
still, they surveyors came with their own set of interpretations (‘the 
more answers, the better’) and their own agenda ('trying to gain a 
reputation as a good interviewer’).  
 
Roughly half a year later, the survey was repeated. While again student 
interviewers were recruited, things were a little different.  Since the first 
social survey, I had taught a class at the university. I had been present 
there every week and had had regular contact with staff and students. As 
before, 25 fourth-year students were recruited, the same salary was 
offered and everyone distributed 20 questionnaires to friends, 
acquaintances, and family members. Again, I collected and paid the 
students approximately ten days later. This time, however, the data were 
of an excellent quality. Every question was answered using only the 
possible answers, no notes in the margins, no multiple answers. The two 
groups of students were comparable, with each group studying in 
different departments. Both groups had been given the exact same 
amount of information on the survey. Taking a gamble, I had decided to 
provide the exact same amount of training to see if it was really only 
about my visibility and assumed status. The second set of students did 
not see me as a distant person, introduced by an important person and 
working for some unnamed international organisation. They did know 
me; I had been present as a member of staff in the department the past 
semester, I had been seen regularly on campus, running to reach my 
classroom in time and drinking tea with students after lectures. Two of 
my interviewers wrote their BA-theses under my supervision. Almost all 
of the students did know me from informal chats or had seen me on 
campus, and this time, students had no reservations to make use of my 
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contact data and ask additional questions. I received numerous phone 
calls with additional questions. When the questionnaires were collected, 
students were eager to talk about their experience as interviewers. I was 
not a person in authority this time, or, as a lecturer, I was a person with 
a different kind of authority. Having been known as a teacher over a 
longer period and having a reputation for being approachable apparently 
made a difference. 
 
The first survey proved unable to answer the research question of what 
the effects of listening to a specific radio station were. It did, however, 
provide valuable information about the interplay between researcher, 
research environment, and lived reality in South Sudan. In drawing on 
ethnomethodology, Greiffenhagen, Mair and Sharrock (2015) 
disentangle methods from their status as entities in their own rights, 
describing a particular reality in a neutral way. They show how ‘data 
trouble’ provides additional information once the researcher stops 
looking for creative fixes and instead for deeper insight. The first survey 
showed that the different backgrounds the students and I were coming 
from created power relations that arose due to the problematic economy 
in South Sudan, and they led to a different way of handling the 
questionnaire. Methods act in a certain environment, and the troubles 
encountered provide information about the particular environment. In a 
more general sense, the experience of doing fieldwork in South Sudan 
made it clear that gathering quantitative data should not be done without 
knowing about the environment and the context. It became clear how the 
social reality of a country in conflict, with an accompanying and 
increasing level of poverty, impacted on the data collection. Data 
gathering is a social process and it requires awareness and reflexivity.  
5.2 Research aims 
 
Only the second survey was used for analysis. The aims were to find out 
whether there is a measurable difference in attitude dependent on a 
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preference for a radio station. If radio underpinned by western values 
provides neutral information and thus enables listeners to participate in 
governance, this effect should be observable in attitudes people held 
towards the state and the government. As media is thought to be able to 
contribute to reconciliation, listeners of western-led radios, and in 
particular listeners of radios that broadcast dedicated peace 
programmes, should also hold more favourable attitudes towards people 
from other tribes than listeners of other radio stations. How people 
thought about the media itself was also investigated, and finally, it was of 
interest whether listeners of ‘western’ radio stations hold different 
attitudes towards the international community, namely the UN and 
iNGOs, than people listening mostly to South Sudanese stations. The 
questionnaire63 consisted of questions about the preference for radio 
stations as the independent variable (IV) and questions asking about 
attitudes towards government, UN-agencies and iNGOs, and people from 
different tribes constituting the dependent variable (DV). Answers were 
measured using a Likert-scale. The analysis considers differences and 
variations in attitudes between groups, again following the order media, 
the state, and groups. The category ‘the state’ here includes attitudes, 
beliefs, and opinions on iNGOs and the United Nation Mission in South 
Sudan (UNMISS), as they provide essential services in the country. 
‘Media’ looks at how media outlets are perceived by the South Sudanese, 
and ‘groups’ investigates the level of interethnic ties and the possibility 
of peaceful cooperation. In this part, it was examined whether there is a 
severe division along ethnic lines in the country and what effects the 
international-led media such as the UN-Radio Miraya and the iNGO-run 
Eyeradio and their peace programmes have on the South Sudanese 
population.  
 
The hypotheses to be tested with reference to the three categories in the 
overall framework can be seen in Figure 13 (below). Descriptive 
                                                        
63 The questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2.1.  
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statistics are used to describe peoples’ attitudes towards the three 
categories. I wanted to investigate what attitudes people hold towards 
the media, the state, and groups, and whether these attitudes are 
dependent on a preference for a specific radio station. The test chosen 
for this was the Kruskal-Wallis H test, as differences in the distribution 
of beliefs needed to be determined, data are non-normally distributed, 
and the dependent variable is ordinal. The data fail the assumptions for 
a one-way ANOVA. Beliefs were measured on a 5-point Likert-scale, 
ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’, including the 
category ‘I do not know’. The independent variable (IV) here is ‘media’, 
determining which media outlet respondents had named as their 
primary source of information. The dependent variable (DV) is the 
attitude held. This is a between-subjects design, as the categories of the 
IV – the media stations - are independent groups (see Figure 4 in chapter 
3.3)  
 Hypothesis Null hypothesis 
State There is a significant difference 
in preference for radio station 
and attitudes towards 
government. 
 
There is a significant difference 
in preference for radio station 
and attitude towards UN-
agencies and iNGOs.  
There is no significant difference 
in preference for radio station and 
attitudes towards government. 
 
There is no significant difference in 
preference for radio station and 
attitude towards UN-agencies and 
iNGOs. 
Media  There is a significant 
relationship between 
preference for radio station 
and belief in media’s 
objectivity. 
 
There is a significant 
relationship between 
preference for radio station 
and belief that journalists in 
South Sudan are well-educated.  
There is no significant relationship 
between preference for radio 
station and belief in media’s 
objectivity. 
 
There is no significant relationship 
between preference for radio 
station and belief that journalists 
in South Sudan are well-educated.  
Groups  There is a significant difference 
in preference for radio station 
and attitudes towards people 
from different tribes. 
There is no significant difference 
in preference for radio station and 
attitudes towards people from 
different tribes. 
 
Figure 13: Hypotheses and null hypotheses 
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In some instances, listeners of the BBC were omitted from the analysis as 
the investigation focused solely on stations broadcasting in South Sudan. 
Where this was done, it is stated in the text. Otherwise stated differently, 
percentages reported here are valid per cent.  
5.3 Sample description 
 
Sample size was calculated with a margin error of 5%, a confidence level 
of 94% and a standard derivation of.5 (Israel 1992). The population size 
was sheer guesswork, as Juba’s last census was done before 
independence in 2008. The validity of this census is questionable at best; 
already in 2008, the census result was inconclusive with numbers having 
been “deflated in some regions and inflated in others” (New Sudan Vision 
2009). While the numbers had not been accepted in 2008, it is also 
unknown how much the population has changed since this time. In 2008, 
the population size of Juba was given as 368, 436 inhabitants (National 
Bureau of Statistics 2010, p.14). Following the referendum, the 
declaration of independence, and the outbreaks of conflict it can be 
reasonably assumed that this number has massively increased. I 
estimated population size at 1.5 million people. The sample size was then 
calculated (Z-score)² * StdDev*(1-StdDev) / (margin of error) at 354. 25 
fourth-year students distributed 500 questionnaires in Juba to friends 
and family members. Following data cleaning, 461 questionnaires 
remained. A further 89 BBC-listeners were later omitted on the grounds 
that the analysis turned to questions asking specifically for South 
Sudanese radio programmes. This reduced the sample to 372 cases. SPSS 
was used for analysis. The sample (including BBC-listeners) consists of 
246 males and 215 females. The majority of the respondents are rather 
young, with 52.2% being between 18 and 29 years old, and 36.7% 
between 30 and 49. Only 2.8% are younger than 18 years, and 5.9% are 




Figure 14: Age of respondents 
 
47.9% of participants are Dinka. 19.1% are Nuer, and 33% are members 
of one of the other tribes of South Sudan (Figure 15). The sample is 
biased towards the Dinka; it is believed that 35.8% of the overall 
population are Dinka, 15.6% are Nuer, and 48.6% belong to one of the 
other, smaller tribes (CIA 2015). Participants of the survey came from 
Equatoria (27.9%), the greater Bhar e Gazal area (27.5%), Upper Nile 
state (22.2%), and Jonglei (21.5%). Only a small minority were originally 






Figure 15: Tribal association 
 
Unsurprisingly, given that the interviewers were students, the vast 
majority of respondents have been to university (61.8%) or attended 
secondary school (24.3%). Only 8% attended solely primary school and 
5.9% never went to school. Here the sample is the most different to the 
overall population. 73% of men and 84% of women in South Sudan are 
illiterate (UNOCHA 2014). This might, however, not be such an enormous 
contradiction as seems at first sight. South Sudan is a vast country with 
massive inequality. Numbers from the whole country almost certainly 
display a different reality than can be found in the capital. Juba is the 
location of the national government; it is the base of ministries and hub 
of international agencies. The population of Juba is almost certainly 
better educated. 11.9% respondents own a business and 11.5% are day 
labourers. Smaller groups of 2% are refugees, 4.3% are office workers, 





Figure 16: Professions 
 
Given the imbalances of the sample, generalisation to the whole 
population is problematic, although maybe not as problematic as it 
seems. South Sudan is a vast country with a very diverse population with 
regards to language, tribe, and lifestyle. Drawing a sample which indeed 
reflects the whole of South Sudan was outside the scope of this research 
project, and it was not the aim to answer a question about all of South 
Sudan. The question phrased here is about media effects in Juba, and 
consequently the sample is drawn from the population of this city. It is 
Juba where radio stations are concentrated. Also, media can only have an 
effect on its listeners, and electricity is scarce in South Sudan. There is no 
city power in Juba, and those with access to electricity own a generator 
or have solar panels. Furthermore, education is expensive in South 
Sudan; schools charge fees and additional costs for books, stationery, and 
transport need to be paid. What is more, attending school or university 
means that people have less time to work and earn money. The sample 
is drawn from people that can reasonably be assumed to come from a 
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more affluent background and thus have more regular access to media 
than the overall population. The sample is thus drawn from the target 
audience of media. An argument can be made that in the provinces and 
the rural areas media projects often come with listener groups, and 
especially peace programmes are broadcast in community houses to 
groups of people. This, however, is not mass media but school. By 
definition, mass media is supposed to work on the masses and not on a 
selected sample of listeners. It is the media’s ability to disseminate 
messages to many people that makes it attractive for policy makers.  As 
the last point, the effects of media are supposedly universal and it would 
not be reasonable to do media development otherwise. This means that 
it should be possible to establish these effects regardless of which 
population is studied (Visser et al. 2000, p.223).  
5.4 Media 
 
Judging from this data, radio is popular in Juba and people listen to it 
often. Half of respondents, however, complain about journalists’ level of 
education, a majority of respondents believe that the government uses 
media to influence people, and a small majority is of the opinion that 
government needs to and should control the media.  
 
5.4.1 Media consumption time and its credibility 
68.3% of respondents have a radio in their household, and 26.3% said 
that they listen to the radio on their mobile. Only 4.1% do not have a 
radio. 58.1% said that they listen to radio ‘a few times a day’ and 24.1% 
listen ‘once a day’ (Figure 17). For 69.5%, radio is the primary source of 
information, and 78% named the news as their favourite programme. 
Only 11.5% said music was their favourite, 7.8% named programmes on 
health and education, and radio dramas are the last popular programme: 





Figure 17: Media consumption time 
 
Radio’s popularity64 is all the more interesting as it does not enjoy high 
credibility. Two variables measured respondents’ attitudes towards 
media itself. The statements were ‘South Sudan’s journalists are not well-
educated and not professional’ and ‘Media in South Sudan is accurate, 
balanced, and neutral’. 58.5% do not believe that media is accurate, 
balanced and neutral, and they disagreed (33.6%) or strongly disagreed 
(24.9%) with the statement. Only a third, 29.4% of respondents, believe 
in the accuracy, neutrality and balance of media. Overall, a majority of 
South Sudanese do not think much of their media (Figure 18). 
 
                                                        
64 The high numbers I found are confirmed by other surveys conducted in the country, 
most notably by an extensive, nationwide survey the iNGO Internews executed in April 
2015 (Internews 2015a). 66% of the inhabitants of Central Equatoria, the state of which 
Juba is the capital, said they had ‘access to radio at some point in their life’ (p. 56), and 
51% said that radio is their prime source of information (P. 54). Further confirmation 
comes from a survey done on behalf of an educational media project funded by USAID 
(EDC 2008). Looking at six cities in what was then Southern Sudan, the survey finds a 
daily listenership of 86%. The numbers are not comparable as the questions were 
differently phrased. Internews defines levels of access by to how many different media 
people have access to, and the EDC-survey looks at six different cities. Still, they all show 





Figure 18: Perception of media 
 
Connected to this is the question of whether people think that journalists 
are reliable and well-educated. Respondents are close to evenly divided 
on this issue. 15.9% strongly agreed and 29.6% agreed with the 
statement, 16.9% strongly disagreed, and 30.3% disagreed (Figure 19). 
45.5%, close to half the sample, are of the opinion that journalists are not 
reliable and not well-educated. This number is a backlash for iNGOs 
doing media development, as they are engaging in journalism training65.  
 
                                                        
65 To make matters worse, these data were collected by students of the Department of 
Mass Communication of Juba University. Having used a snowball system for data 
collection there might be a positive bias. The opinion about the quality of journalists 
might have been worse if the sample had been collected by interviewers not having a 




Figure 19: Perception of journalists' professionalism 
 
Nevertheless, there are no reservations about media’s credibility. A 
staggering 82.2% said that they believe what they hear on the radio, with 
28.5% strongly agreeing and 53.7% agreeing with the statement. Only 
10.4% disagreed and 3.3% strongly disagreed. This is startling; it 
contradicts the beliefs about journalists' reliability and education. In 
addition, 71.2% believe that the government uses media to influence 
people, with 28.5% strongly agreeing and 42.7% agreeing with the 
statement (Figure 20). This is another discrepancy: A majority of 
respondents believe what they hear on the radio and a majority of people 
believe that government uses media to influence people. Two 
explanations seem possible. First, it might be that respondents believe 
that the media and the journalists are witty enough to uncover and side-
track the governmental attempts to influence listeners. As many people 
do not believe in the professionalism and education of South Sudanese 
journalists (see Figure 19 above), this explanation seems far-fetched. The 
more reasonable explanation is that people in South Sudan simply do not 
see a problem with getting information from and being influenced by the 
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government. This might also explain the large number of people who 
stated that they believe what they hear on the radio. 
 
 
Figure 20: Belief that the government uses media 
 
Two more measures indicate that the South Sudanese do not see 
governmental involvement in the media as a problem. First, in western 
thought state-owned or influenced radio stations are a feature of an 
authoritarian regime (Siebert, Petersen, Schramm 1963). For the South 
Sudanese, financial dependency does not seem problematic. When asked 
who should pay for media, a majority of 35.9% said the government 
should pay, on grounds that information is necessary. 33.8% said media 
should make money through advertisements and selling of airtime, thus 
subscribing to a business model of media. 26.4% named the United 
Nations and the international community as donors, and only 3.9% voted 
for a public fee. Secondly, an (albeit very small) majority of 50.1% stated 
that the government is right to control the media. 46% were opposed to 





Figure 21: Wish that the government shall control media 
 
The approval of government control can be explained by South Sudanese 
history. Media's ability to kindle conflict via hate speech is well known in 
the country. Historically, media has been used as a mobilisation tool 
(Arop 2006), and hate speech has also been broadcast in the ongoing 
conflict (Somerville 2014). Government control is seen as a way to 
prevent hate speech and its consequences. Having experienced the 
effects of hate speech, it seems that the South Sudanese prefer a 
controlled media sector to the costs of freedom of expression. When 
asked about media criticising the government, however, a majority gave 
a different impression. 20.4% of respondents agreed, and 14.8% strongly 
agreed that media criticises the government too much; a majority of 
48.3%, however, did not concur: 27.2% disagreed and 21.1% strongly 
disagreed (Figure 22). This is in opposition to observations made in Juba 
and informal chats when people stated that open critique of a leader is a 





Figure 22: Media critic of the government 
 
There are two possible explanations for the variation. First, the sample 
consists mostly of students, and students were distributing it in a 
snowball system. It can be reasonably assumed that the sample is drawn 
from a relatively affluent and well-educated population, which may make 
criticising a leader or the government more accepted. Ethnographic 
observations were made while being with day labourers, drivers, shop 
owners, and newspaper agents – mostly people with no access to higher 
education. South Sudanese society is strictly stratified and this might be 
an explanation for the difference in attitude towards leadership. A 
second possible explanation is that while people might not criticise 
themselves, they may silently enjoy someone else doing it. In this 
explanation, media and journalists act as a surrogate for what regular 




5.4.2 Connections between beliefs about and preference for media 
In the next step, it was tested whether beliefs and opinions are differently 
distributed through the subcategories of the IV and thus if a preference 
for listening to a radio station comes with a particular attitude towards 
the media. As Radio Miraya, Eyeradio, and Voice of America are explicitly 
operated in a ‘western’ way, differences were expected. It was assumed 
that listeners of these radio stations believe more firmly in the 
information provided by the stations, that they believe media to be 
accurately balanced and neutral, and that their journalists are well-
educated. On the other hand, listeners of these stations should disagree 
with the statements that most information on the radio comes from the 
government, that the government is right in controlling the media, and 
that media criticises the government unfairly and too often. For the South 
Sudanese stations, in particular for the state-run SS-TV / SS-Radio, 
attitudes were likely to be opposite. Kruskal-Wallis H tests were run, and 
the hypothesis was that there are significant differences between groups. 
The null hypothesis to be tested was that there are no differences. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed no statistically significant differences 
for the statements ‘Media in South Sudan is accurate, balanced and 
neutral’ and for ‘South Sudanese journalists are not well-educated and 
not professional’. There was no difference in distribution for ‘I believe 
what I hear on the radio’, ‘Most information on the radio comes from 
government’, and ‘The government uses media to influence people’. For 
all these statements, the null hypothesis was retained. Judging from this 
sample, it does not make a difference to which radio station people like 
to listen. Whether people listen to the UN-station, Eyeradio, or the South 
Sudanese radio stations does not impact on their opinion on journalists' 
education and media’s standard, on the belief that government uses 
media, or on the question how accurate and reliable media is in South 
Sudan. Only one of the statements in the media-section showed 
statistically significant differences in distribution through categories. 
One came close and was hence also further examined. Listeners of the 
150 
 
state-owned SS-TV / SS-Radio are more likely to believe in the necessity 
of state control over the media. For the statement, ‘The government is 
right to control the media’, distribution is statistically significant among 
radio stations, H(4) = 14.222, p =.007. Pairwise comparisons were 
performed using Dunn’s (1964) procedure after visual inspection of a 
box plot, which showed that tests scores were not similar for all groups. 
A Bonferroni correction was in place for multiple comparisons. 
Statistical significance was, due to 15 comparisons, accepted on a very 
low number (p <.00333333). I thus accepted the unaltered significance 
level p <.05. Values are mean ranks unless otherwise stated.  
 
Treated like this, the pairwise comparison showed statistically 
significant differences of the statement ‘Government is right to control 
the media’ between listeners of the state-run SS-TV / SS-Radio (127.79) 
and the two liberal radio stations, Eyeradio and Voice of America, 
(208.37), (p =.004). This was statistically significant on the unaltered 
significance level. The same holds true for the statistically significant 
difference in distribution between the audiences of SS-TV / SS-Radio and 
the church-run Radio Bakhita (210.25), (p =.035). On the altered 
significant level two more pairs were statistically significant: SS-TV / SS-
Radio and UN-Radio Miraya (183.75), (p = 0.07), and SS-TV / SS-Radio 
and the group of small radio stations (182.87), (p =.029).  
 
Visual inspection of clustered bar charts after cross-tabulation showed 
that listeners of SS-TV / SS-Radio in the majority strongly agreed with 
the need for governmental control of the media (Figure 23). For clarity 
the table shows only agreement, disagreement, and the category ‘I do not 







Figure 23: Wish for the government to control media across audiences 
 
It was expected that the audience of the government-owned media 
would see a need for more control by the government, and that habitual 
listeners of other radio stations would disagree with the statement. In 
this sense, the confirmation of these expectations adds further weight to 
the notion that the sample does indeed reflect reality in Juba. The 
clustered bar chart, however, holds a surprise. The audience of the UN-
Radio Miraya also agreed in the majority with the statement, as does the 
audience of the small South Sudanese radio stations. The difference lies 







Media outlet Agree  Disagree 
Miraya 49% 45.3% 
Eyeradio, VoA 39.6% 55.6% 
Radio Bakhita 42.3% 53.9% 
SS-TV / SS-Radio 72.4% 20.7% 
Small South Sudanese stations 52.4% 47.6% 
 
Figure 24: Approval of government control 
 
Coming to the statement ‘Media criticises the government unfairly and 
too often’, the result of the Kruskal-Wallis H test was close to statistical 
significance (p =.058). The null hypothesis that there is no difference 
between the audiences of different radio stations was retained. Still, the 
result was so close to statistical significance that posthoc analysis was 
nevertheless run and revealed that again the audience of SS-TV / SS-
Radio is most likely to agree with the statement. Due to the non-
significant test result, I could not run pairwise comparisons, hence I 
performed Mann-Whitney U-tests to determine if there are differences 
in the belief that media criticises the government unfairly across 
preference for a media house. Distributions were not similar as assessed 
by visual inspection. Statistically significant differences were found 
between the state-run SS-TV/SS-Radio and the UN-run Radio Miraya (U 
= 1998, z = -2.580, p =.010) and between SS-TV/SS-Radio and the church-
run Radio station Bakhita (U = 233.5, z = -2.475, p =.013). Between SS-TV 
/ SS-Radio and the US-financed radio stations Eyeradio and Voice of 
America the difference was close to statistical significance (U = 912, z = -
1.819, p =.069). No other difference was statistically significant or close 
to it. Listeners of the state-run SS-TV/SS-Radio hold a different attitude 
on media criticising the government. This audience was most likely to 
agree strongly with the statement that ‘Media criticises government 
unfairly and too much’ (Figure 25). In the table, again, the distinction of 







Figure 25: Media critic across audiences 
 
As before, it is hardly a surprise that the audience of SS-TV / SS-radio 
agrees with the statement, as SS-TV is the government’s media station. 
The South Sudanese know it as a mouthpiece of the government. A 
second interesting point here is that no listener of Radio Bakhita, the 
station run by the church in South Sudan, strongly agrees with the 
statement, and a similar count of listeners ticked ‘I do not know’ and 
‘disagreement’. Conclusions from this are rather speculations, but this 
might be an indication that listeners of the church radio are rather wary 
of the radio station's position. Radio Bakhita broadcasts with the western 
idea of being a watchdog on government, but the station lacks the 
international backing, both morally and financially, that Miraya and 
Eyeradio enjoy. Bakhita has been closed down before. The answers given 
in the survey might point to an unwillingness to take a clear stance. 
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Finally, the audiences of smaller South Sudanese stations were also more 
likely to disagree than to agree with the statement. The stations were a 
majority of listeners disagreed with the statement are the UN-Radio 
Miraya and the US-financed stations Eyeradio and Voice of America. 
Statistical significance aside it seems that there is a tendency in the 
audiences of international-led media such as Miraya, Eyeradio, and VoA 
to be not as sensitive to criticism as the audiences of the rather ‘South 
Sudanese’-radio stations Bakhita, SS-TV/SS-Radio and the smaller 
outlets Capital, Liberty, Dream, and City FM. Whether this is a 
consequence of or a precondition for listening to them cannot be 
concluded from this data. 
 
5.4.3 Summary 
Radio is a popular medium in Juba, with a majority of people owning 
radios, listening a few times a day, and using radio as their main source 
of information. The news is named by a majority as a favourite 
programme, while radio dramas are the least popular. Radio’s stated 
popularity is, however, startling, as people in the majority do not think 
that media is balanced, reliable, and neutral, and the majority also has 
doubts about journalists’ education and reliability. This notwithstanding, 
people believe what they hear on the radio and they also believe that the 
government uses media to influence people. It seems that in South Sudan 
people have no trouble with the government mingling with the media. A 
small majority also thinks that the government should control the media. 
On the other hand, South Sudanese in the majority do not think that the 
media criticises the government too much or unfairly. Listeners of the 
state-owned SS-TV and SS-Radio are more likely to opt for government 
control of the media and they also are more likely to agree with the 
statement that the media is criticising the government too harshly. For 
all other statements, it does not make a difference to which radio station 
people are listening. 
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5.5. The state 
 
In this section, I test for peoples’ attitudes towards and beliefs about all 
things state. The country is currently hosting a peacebuilding mission 
and huge chunks of services are delivered by UN-agencies and iNGOs. I 
examine peoples’ attitudes towards the South Sudanese government, the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and iNGOs. Probably 
unsurprising, a majority of respondents do not believe that their 
government is doing good work in the interest of the whole population. 
More surprisingly, UNMISS also does not enjoy a high reputation.  
 
5.5.1 People’s views on their government 
A first question was if people believe that their government works in the 
best interest of all people in South Sudan. With a civil war ongoing in the 
country, which is named a conflict between the Dinka and the Nuer in 
many western newspapers and the government widely seen as a ‘Dinka-
government’, it was expected that a majority of people would say that the 
government is not working in every South Sudanese’s best interest. 
Indeed, so they did, although the difference between those who believe 
that the government is a government for all South Sudanese and those 
who do not is not as wide as expected. 52.8% of respondents rejected the 
statement, with 27.8% strongly disagreeing and 25% disagreeing. 
Opposed to this, 38.9% do believe that the government works in the 
interest of the whole population, with 20.4% strongly agreeing and 
18.5% agreeing (Figure 26). While there is a majority not believing that 
the government does good work for everyone, given the situation in the 





Figure 26: Belief that the government works in the best interest of all South Sudanese 
 
5.5.2 People’s view on UNMISS and iNGOs 
When asked the same question about UNMISS, 48% of respondents said 
that they believe that UNMISS works in everyone’s best interest (22.1% 
strongly agreeing and 25.9% agreeing). 41.4% answered in the negative, 
with 19.5% strongly feeling that way, while 21.9% disagreed (Figure 27). 
This rather unfavourable opinion of UNMISS is surprising, to say the 
least. A possible explanation for the relatively low level of approval might 
be the perception of them as distant. This has been described by Beatrice 
Pouligny, who writes that “for the majority of the population the 
presence of the ‘blue helmets’ is often no more than big Toyota Land 
Cruisers and other all-terrain vehicles in white colours, with armoured 
cars possibly added, waving a blue flag, seen passing along the main 
roads, and, more rarely, stopping.” (Pouligny 2006, p.43). In Juba, many 
people equalise the UN-mission with barricaded, inaccessible 




The picture UNMISS presents is quite similar to the government. It is an 
image of distance; there is the feeling that 'the upper crust' has nothing 
to do with the life of ordinary South Sudanese. This was found in doing 
ethnography, but the numbers from the survey point in the same 
direction.   
 
 
Figure 27: Attitude towards UNMISS 
 
International NGOs, on the other hand, enjoy a higher level of approval. 
73% of respondents agreed to the statement ‘International NGOs are 
doing a good job’. A third (31.9%) of respondents strongly agreed with 
the statement. 19.5% were opposed to the statement with 11.2% 
disagreeing and 8.3% strongly disagreeing. From the dataset no answer 
can be given why iNGOs enjoy a higher level of approval than UNMISS. 
Still, that both of the two more inaccessible bodies, the government and 
UNMISS, are viewed rather unfavourable, while the more accessible 
iNGOs enjoy a better reputation, hints in the direction that accessibility 




Some critiques, however, goes towards iNGOs too. In the context of the 
discrepancies between the government and iNGOs, apparent in a new 
NGO-law and the government’s critiques on iNGO’s lobbying for more 
sanctions against South Sudan (see chapter 4), participants were also 
asked if iNGOs are cooperating enough with the government. 48.6% of 




Figure 28: iNGOs cooperation with government 
 
This is an interesting result. INGOs often see governments as an 
adversary; as a bullying and corrupt entity which makes humanitarian 
work necessary in the first place and then hinders it. This may or may 
not be an accurate view, but on the contrary to it, in Juba the population 
does to an extent wish for a closer cooperation. 
 
5.5.3 Can power change peacefully in South Sudan? 
A major difference between a democratic and an authoritarian regime is 
if and how a government is chosen. It is one of the defining features of 
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democracy that power passes by the will of the people, expressed in free 
and fair elections. Shortly before this survey was conducted, the South 
Sudanese government decided to postpone the constitutionally 
guaranteed elections and to extend President Salva Kiir’s term in office 
(Sudan Tribune 2014), giving rise to some concerns about South Sudan’s 
commitment to democracy66. The South Sudanese population does not 
seem to share this concern. Asked if they think that South Sudanese 
leadership can change peacefully and at the peoples’ will, 65.1% stated 
the belief that it can, while 34.9% said it could not (Figure 29).  
 
 
Figure 29: Belief in peaceful change of leadership 
 
A majority of people think that democratic change is possible. This is 
quite remarkable, as the conflict which has been ongoing since December 
2013 is about leadership and power. It seems significant that despite 
ongoing fighting respondents show a strong belief in the possibility of 
peaceful change.  
                                                        
66 Informal chats with members of the international community in South Sudan. Grave 





5.5.4 Media’s influence on these beliefs 
In the next step of the analysis, it was determined whether these beliefs 
are dependent on a preference for a specific media house. As said before, 
Kruskal-Wallis H tests were performed to identify if there are differences 
in the distribution of the five statements: 
• The government works in the best interest of all people in South Sudan; 
• UNMISS works in the best interest of all people in South Sudan; 
• INGOs are doing a good job; 
• INGOs are not working enough with the government; 
• Leadership in South Sudan can change peacefully and on demand of the 
people. 
 
To which media house one is listening does not make a difference for the 
beliefs if the government works in people’s best interest. This is all the 
more noteworthy as media development is done with the idea to 
contribute to statebuilding. It has already been mentioned (in chapter 4) 
that the UN-Radio Miraya is part of UNMISS’ public information 
department and that broadcasting needs to be in line with the PR-
departments guidelines. When UNMISS was established in 2011 (United 
Nations 2011) its tasks were: 
 
to support the Government in peace consolidation and thereby 
fostering longer-term statebuilding and economic 
development; assist the Government in exercising its 
responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and 
resolution and protect civilians; and help the authorities in 
developing capacity to provide security, establishing the rule of 
law, and strengthening the security and justice sectors in the 
country. 
 
With the outbreak of conflict in December 2013 UNMISS troops were 
increased, and in May 2014 the mission’s main aim shifted to the 
protection of civilians (United Nations 2014). However, until then 
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UNMISS’ main aim was assisting the government, and it is not a far 
stretch that Miraya was a part of this assistance – although an 
unsuccessful part as is clearly indicated by the fact that no difference 
between listeners of different radio stations exists. For people’s attitudes 
towards the state and the government, it does not matter if one is 
listening to the BBC, the UN-Radio Miraya, Voice of America, or the state-
run SS-TV/SS-Radio. For the opinion on iNGOs work and for the belief 
that iNGOs should cooperate better with the government too, no 
connection to preference for a radio programme exists.  
 
Radio station preference does make a difference for the two other 
statements. The distribution of scores referring to the statement that 
UNMISS works in the best interest of people in South Sudan is 
statistically significant between listeners of different radio stations, H(5) 
= 16.908, p =.005. Tests scores were not similar for all groups, as 
assessed by visual inspection of a boxplot. Pairwise comparisons were 
performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction 
for multiple comparisons. Statistical significance was accepted at the p 
<.00333333 level. This slight number is due to 15 comparisons and 
unaltered significance level at p <.05 was then accepted. The posthoc 
analysis revealed statistically significant differences in attitude towards 
UNMISS between a few radio stations. Most interestingly, the significant 
difference is between the BBC (273.65) and other stations. Those are: the 
BBC and category 2, Voice of America and Eyeradio (198.24), (p =.000), 
the BBC and Radio Bakhita (208.58), (p =.026), the BBC and the small 
South Sudanese stations (215.79), (p =.017), and the BBC and Radio 
Miraya (223.79), (p =.003). Apparently, listening to the BBC World 
Service does make a difference, but which attitude do listeners of the BBC 
in South Sudan have towards the work of UNMISS? Cross-tabulation was 
executed between the variables ‘which media’ and ‘attitude towards 
UNMISS’ to answer this question. A clustered bar chart (Figure 30) shows 
that listeners of the BBC are more likely to have an unfavourable attitude. 
BBC-listeners disagreed and strongly disagreed with the majority with 
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the statement ‘UNMISS is working in the best interest of the people in 




Figure 30: Attitude towards UNMISS across media audience 
 
The distribution of scores was also statistically significantly different 
between preference for media and the belief that ‘leadership in South 
Sudan can change peacefully and on demands of the people’ H (5) = 
12.185, p =.032. Visual inspection of a boxplot showed that tests scores 
were not similar for all groups. Again a pairwise comparison was 
performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction 
for multiple comparisons. Statistical significance was, due to 15 
comparisons and a tiny number (p <.00333333), accepted at the 
unaltered significance level p <.05. Values are mean ranks unless 
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otherwise stated. Again, the BBC is the ‘odd’ case. The posthoc analysis 
revealed statistically significant differences in the belief that leadership 
can change peacefully between the BBC (203.41) and UN-Radio Miraya 
(232.13), (p =.04), between the BBC and the liberal radio stations 
Eyeradio and VoA (244.70) (p =.014), between the BBC and Radio 
Bakhita (271.77) (p =.005), and the state-run SS-TV / SS-Radio (206.00) 
and Radio Bakhita (p =.026). Cross-tabulation was then executed 
between the variables ‘which media’ and ‘belief in peaceful leadership 
change’ to understand what the difference is. This revealed that, 
statistical significance aside, Radio Bakhita is the only radio stations 
whose listeners do not believe that leadership can change peacefully and 
on the demand of the people (Figure 31). 
 
The only other eye-catching difference is that the audience of Eyeradio 
and Voice of America are significantly more likely not to believe in the 
possibility of peaceful change. This can be read in a positive way. The 
more critical stance of listeners of Eyeradio and VoA shows that those 
stations do reach their goal. They come with a western underpinning and 
the belief that media needs to act as a watchdog on government. When 
the audience is more critical than the audiences of other media stations, 
this translates to success. On the other hand, it can be argued that this 
critical stance weakens an already weak government, which might result 







Figure 31: Peaceful change of leadership across media audiences 
 
5.5.5 Summary 
This part of the chapter reviewed opinions about the state and 
government of South Sudan, and about the work of UNMISS and iNGOs in 
the country. The reason to include the latter two was that UNMISS and 
iNGOs provide services in the country which one would expect to be 
delivered by the government. The analysis revealed that a large portion 
of respondents do not think that the government is working with the best 
interest of all people in South Sudan at heart. This is not terribly 
surprising as a conflict is ongoing and the economic situation is 
deteriorating. What is surprising is that over a third of respondents do 
think that the government is working in the best interest of all people in 
South Sudan. The work of UNMISS is also not seen favourable in general. 
Again the sample is close to evenly divided between people thinking that 
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UNMISS works in the best interest of the South Sudanese. Different to the 
belief about the government, however, it is an –albeit small – majority 
that thinks positively about UNMISS. INGOs are seen as doing a good job, 
but are asked to cooperate more with the government. Finally, 
respondents were asked if they believe in the possibility of peaceful 
change in South Sudan. A majority do think this is possible. Most of these 
beliefs are not dependent on a preference for a specific radio station, 
with two exceptions. BBC-listeners are more likely to see UNMISS in a 
negative light, and the audience of the church-run Radio station Bakhita 




This section presents the results from questions about interethnic 
relations in the country and the belief that people can live peacefully 
together despite affiliation with different tribes. South Sudan is a multi-
ethnic state, with approximately 62 different tribes living in the country. 
International media more often than not describes the conflict as an 
ethnic one, with the Dinka and the Nuer being the main adversaries. On 
grounds of this view, some international-led media outlets are producing 
and broadcasting so-called peacebuilding programmes. At large, peace 
journalism aims to raise awareness about the possibility of nonviolent 
responses to conflict and thus to prevent outbreaks of violent conflict 
(European Center for Conflict Prevention 2003; Lynch and McGoldrick 
2007; Staub et al 2010; Staub 2013). In South Sudan, this is especially 
done by the UN-Radio Miraya and the iNGO Internews’ Eyeradio. An 
example is the radio drama ‘Sawa Shabab’ produced by the Dutch iNGO 
Free Press Unlimited (no date) and broadcast in South Sudan by the UN-
Radio Miraya and the church-financed Radio Bakhita. Eyeradio 
broadcasts a programme named ‘In search of peace’ (Eyeradio no date). 
The assumption when looking at the survey is thus, first, that the data 
will show a divided country, and second that people listening to the UN-
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Radio, Eyeradio, or Bakhita will have more favourable attitudes towards 
people from other tribes than the audiences of the South Sudanese radio 
stations or the government-owned media SS-TV / SS-Radio. As before, 
descriptive statistics will be presented and are followed by Kruskal-
Wallis H tests which shall determine whether the distribution of opinion 
and beliefs is connected to a preference for a media house. The sample 
has been regrouped. As Eyeradio broadcasts a programme explicitly for 
peace, the station is not grouped together with Voice of America. The BBC 
World Service is excluded reducing the sample to 372 cases, as this part 
of the chapter looks explicitly at the effects of peace programmes. 
 
5.6.1 No division along ethnic lines 
The assumption that the country is divided along ethnic lines cannot be 
confirmed. Despite the ongoing conflict and the failing peace talks the 
data do not show a division between the tribes. Respondents were asked 
if they trust people from tribes other than their own. 63.2% of 
respondents are not of the opinion that only members of their own tribes 
are trustworthy, 29.3% strongly disagreed with the statement, 33.9% 
disagreed. 33.1%, answered in the affirmative with 12.5% strongly 
agreeing and 20.6% agreeing. Although a third of respondents state that 
they mistrust members of other tribes, the majority does not. The 
statement is, however, a bit theoretical. Trust is rather shown in 
everyday life than stated in a questionnaire. To add a bit flesh to the bone, 
respondents were asked about the composition of their social circle, the 
importance of living in a segregated neighbourhood, and if they have 
interethnic contact in everyday life. The answers to these questions show 
rather a mixed society than a divided one. 84.4% of respondents said 
they do have contact with members of other tribes in everyday life. 





Figure 32: Contact across groups 
 
 




To add further to this picture, 87.4% of respondents said that they have 
friends with a different tribal affiliation (Figure 34). 
 
  
Figure 34: Friendships 
 
Asked how important it is to live in a segregated neighbourhood, only 
18.3% said that this would be important, with 8.6% feeling strongly this 
way. A majority, however, has no trouble with living in a mixed 






Figure 35: Desire to live in a segregated neighbourhood 
 
5.6.2 The belief in a peaceful coexistence 
Lastly, participants were asked to respond to the statement ‘I do believe 
that Dinka and Nuer and all other tribes in South Sudan can live together 
peacefully’. 56.3% stated that they believe in a peaceful coexistence, 
31.8% strongly agreed with this statement, and 24.5% agreed (Figure 
36). While the majority of participants believe in the possibility of 
peaceful coexistence, more than a third (38.1%) does not. This is a 
puzzling result when thinking about the prior numbers. 84.4% of 
respondents said that they have contact with members of other tribes in 
everyday life (Figure 32) and 78.2% said that it is not of particular 
importance (Figure 33). A majority also has a mixed social circle (Figure 
34) and there is no trouble with mixed neighbourhoods (Figure 35). 




Figure 36: Belief in peaceful coexistence 
 
There are two possible explanations for this. First, some respondents 
might have made a difference because one statement asked for ‘members 
of other tribes’ while the other explicitly asked also for Dinka and Nuer. 
These are the two biggest groups in South Sudan and the two main 
adversary tribes; singling them out might have made more people 
doubtful about the possibility of peace. Secondly, respondents might 
make a difference between peaceful relations in everyday life and the 
possibility of a political peace deal. What shows here might be what 
Roger MacGinty names a “grudging coexistence”: social rules that people 
build and use to navigate in deeply divided societies (MacGinty 2014, 
p.549). These social practices enable people to live in a country in civil 
conflict and maintain social ties to members of adversary groups. 
 
To evaluate divisions in South Sudanese society further, I examined then 
if the belief in peaceful coexistence is connected to tribe membership. 
Interestingly, it is not the Dinka and the Nuer that do not believe in 
peaceful coexistence, but the members of other tribes. A Kruskal-Wallis 
H test was run to find out if there were differences in the distribution of 
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the belief that peaceful coexistence is possible across tribes. The test did 
show a significant difference between tribes (p =.000). As before, 
pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn's (1964) procedure 
with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. This showed 
statistically significant difference between all three groups; between 
Dinka (189.23) and Nuer (235.50) (p =.013), Dinka and a member of 
other tribes (287.64) (p =.000), and Nuer and members of other tribes (p 
=.0070). Cross-tabulation was executed between the variables, and 
visual inspection of a clustered bar chart showed that while Dinka in vast 
numbers strongly agree that peaceful coexistence is possible, Nuer do so 
in smaller numbers, but still with a majority. Members of other tribes, 
however, strongly disagree with the statement. While the groups of 
Dinka and Nuer are seen as the warmongers and their quarrel is 
understood as the primary driver of the conflict, members of these tribes 
believe in peaceful coexistence. Members of other tribes in South Sudan 
do not (Figure 37). During observations and informal chats with 
members of other tribes, especially Equatorians, participants often 
phrased mistrust towards the SPLM, which they described as a ‘Dinka 
movement’. For the common Equatorian, the hopes of independence 
have been shattered. Before independence, they were suppressed by 
Khartoum. During the civil war, they were domineered by the SPLM/A. 
Today they feel suppressed by the government, which is formed by the 
SPLM. It is hardly startling that members of other tribes mistrust the 
possibility of peaceful coexistence. The sample analysed here, however, 
only offered 'Dinka', 'Nuer' and 'Member of another tribe'67 as categories; 
it cannot be determined, which tribes among the smaller groups hold the 
most suspicion against the possibility of a South Sudan for all its people. 
This would be a question for further research.  
                                                        
67 This rather rough categorisation was chosen because the Dinka and the Nuer are the 





Figure 37: Belief in peaceful coexistence across tribes 
 
5.6.3 Peace programmes’ influence on interethnic ties 
Finally, the question whether a preference for a radio station leads to 
more favourable attitudes towards members of different tribes needed 
to be answered. As the UN-Radio Miraya, Eyeradio and Radio Bakhita are 
broadcasting programmes with the explicit aim of supporting peace it 
was expected that listeners of this media would show more favourable 
attitudes than listeners of other stations. Three Kruskal-Wallis H tests 
were run to determine if the distribution of the believes that one should 
only trust people from one’s own tribe, that it is important to live in a 
segregated neighbourhood and that peaceful coexistence is possible, are 
differently distributed across listeners of different media. This was not 
the case. In all three instances the null hypotheses had to be retained. 
There are no statistically significant differences in the distribution of 
attitudes towards members of other tribes dependent on a preference 
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for media. Despite this, cross-tabulation was run for visual inspection to 
look for insights even if the distribution is not statistically significant. The 
distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘simple’ disagreement and agreement 
are in the following omitted for clarity.  
 
 
Figure 38: Trust across audiences 
 
The first cross-tabulation was executed between ‘media preference’ and 
the statement ‘I do not trust members from tribes other than my own’ 
(Figure 38 above). All audiences of media stations show a roughly similar 
shape. All have a majority of listeners disagreeing with the statement, 
indicating that they trust people from different tribes. The same holds 
true when looking at the bar chart for media preference and the 
statement ‘It is important to me to live in a neighbourhood with only 
174 
 
members of my own tribe’. Audiences of all media stations in the 




Figure 39: Neighbourhoods across audiences 
 
Finally looking at the clustered bar chart for media preference and the 
statement ‘I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all other tribes can live 
together peacefully in South Sudan’, the picture changes a bit. All 
audiences do in the majority either agree or strongly agree with the 






Figure 40: Belief in peaceful coexistence across audiences 
 
However, when examining actual ranks of the responses (strongly agree, 
agree, I do not know, disagree, strongly disagree), important details 
become visible. The audience of the small radio stations Liberty, City, 
Capital and Dream show a tie between strongly agree and strongly 
disagree. Furthermore, within the audience of UN-Radio Miraya, nearly 
as many people disagreed strongly with the statement as agree with it 
(Figure 41). This might look like nit-picking, but the difference is 
important. From Figure 40 it can be concluded that Radio Miraya 
listeners are in the huge majority believing in the possibility of 
interethnic cooperation and peace. Figure 41 shows that there is, in fact, 





Figure 41: Belief in peaceful coexistence across audiences II 
 
In general, it cannot be said that the broadcasting of, or listening to, peace 
programmes makes a difference to people’s attitudes towards members 
of other tribes.  
 
5.6.4 Summary 
From this sample, it can neither be concluded that South Sudanese 
society is severely divided along ethnic lines nor that the presence of 
international-led media and the broadcasting of peace programmes 
makes a difference for interethnic cooperation and reconciliation. In the 
majority, respondents have contact with people from other tribes in 
everyday life, their circle of friends and acquaintances is composed of a 
mix of different tribes, and people do not find it important to live in 
segregated neighbourhoods. Strikingly, while aa majority, albeit a small 
one, believe in peaceful coexistence between the tribes, fewer people 
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believe in it than experience it. Also, the Dinkas’ and the Nuers’ believe 
in bigger numbers in peaceful cooperation than people from other tribes. 
However, a connection between a preference for a particular radio 
station and a favourable attitude towards members of other tribes or a 
belief in peaceful coexistence could not be found.  
5.7 Chapter conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have investigated the effects of western-led media in 
South Sudan using a social survey, while also examining the process of 
survey research in a country of the global South. Surveys come with 
advantages in complex environments; they also come with 
disadvantages. First, surveys deliver information on how entrenched a 
phenomenon is in the society. Furthermore, during the process of 
conducting this research project in Juba, it became clear that they also 
allowed for greater inclusivity. When conducting the interview part of 
this project, regular people were wary of answering questions in a 
recorded one-on-one interview, and their voices were hence hardly 
heard68. Questionnaire research healed this problem. Answering 
questions with clear, already phrased answers asked by a South 
Sudanese national was apparently easier than to be interviewed by a 
Kawaja. The survey hence proved to be a tool to gain access to people 
who would otherwise not be heard. A problem was drawing a 
representative sample from the population. I focus on Juba but even 
there population numbers are unknown; the situation was made worse 
by the outbreak of violent conflict in December 2013 when an unknown 
number of people fled either to or from Juba. A minimum sample size of 
354 cases was sought, 500 questionnaires were distributed, resulting 
after data cleaning in a sample of 461 cases. From this, BBC-listeners 
were excluded when the question explicitly focused on South Sudan 
media, reducing the sample to 372. While gender, age, and tribal 
association are relatively close to South Sudanese reality, having been 
                                                        
68 A detailed account of this can be found in chapter 6. 
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collected by students the majority of respondents are students. This is 
far away from reproducing Juba’s population. Still, the focus on students 
in the survey is not as problematic as one might think. No public 
electricity distribution system exists in South Sudan. Having power in the 
house – and thus access to media – is a matter of money. Students, on the 
other hand, can be assumed to come from relatively affluent 
backgrounds – they could not afford to study otherwise. This is a 
population which is the most likely to have access to media, thus it is a 
population which is of interest when assessing media development 
campaigns. Conducting the survey showed the importance of paying 
close attention to how a sample is collected. I conducted the survey twice, 
and this showed how interviewers seeing me had a direct impact on how 
they collected data and consequently how useful the data were for me. 
The process of data gathering revealed insights into the importance of 
the interplay between researcher and environment and into the process 
of researching as a social activity. Awareness and reflexivity about data 
gathering are necessary when doing quantitative research. In this sense, 
quantitative research needs to be ethnographically informed.   
 
I used descriptive statistics and nonparametric tests to investigate what 
attitudes and beliefs South Sudanese held towards the media, the state, 
and groups and if these beliefs are connected to a preference for a radio 
station. Respondents’ stance on media is rather critical. They do not see 
media in their country as balanced, accurate, and neutral, and they also 
do not have a great opinion of their journalists. The sample is evenly 
divided on the question of whether journalists are well-educated. This, 
however, does not lead to reservations towards media. A majority 
believes what is broadcast, although a majority also is convinced that the 
government uses media to influence people. This is contradictory, unless 
it means that respondents do not care too much about being influenced 
by the government. That this indeed might be the case is further 
supported by two other measures. A small majority thinks that the 
government is right to control the media, and a third of respondents said 
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that government should pay for media, thus opting for state-owned 
media. A further third wanted a business model and a quarter wanted 
the UN to pay. For statements on media accuracy, journalist education, 
believing the media and government’s influence, it does not make a 
difference which radio station respondents heard. For the statement, if 
the government needs to control media, significant differences have been 
found. Listeners of the state-run radio SS-TV / SS-Radio do agree in the 
majority with the need for government control. This is unsurprising – the 
audience of SS-TV / SS-Radio can be expected to be supportive of 
government measures. In addition, however, the clustered bar chart 
showed that listeners of the UN-run Radio Miraya and the audiences of 
the smaller South Sudanese stations Liberty, Dream, Capital and City also 
in the majority agree that the government should control the media. 
 
Media development and internationally-led media have the explicit aim 
to inform people on current affairs, hold government accountable, and 
enable the population to participate in governance. It was hence 
expected that audiences of the UN-run Radio Miraya, the iNGO-run 
Eyeradio, of Voice of America in South Sudan, and of the church-run 
Radio Bakhita would show different attitudes than audiences of the 
state-run SS-TV / SS-Radio and the small South Sudanese radio stations. 
Testing and visual inspections of graphs, however, told a different story. 
In the majority, respondents do not believe that the government works 
in the best interest of all South Sudanese and it does not matter which 
radio station people listen to. UNMISS does not enjoy a much better 
reputation among South Sudanese, with respondents close to evenly 
divided on the statement that UNMISS works in the best interest of all 
South Sudanese. The most critical listeners are the audience of the BBC 
World Service. INGOs enjoy a better reputation, as respondents approve 
of their work but wish for more cooperation with the government. As 
there are well-published problems between the national government 
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and the international community69, this is an interesting result. Finally, a 
majority believes that leadership can change peacefully and on demand 
of the people. Here it made a difference to which radio station people 
listen to. The audience of Radio Bakhita was the least likely to believe in 
peaceful change. 
 
The conflict in South Sudan has often been described as an ethnic one 
with hostile groups fighting against each other, and the Dinka and Nuer 
as the main adversaries. The survey does not confirm this view. A severe 
division along ethnic lines cannot be found. A majority of people have 
contact across tribal lines in everyday life, and a majority does not see 
this as a big deal. Furthermore, a huge majority has friends with a 
different tribal association, and a majority does not find it important to 
live in a segregated neighbourhood.  The conclusion here can only be that 
people live interethnic cooperation despite the ongoing conflict. This 
underpins the notion that the conflict is not ethnic. Secondly, the data 
revealed that while a majority of respondents believe that Dinka, Nuer 
and all tribes can live peacefully together, a statistically significant 
difference was found. Dinka and Nuer believe in the majority in peaceful 
coexistence, while members of other tribes do not. Lastly, for what 
attitudes people held against members of other tribes than their own it 
does not make a difference to what media they are listening.  
 
In general, from the survey it can be concluded that the effects of 
international-led media in South Sudan are not as desired. There is no 
evidence that people that are listening to a specific type of media have a 
favourable attitude towards government or towards people from other 
tribes. The promises of media development, to enable people to 
participate in governance, to strengthen democracy and to contribute to 
peace, cannot be seen as fulfilled.  
  
                                                        
69 See the article in Appendix 1.6, p.29.  
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6 – Interviews 
 
It has been estimated that 90% of all social research comes in the one or 
the other form with interviews (Holstein and Gubrium 1995) and it has 
been said that we are living in an interview society (Denzin 2001b, p.23).  
To an extent, all methods employed in this thesis come with an interview 
element. There were informal chats when doing ethnography and highly 
structured interviews in the survey part. This chapter examines the 
effects of media in South Sudan using unstructured interviews. The aim 
was to gain insights into people’s experience (Silverman 1993, p.91), to 
achieve an understanding of how the South Sudanese perceive the media 
in their country, and how this understanding is congruent with the idea 
of western media. The second line of inquiry was again if media has 
brought results in the two areas it is supposedly acting upon, namely the 
state and relations between groups. While it is not possible to establish a 
causal link from preference for a radio station to an attitude, value or 
belief, it seems nevertheless reasonable to expect attitudes and values 
closer to the western thinking after some years of western media’s work 
in the country. 28 people were interviewed – less than initially was 
hoped for. Media is supposedly working on the masses, and this provided 
in theory a wide pool of possible interviewees to choose from. In practice, 
recruiting people for interviews was harder than expected. Mostly, only 
members of the local elites and journalists agreed to interviews. This 
gives rise to a concern about whose voices are heard in interview studies 
– an important question due to the popularity of the method.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. I first provide details on the execution 
and the strengths and weaknesses of the method. Following this, the 
results from the interview study concerning the media, the state, and 
groups are presented. In the interest of readability, information on the 
interview partner is given after a full quote (>30 words). Otherwise, this 
information is provided in a footnote. In order to protect people’s 
identities, only limited information is given. Grammar has been carefully 
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adjusted where necessary. Based on the interviews, I argue that media is 
differently understood in South Sudan than among the international 
expats engaged in media development; and the attempts to implement 
media based on western understanding leads to problems for the newly 
trained journalists in South Sudan and for the statebuilding project as it 
weakens the state instead of strengthening it. The interviews show that 
there is no mutually agreed definition on the media’s role, on what 
‘freedom of expression’ precisely means, and how far this freedom can 
and should go in a country experiencing internal conflict. The conflict is 
mostly identified as a power struggle, and not as a consequence of the 
multi-ethnic nature of the country. Ethnicity is seen as playing a role, but 
not as an initiating factor. 
 6.1 On doing interviews 
 
We were sitting in the shade of a large mango tree in the garden of Juba 
Bridge, one of the restaurants on the banks of the Nile. The table was 
laden with water, coffee and tea. It was a sunny Saturday midday, too 
early for the influx of Juba’s elites and expats to come for dinner; the 
garden was still relatively empty. Only a handful of people were there, 
two couples sitting on tables directly by the water, three men, drinking 
beer and telling jokes, and a lone guy, close to our table, writing in a 
notebook. I was sitting with a media activist who was involved with a 
couple of community radio stations in the provinces. It was my second 
meeting with him, and he had suggested the restaurant. My voice 
recorder was on the table but hidden under a few sheets of paper and a 
newspaper. We talked, he answered my questions patiently and friendly, 
providing insights into South Sudanese everyday life, his personal 
experience and thoughts, and the social situation. After some hours, we 
concluded the interview and paid. When we left he nodded towards the 
notetaking guy, acknowledging and greeting him. Outside the restaurant, 
he told me the guy was his ‘shadow’ from the security forces. He said he 
was always followed. When he saw my rather concerned face he laughed. 
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I asked if it had been wise to meet in public under these circumstances. 
He insisted that it was “no big deal”.  
 
I was nervous the next couple of days, wondering if he was okay. 
Following this, I avoided doing interviews in public, insisting on visiting 
people in their offices or inviting them to my office or apartment, and I 
toned my questions down; I did not ask as direct questions as I had 
before. It took some days before I calmed down, wondering if I had finally 
become paranoid.   
 
6.1.1 The interview as a social situation  
An interview is a social situation (Briggs 1986, p.2; Kvale, 2007, p. xvii; 
Johnson and Rowland 2012, p.100). It happens in the context of 
interviewer, participant and environment, and, as the above shows, the 
answers gained but also the questions asked are shaped by the dynamics 
of the research situation. The ‘interview as a social situation’ issue 
influences interviews in many ways. Perera notes that in conflict 
research, narratives are not only framed by international peacekeepers 
but also by local actors. Writing about her interviews in Congo with 
different actors, all concerning the leader of an armed group, she notes 
that for the Congolese respondents the stories reveal the dynamics that 
they feel drive the conflict. “For Claude, the NGO worker, it was Rwandan 
interference. For Didier, the businessman, it was western interference 
more generally. For Etienne, the journalist, it was exploitation, 
disillusioned youth and marginalisation.” (Perera 2017, p.50). Her 
respondents do not so much reveal a truth about the leader of the armed 
group, but disclose what they see as a cause of the conflict. Respondents 
and interviewer’s background, feelings, and hopes all influence the 
answers given.  
  
This gives rise to the question whether participants have and are 
providing insights into what is ‘really out there’, or if they are actively 
constructing meaning during the interview (Alvesson 2011). In this 
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study, I was interested in respondents’ perceptions and feelings, and the 
establishment of objective facts was not a primary concern of mine. Still, 
I analyse the interviews within a frame of a social context that exists 
independently and objectively from respondents’ experience and 
meaning-making. In the context of my research question, I was interested 
in my interviewees’ experience, what they feel, think and how they 
understand the situation they and the country are in. The approach 
chosen was phenomenological – I wanted to probe the ‘lifeworld’ and 
understand the ‘lived experience’ of my participants (Husserl 1964). It 
seems, however, doubtful that ‘lived experience’, ‘objective facts’ and 
‘constructed meanings’ can be clearly divided. It is likely that all three are 
present. In this way, I see my respondents’ accounts as a facet of their 
experience, which is ultimately connected to the social context and 
milieu the respondent is coming from, while the experience is caused by 
an objectively existing environment (Danermark et al. 2002; Crouch and 
McKenzie 2006).  
 
All interviews I conducted contained a mix of questions asking for 
descriptions, interpretations and feelings. How much even simple 
questions are open to interpretation and construction becomes clear 
when looking at a question like: ‘Can you tell me what radio stations 
there are in Juba?’ I almost always asked this question, and it was 
answered in many different ways, with the UN-funded Radio Miraya 
sometimes being named a ‘private radio station’ and the government-
owned SS-TV and SS-Radio labelled a ‘public’ station. This provided 
insights into how different media systems are understood in South 
Sudan, compared to the understanding of western media experts 
working in media development. Furthermore, it provided insights into 
how people understand this particular radio station and how this might 
be connected to their position in society. An important question with 
regards to interview studies is then maybe not only if answers describe 
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an objective reality or a constructed one. As said before70, reality is 
constructed, but constructs are based on facts that are often measurable 
(Danermark et al. 2002). It seems important to figure out which 
interpretations reflect interviewees’ realities – the essence, to stay in the 
phenomenological vocabulary – and which are constructed during and 
because of the interview situation. This might be especially important 
when research is done in a developing country, where the positionality 
of the researcher can create a clear power relationship. In my case, this 
showed especially in interviews with journalists. Many of them tried to 
sell me a western idea of the media in the hope I would report positively 
about their media house to wherever it was I was reporting to71. Twice I 
was directly asked about funding possibilities. Interview participants 
react to the interviewer, which has an impact on answers.  
 
6.1.2 The trouble with recruitment 
Access has been named a problem in ethnography (Bryman 2001a, 
p.xviii; Bryman 2001b, pp.292–298; Feldman et al. 2003; Harrington 
2003, p.593; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, pp.42–43; Sarantakos 
2013, p.220). Still, in Juba it was easier to gain access for observations 
than to recruit people for interviews. The plan had been to interview 
people belonging to one of four categories: journalists and media 
activists, government and politicians, civil society, comprising of 
university teachers, NGO-workers, church members and other activists, 
and finally, regular people. It was this last group that was the hardest to 
access72. At first, I thought that people were scared about possible 
                                                        
70 See chapter 3. 
71 The belief that I had more influence and power than I actually had was not constantly 
present but came up regularly. In fact, the only person I was reporting to was my PhD-
supervisor. I am not sure what he would have made of such information. 
72 With politicians, it was usually a problem to find a time that suited them, journalists 
were happy to talk about their difficulties and most people I approached from the wide 
category of civil society were also willing to share opinion and insight. Regular people, 
frankly, were not. People flinched when I asked for an interview. Sometimes I was 
offered help with drawing up a questionnaire “which people in South Sudan would be 
more willing to answer to”. Even my class at the University fell silent when I asked if 
someone would be willing to do an interview with me for my PhD research. 
186 
 
consequences and made a point of stressing anonymity. This did not 
help. It took a while to understand that people were scared that they 
would not understand the questions, thus could not answer it and hence 
would lose face. Journalists, activists, academic staff, and politicians are 
used to engaging in discussions, to answer and ask questions, and they 
enjoy a level of assertiveness that regular people do not possess. The 
problem encountered was not confidentiality but confidence, or rather a 
lack thereof. 
 
There was no solution for this problem. In the end, I managed to recruit 
28 participants. Interviews were roughly between 30 and 90 minutes 
long. Ten interviews were done with journalists (group 1). Six interviews 
belong in group 2, consisting of politicians, both members of the current 
government and of opposition parties. Group 3 is very widely composed 
of what might be named civil society members, although following a 
rather loose definition of civil society. Interviewees were church and 
media activists, academic staff, and teachers. Eight interviews belong in 
this category. Group 4, finally, in lieu of a better word, looks at ‘listeners’, 
which here means South Sudanese who are not activists, journalists or 
government officials. Only four interviews belong in this group: a driver, 
a student, a restaurant manager, and a security guard. Everyone in this 
group agreed to an interview after a longer acquaintance with me, save 
for one person who was working for a friend of mine and was asked by 
this friend if an interview was possible. The journalists and media 
managers were approached based on their different levels of 
professionalism, the stages of their career and their working places. In 
this group there are people working for iNGO-run radios, for newspapers 
and for the state-owned media house SS-TV / SS-radio. The group of 
politicians contains staff from the Ministry for Information and 
Broadcast, the SPLM and SPLA and the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, 
as well as one local politician and an opposition politician. Again, the 
people were approached with a request for an interview. More had been 
contacted, but some interviews were not possible due to time 
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constraints. Group three, civil society, contains eight interviews. There is 
a leader of a national NGO, some academics, two people engaged in local 
media development, a South Sudanese communications adviser, and a 
researcher. Interviewees were approached because of their connection 
to media and because of their public involvement in or public discussion 
of the peace negotiations that happened at the time under the auspices 
of the IGAD in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. The categorisation I use 
here is problematic as distinctions are not clear-cut. University 
professors are listeners, the media activist has once been a journalist, 
and the student I interviewed might well go on to work for the 
government. The distinction is mostly meant to provide information, in 
the widest sense, on the position of the people in the group towards 
media and to provide some context. Literally everyone I interviewed 
asked for and was guaranteed anonymity. South Sudan is a government 
controlled area and questions about the government and about the 
media are especially sensitive in the current situation73. 
6.2 Media 
 
The situation for media is dire in South Sudan. The country is classified 
as ‘not free’ in terms of the press by Reporters sans Frontières (2016), 
and journalists have been talking about oppression and harassment: 
 
Of course, one time I did a story on the four billion dollars which 
were [sic] disappeared. That thing, we wrote it, it was published. 
When it came out, after two days, the security personnel went 
where I sleep, where I stay [but] (…) I was in Dubai. They 
thought I could not be found. (…) Then I just decided, I changed... 
I became a nomadic. I could sleep just everyplace.  
(Midcareer journalist, male/Interview 15) 
                                                        
73 As the situation in South Sudan is highly kinetic and volatile, I also omitted the names 
of people who did not ask for anonymity. This decision was made following the attack 
on a compound popular with Aid workers in Juba that resulted in several rapes and the 
death of local journalist (The Guardian 2016). The list of interviews giving rudimentary 




Interviewees agree that the harsh line against the media began in the 
aftermath of the outbreak of violent conflict in December 2013. This was 
when the government on the one hand, and the journalists and 
international community on the other hand disagreed on what role 
media has to fulfil in society. The emerging narrative was of a media that, 
while informing the population, still needed to follow government policy 
especially in the security-sensitive situation after December 2013. This 
came with the view and suspicion that the international community 
undermined the government’s reputation and mingled in the internal 
affairs of the sovereign nation of South Sudan. Problems like this are not 
unheard of. Statebuilding projects and the implementation of western 
institutions in non-western states often produce tensions and problems, 
to the point that “despite all case-related differences, the comparison of 
the compiled cases suggests that there are structural similarities 
regarding limits to contemporary statebuilding that do not emanate from 
specific contexts or actors but are of a more general nature” (Bliesemann 
de Guevara 2010, p.113). The media is not usually included as an 
institution in a statebuilding project, yet, as media development tries to 
implement western media structures in a non-western country, it is 
likely to encounter and create similar problems. In South Sudan, the 
concurring narrative to the government’s reading of the situation, heard 
mostly from journalists, was of a ruthless government that engaged 
effectively in censorship. The self-perception of journalists was of special 
interest here. In particular, the younger journalists pleaded for an 
unregulated media, maybe repeating the mantra of many media 
development practitioners (Putzel and van der Zwan 2006, p.13, 14).  
 
6.2.1 What role for media? 
When asking what role media should fulfil in a society mainly two 
functions were stated. Journalists named media ‘the parliament of the 
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people’ and ‘the voice of the voiceless’74. It fulfils this function by 
speaking on behalf of the people with the leaders75, and by asking for and 
airing people’s views, which are supposedly heard by the government 
and inform it on the people’s will76. Media is understood as a 
communication tool, and it is a two-way communication: acts and 
policies from the government are broadcast to the people, people’s 
opinions on these acts and policies are collected and broadcast, and thus 
the government is informed on the people’s will and opinions. As an 
interviewee phrased it: 
 
We do call it as the voice of the voiceless, the parliament of the 
people, because we do call the local people down with the 
government, meaning we are the bridge between the people and 
the government. We get what the government says, we bring it 
to the people. We also track what the people say and take it to 
the government. (Senior staff, female/Interview 1) 
 
In another interview the emphasis was put on asking the population for 
their opinion and broadcasting it to the government: 
 
So we have this like VoxPops77 getting the people, yeah. They 
always get the views and opinions of people and we go to the 
market. They actually try to know what is going on and 
everything. (Former junior journalist, female/Interview 5) 
 
In the groups of journalists, civil society members and listeners 
interviewed, media was also named ‘a mouthpiece of society’78 and a 
focus was on media’s role to inform and educate people79. This is 
                                                        
74 Senior staff, female/Interview 1. 
75 Senior staff, female/Interview 1. 
76 Former journalist, female/Interview 5, academic staff, male/Interview 2, senior staff, 
female/Interview 1. 
77 Radio slang for ‘Vox Populi’, Voices of the people. A reporter asks people on the street 
for their opinion on an issue. Several statements are recorded and broadcast together.  
78 Academic staff, male/Interview 2. 
79 Security manager, male/Interview 3, media activist, male/Interview 6, junior 
journalist, male/Interview 7. 
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basically in line with the ideas of western media. Although, and 
strikingly, the idea of media as a watchdog on government is mostly 
absent. It was only mentioned by one journalist: 
 
You need independent media so that they are a watchdog for the 
people. To speak on behalf of the people, what the people are 
saying. It should be reflected. You should know it and not only 
that, there are certain things that go wrong especially things like 
corruption. Very big in this country and if the media doesn't 
speak out, the government we know will not take any action. It 
could lead to the collapse of the regime. We try to dialogue with 
them [the government], but is not easy. Sometimes they 
understand, sometimes they don't understand. (Senior 
journalist, male/Interview 9) 
 
This person had a very long career as a journalist starting in Khartoum 
and working also as a foreign correspondent for international media. The 
watchdog-idea, the political function of media, is at the heart of how 
media is conceptualised in the West (Coronel 2010). In developing 
countries with media being owned privately but also by the government 
and also supported by international organisations, iNGOs and foreign 
governments, this function is present but media is also seen as an 
educational tool. This might be the reason why media’s control function 
on government is not phrased prominently here. Still, the absence is 
surprising. Taken together with the view that government needs to build 
the capacity of journalists, as stated by academic staff at Juba 
University80, this might be interpreted as a sign that in South Sudan 
media is not seen as an institution opposed to the government, but as an 
institution of the state and hence a supporting element of the 
government. Thinking about media’s long history in the Sudan as a 
mouthpiece of government and the rebel movement during the second 
civil war (Arop 2006; Wani 2014) this seems reasonable. However, one 
interviewee said, that "one of the things that still needs to be developed 
                                                        
80 Academic staff, male/Interview 2. 
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in South Sudan is investigative reporting which is at its weakest point at 
the moment"81. Missing capacity to fulfil the watchdog role might explain 
why it has rarely been mentioned in the interviews. A third possible 
explanation is that the harsh line the government has on media gives 
people the feeling that media cannot act as a watchdog on government, 
even if it possibly should do this. This is also a clear indication of the 
informalisation process (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012) in the media. 
While established by international expats with international standards 
in mind, the actual practices bend to social realities in the country.   
 
With regard to the idea that media is giving ‘voice to the people’, this 
seems a questionable idea at best. First, the collection of vox pops or the 
broadcast of call-in shows is hardly representative. Individual opinions 
are just individual opinions; they can hardly be seen as the will of the 
people. Even in a large call-in show only a tiny minority can state their 
view (Stremlau et al. 2015). Furthermore, for being a two-way 
communication, a receiver of the broadcast information is necessary: 
someone needs to listen. There is no evidence that the government does 
listen to these shows with the aim to have the will of the people inform 
policy. Quite opposed to the idea of a tool to communicate with the 
people, the government sees media rather as a tool to communicate to 
the people: 
We need it [the media] of course. (…) In terms of recruitment 
and in terms of dissemination of information to the public. It 
started since the SPLM/SPLA days. Back in the bush, the SPLA 
had a radio station and a radio broadcast. It was the only tool, 
means, to send instant messages to the people. The same applies 
to South Sudan. (Senior government official/interview 28) 
 
In another interview, conducted in the Ministry of Information and 
Broadcast, this thought was put even further: 
 
                                                        
81 Media activist, male/Interview 6. 
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We believe that media is the ears and the eyes of the people. 
Media plays a role; even during our times of struggle, media was 
able to play an important role even after the CPA was signed. 
Even the radios and the media houses (…) like from the UN and 
from other places, they played a very, very important and 
crucial role in bringing this country together. (…) They played 
an important role. But. Behind [this] is always a policy that are 
[sic] not in line with our policy, the policy of the government, 
and not in line with the constitution of the country. So. The role 
of the media here, is to make sure that the policies of the 
government to bring peace, to bring harmony, development in 
all aspects of life, are being put out there for everybody. 
(Employee in the Ministry of Information, male/Interview 18) 
 
These are contradictory views on the role of media. Journalists see it as 
an information tool that has the task to inform the government on the 
will of the people. Opposed to this, the government sees media as an 
information tool only for the people. The aim is to inform people of 
government policy. Furthermore, the government sees the international 
community as a troublemaker and its ideas regarding media as an attack. 
Judging from this, the idea that media is acting as a communication 
device, making government more approachable to the population and 
henceforth strengthening democracy can only be seen as an assumption 
of international development (Autesserre 2017), and a selling argument 
for media development organisations (Allen and Stremlau 2005). 
 
6.2.2 Reasons for oppression 
As a starting point for the deterioration of the relationship between the 
government and the journalists, repeatedly the events of December 2013 
have been named82. It is clear that journalists are scared: 
  
                                                        
82 Security manager, male/Interview 3, junior journalist, male/Interview15, midcareer 
journalist, male/Interview 24, media manager, male/Interview 28. 
193 
 
If they [journalists] tried to report something, like to tell the, for 
example, if a killing happen and then they were like they want 
people to know that it happen, so they [government] just cover 
everything up or maybe they kill someone (…). That's what 
happened. That's why we are like kind of scared and that's the 
reason why I'm not working as a journalist now. (Former 
journalist, female/Interview 5) 
 
Even us, our editor-in-chief, who was by then … she came from 
France, she was once arrested also. She was blamed by the 
government that she broadcasted information from the rebel 
site. (Junior journalist, male/Interview 7) 
 
In the group of interviewed journalists and media managers, everyone 
stated that the government oppresses the media83, because the media 
interprets its job differently than the government wishes for:  
 
They are saying that [radio station name] is a rebel because 
really, they have that thought that [radio station name] is only, 
should only broadcast gospel and pray to the people without 
touching what is happening to them in the conflict. (Senior staff, 
female/Interview 1) 
 
Looking at all interviewees, there are different narratives as to why the 
government is harsh on the media. Foremost, missing professionalism of 
the journalists is blamed. This accusation came from the group of 
interviewees working for or in the government or ruling party: 
 
There are so many of them. Journalists. But are they really 
qualified? If you see all of them - say, you see two. Maybe they 
are experienced. But if you see many of them. 80% are 
                                                        
83 Senior staff, female/Interview 1, junior journalist, female/Interview 5, junior 
journalist, male/Interview 7, senior journalist, male/Interview 8, midcareer journalist, 
male/Interview 9, senior journalist, male/Interview 10, junior journalist, 
male/Interview 12, junior journalist, male/Interview 15, student, male/Interview 19, 
midcareer journalist, male/Interview 22, junior journalist, male/Interview 24. 
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youngsters. They are not really educated. They go to school and 
then they are taught how to do photographs, maybe. They learn 
a bit about broadcasting, but it’s not enough. (Officer, SPLA, 
male/Interview 11). 
 
The same concern was, however, phrased by people in the civil society 
group: 
 
Most of the people that are hired are masquerading now as 
journalists, [they] are not journalists in the real sense of the 
word, because there are ethics in journalism. You know that, but 
since these people don’t even know the boundaries, they say 
whatever they say, and they unnecessarily tick off people. 
They’re careless in their own way with some big shots, and so 
that’s when they get into trouble. (Researcher, male/Interview 
14) 
 
I call them the lazy people, because I think they... a lot of times 
they feed on rumours. That are readily available. Not doing 
enough of the in-depth research for themselves and being able 
to analyse and come up with you know an item that probably is 
well-cooked, than really just feeding on the common sense. 
(Consultant, male/Interview 21) 
 
An academic from Juba University mentioned explicitly the need for the 
government to be involved in capacity building – training – of journalists, 
although he called for a bigger level of media independence: 
 
Of course. lot of journalists that are coming in now are young 
people actually. (…) They have not yet harmonised their 
thinking, their writings, and their reporting systems and the 
way they look at issues so that is important. That ideology of 
writings and thinking, the government should build capacities, 
especially in context to the media law, and the broadcasting law 
as well. However, I am insisting that there's that need to (...) be 
able to give them a lot of spacing so that they are able now to 
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write freely so long as they have constructive argument and 
criticisms again over they talk about. (Academic staff, 
male/Interview 2) 
 
As much of media development is about journalism training (McCurdy 
and Power 2007; Rhodes 2007, p.12), these complaints about journalists’ 
education are aimed at the international community, the iNGOs 
specialising in media, and the donors. National Organisations in South 
Sudan, like the Association for Media Development (AMDISS), see a lack 
of coordination between international donors and among executing 
agencies as part of the problem as it results in a tendency to conduct 
short-term training done by international experts:  
 
You know, DW [Deutsche Welle Akademie] came to visit us 
some months back they are interested in our training. 
Foundation Hirondelle [iNGO] came to visit us. They are also 
interested in giving training. However, from this study which I 
talked about from 2012, its one of the things that the journalists 
said, 'Listen, we don't want this thing, this flight by night. 
Somebody flies in from London, somebody comes in from New 
York or Frankfurt or wherever, stays two, three days, having 
brought all the tools for training, practice tools of training and 
go back. This parachute-thing, we don't want it. (Media 
manager, male/Interview 25) 
 
While investments in journalism training are definitely to be welcomed, 
the described parachute-approach is seen as doing more harm than good. 
Treating journalism as a mere technical skill that does not need to be 
adjusted to the culture in which it is supposed to occur leads to short-
term training by trainers with no experience of the local context. This can 
be seen as a consequence of what Bliesemann de Guevara (2012, p.11) 
describes with regards to statebuilding projects: the implementation of 
internationalised norms with no local substance. The consequence of 
media development is that journalists do not get a full-rounded 
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education; instead they try to apply concepts learned in a short-term 
training to a culture alien to that concept. This, according to an employee 
from the Minister of Defence: 
 
(…) is how media is coming into conflict with the security. You 
know. They sometimes think: This is information, this must go 
out. But do they know what is there in the minds of the people? 
Somebody may go and chew out big information into a different 
construct. For those who don't have access to direct media. You 
know, could, and could be misused. And if it is misused we have 
a problem in the country. This is a contradiction. You know and 
that's why freedom of the press, for me I see, it is the only viable 
way to be regulated. (Officer, SPLA, male/Interview 11). 
 
The same is said by a researcher from a local institution: 
 
That is where there is a problem. People report things that are 
wrong, that are not confirmed, are not checked with anyone that 
may be propaganda that irritates people. That one explains part 
of the difficulty that they already find themselves in. 
(Researcher, male/Interview 14) 
 
 The confusion about different concepts was found in the interviews with 
journalists, but also with other people. In an interview with the academic 
staff it was evident that the journalistic concept of ‘balancing’ might not 
be clearly understood in South Sudanese society:  
 
If you want to know about what is wrong with the government 
whatever and you go to Radio Tamazuj, you just get that quickly 
and you just get that story plain the way it is. Miraya will 
balance. Eyeradio will try to balance because they are in the 
country and they can be in trouble with the security. (Academic 




Balancing a news report in journalism refers to listening to and 
broadcasting of both sides of a story in order to report neutrally and 
unbiased. This rule is one of the backbones of objective journalism 
(Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2016). The three radio stations named in the 
quote are Radio Tamazuij, a radio and website located outside South 
Sudan and supported by a Dutch NGO, the UN-Radio Miraya, which 
enjoys a rather secure position because it is a run by the United Nations, 
and Eyeradio, run by the iNGO Internews. These three radio stations 
have different layers of protection against oppression from the 
government. The way their approach to ‘balancing’ is phrased here 
indicates that ‘balancing’ is something done because of these different 
layers of protection, with Tamazuij, not balancing but giving the story 
‘plain the way it is’, doing the best job. This is a problematic notion. In 
addition to this, another interviewee who has worked as a journalist for 
Eyeradio, stated when asked what the journalistic ethics are, that it 
included not to interview children84. While certainly a child should not 
be interviewed in the absence and without the permission of a legal 
guardian, it is hardly the first or most important rule in journalism. 
 
Radio stations have been accused of being tribalist85. It is unclear if this 
is seen as having been done on purpose or as a consequence of the 
missing education of journalists. However cut, the media has been 
accused of contributing to the conflict instead of containing it. 
 
The media played a negative role in terms of mobilisation, 
because the message that was sent to the ordinary people, I 
remember one thing and interview with (not understandable) 
it was very dangerous, and it sparked the conflict into a tribal 
turn, because, once you were interviewing, and it was even BBC, 
they said that oh, the Nuer in Juba were being killed in the 
                                                        
84 Junior journalist, male/Interview 7. 
85 Security manager, male/Interview 3, junior journalist, male/Interview 12, midcareer 
journalist, male/Interview 22. 
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streets. Of course, this was not the truth, but she said it for 
political purposes. (Government official, male/Interview 13) 
 
When the conflict broke out, you realise that the country was 
sharply divided to an extent that even some media personnel, 
staff, some take a side. It was no longer an objectivity of media, 
so some radio stations depending on whoever is running will 
broadcast what is going on with his or her own opinion. (Junior 
journalist, male/Interview 22). 
 
The fear that media can incite hate is why many in groups 2, 3, and 4 – 
government, civil society and listeners - support media regulation. 
Journalists, however, do not. This mirrors the views of experts working 
on statebuilding and experts working on media development (Putzel and 
van der Zwan 2006, p.13).  
 
Finally, it has been said that the government’s expectation that media has 
to be friendly towards them, was created by the behaviour of 
international media in the past:  
 
Because when the BBC was reporting here in the South, the BBC 
I can say was biased towards Northern Sudan. And was 
projecting southern Sudanese people as people who were so 
oppressed, people who were suffering, people who needed to be 
given their rights. Majority of the SPLA-soldiers became heroes 
who captured towns and the BBC said, "The SPLA captured this 
town. The SPLA did this, the SPLA is this. The SPLA is doing 
blah." They have developed that concept of a child that has been 
spoiled. They have been baby-sat by the media for a long time, 
the media has been very positive about them. (Senior journalist, 
male/Interview 10) 
 





But I think in this country even if you know some of the ethical 
issues at the boundaries you will still come to confrontational 
issues with this government, they are sensitive. They feel, you 
know, that you are pointing fingers at them. (Consultant, 
male/Interview 21) 
 
Repeatedly, it has been said that the government lacks the understanding 
of what media is supposed to do in a country and that training is needed 
for the government and for state institutions. The notable exception to 
this overall opinion came from a senior politician with an opposition 
party, who bluntly stated that the government does not lack the capacity 
and does understand what the media should be in a democracy: “But it is 
something they don’t want.”86 Coming from a man who had been among 
the founders of the SPLA and having worked with the current 
government when its leaders were still a rebel movement themselves, 
this voice and opinion carries weight. Furthermore, there is not really a 
doubt that the democratic understanding of the government of South 
Sudan is lacking, nor should the media alone be accused of the problems 
in the country and in the relationship with the government. This 
notwithstanding, it seems clear that media development that treats 
journalism as a mere technical skill makes for problems in a non-western 
country.  
 
6.2.3 The trouble with cooperation 
Another topic emerging clearly from the interviews with civil society 
members, journalists, and regular people is cooperation. There is, 
however, no dominant opinion on this. A wish for cooperation between 
the media and the government was phrased repeatedly, and such 
cooperation is not seen as problematic but as necessary. 
 
If you bring them together, the government and the security 
service, all the media houses, and they sit together and they 
                                                        
86 Senior opposition politician, male/Interview 22. 
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have a workshop training together, everybody else will see 
themselves. The good thing we do in the [inaudible] we want to 
bring all the antagonistic groups together, those who don't like 
them so you bring them together. Let them eat a meal and let 
them have themselves, greet each other, and they talk. 
(Academic staff, male / Interview 2) 
 
This need to talk was also wished for by regular listeners. It was stated 
in an interview that government and journalists need to be trained so 
that they stop being hostile towards each other: 
 
The government needs to be actually to be given capacity also 
together with the media, personally with the journalists, such 
that they should not see each other as enemies, so when I am 
writing I have to approach. If the minister misbehaves, I should 
not approach in [inaudible] way such that to get them react, 
seriously. There is a smart way. (Security manager, 
male/Interview 3) 
 
This ‘smart way’ of approaching someone who has, as a member of the 
government, misbehaved, seems to reflect the problem that leaders 
should not be criticised in public but in a way that does not let them lose 
face. This has been mentioned before by a South Sudanese researcher 
who pointed out that journalists end up in trouble with the leadership 
and the security forces because they phrase criticism that is not well-
researched and confirmed87. 
 
The need for the government, in particular the security forces, and the 
media to get to know each other and to cooperate was also stated by 
AMDISS. The ‘Media Working Group’ they are doing is chaired by 
UNESCO, with the participation of the Ministry of Information and 
several other media stakeholders: 
 
                                                        
87 Researcher, male/Interview 14. 
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There are quarterly meetings that bring together as I said 
earlier the media actors, media support organisations and the 
local media. Some of the actual points that come out of the, this 
kind of meetings is basically difficult to enforce. We talk about 
collaboration. If for example AMDISS would be working on 
training of journalists, we expect that other organisations who 
like to conduct training will have to come to AMDISS. (…) But in 
fact, you know you know, we say, we are coordinating this, but 
they'll do their own training. So in effect AMDISS is trying to 
coordinate and other organisations is doing training. (Media 
manager, male/ Interview 26) 
 
At the same time, it was mentioned that it is problematic to get especially 
the foreign agencies for media development to join the table: 
 
But somehow we find media are challenged in this area where 
some organisations, international organisations come directly 
without looking at the already existing efforts that the local 
organisations have done, and they go in directly (not 
understandable). We feel that is not appropriate, because it is 
double (not understandable) of efforts, and one is that... it is 
more appropriate when you work with a local organisation to 
build on what they have done, so that is moving forward, not 
starting again. From scratch. (Media manager, male/ Interview 
26 
 
The same was mentioned by another media activist: 
 
 
One of the major challenges that I also see that the international 
development organisations for the media, media organisation 
faces is the understanding on the real local context. Because at 
times they would come, they'll gather a few certain indicators 
that seem to be visible enough, but there are certain issues that 
they actually don't understand, the nitty gritty. Those are the 
thing that make a time, causes the conflict or rather create a 
situation that makes it uncomfortable for the public or the other 
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people, the other institutions. I have always been encouraging 
the international media, the Deutsche Welle, the BBC that you 
need to work with the local media development organisations. 
Because they understand the context, they understand local 
language, the needs of these people and when a trainer comes, 
you train them yes, but they would also guide you on the nitty 
gritty things so that when these people come they actually fit in. 
(Media activist, male/Interview 6) 
 
A lack of coordination was thus stated; an unwillingness of the 
international media organisations to coordinate and work with the local 
organisation. As to why this is, is a topic of speculation. It might be that 
the fact that the government is included in the Media Working Group 
meetings sits not too well with some iNGOs, even if government 
involvement is not seen as problematic in South Sudan. A journalist 
involved in organising these meetings also named them an opportunity 
to enhance mutual respect between the government and the media, by 
keeping healthy distance: 
 
Respect really, not necessarily cooperate but respect each other. 
Understand that each one has got a role to play and they must 
be allowed to play their role independently. The government 
should not interfere with this and the media also should respect 
the government. (Senior journalist, male/Interview 9). 
 
It was mentioned that the UN-agencies and the big international media 
development organisations want bigger NGOs as partners, that they are 
not keen on working with local partners: 
 
I know some organisations have very protective ways of doing 
things. That sense I have from meeting DW88 folks, they are like: 
this is what we do, you know and keep it close to my chest, and 
                                                        
 88 Abbreviation for ‘Deutsche Welle’. Deutsche Welle Akademie is Germany’s 
organisation for media development. 
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just show you one side of it. (Media manager, male/Interview 
25) 
 
That there is indeed a certain amount of protectionism has been noted: 
“after all, whatever the integrity of their staff, global media networks 
obviously have self-serving motives” (Allen and Stremlau 2005, p.30). 
Eventually, media development is a market. 
 
It is not only that there is no mutual respect between the government 
forces and the media, and no cooperation between the international and 
local media organisations, there have also been complaints about lack of 
cooperation among journalists and media outlets in Juba: 
 
There is nothing called media fraternity because we have the 
church media with its own agenda. We have the UN media with 
its own agenda, we have the private media with its own agenda. 
We have the government media with its own agenda, so you will 
find that all these media sectors do not work collaboratively. 
They are suspicious of each other. Even journalists themselves, 
they are always suspicious of each other, so there is no media 
fraternity. The media itself needs to come out and work as 
media fraternity. That means their own reporters, their own 
media managers they work together to bridge the gap between 
government and the society by evaluating policies, pointing out 
where the government has gone wrong. And also appreciating 
what the government is doing right, yeah. (Senior journalist, 
male/ Interview 10) 
 
When Radio Bakhita was closed and a number of their journalists were 
jailed, there was a disagreement among the media professionals on how 
such a situation should be handled in a country with no institutionalised 
way of media complaints. The Agency for Media Development, AMDISS, 
offered Radio Bakhita help in advocating for the release of the journalist, 




We really found almost opposition from the Catholic Church 
itself. They said, oh, you people, the archbishop himself is 
working on this. He's going to meet the president, so he can 
handle this. They were really trying to say, well, just don't do 
anything. We will handle it ourselves. They didn't want the 
involvement of AMDISS, although later on they realised that 
AMDISS was useful, but they thought they could handle it. 
Because they wanted to keep it something between the two. 
Between the government and the Catholic Church or Bakhita, 
not involving other people. (Senior staff, male/Interview 9) 
 
This policy of non-involvement points to a situation with no clear rule 
how to handle the situation, which indeed it is. The legal framework is 
missing, and in this situation, Radio Bakhita rather trusted their ability 
to negotiate a solution. AMDISS, on the other hand, lobbies for a rule of 
law and clear rules according to which every party, including the 
government, has to behave in such a situation. They are rather irritated 
by such isolationism: 
 
Really, I think this policy, I don't know where it comes from. It's 
very maybe to explain why they... I talked to the secretary of the 
archbishop and I said, "You people you are cowards. Why do you 
allow your journalist to be arrested like that and you just talk in 
very low tones? You should come out clearly and say this is 
wrong and release my people immediately, but you are just 
keeping your voices very low. This is wrong." I quarrelled them 
very much. (Senior staff, male/Interview 9) 
 
This begs the question to what extent a free press is a possibility in a 
country where a rule of law and legal institutions are not in place. After 
all, a free press is not just guarding democracy; it is as much a beneficiary 
of it. A situation where a free press is implemented by international 
actors without coordination with local actors and without the assured 
involvement of the state and national government will most likely lead 





The journalists in Juba believe that their job is not only to inform the 
people about government policies and events of the day but also to 
inform the government about what the people think. On the contrary, the 
government sees media solely as a one-way information channel. 
Journalists in Juba feel oppressed and name as the starting point for the 
oppression the outbreak of violent conflict in December 2013. The 
government, but also civil society members, say that journalists are not 
professional and that this is a cause for the problems journalists find 
themselves in. The international media development agencies are seen 
as partly responsible for this, because of their penchant for short-term 
training by international, and not regional, trainers. South Sudanese 
media managers complain about an unwillingness of the donors to 
coordinate efforts; and it is said that the journalistic training provided is 
more often than not insufficient to the country’s culture. Media has also 
contributed to the conflict by sharpening ethnic tensions, this being 
another reason why people wish for media regulation. The situation is 
further worsened by an absent legal framework for media.  
6.3 The state 
 
Concerning the state and the leadership in the country, all four groups 
saw the government as unstable and dithering. The ones most critical 
towards the government were – maybe unsurprisingly – the journalists. 
In this group, it was stated that the leaders are dictators with no 
democratic commitment: 
 
They don't want anybody if you get today to be in power, you 
don't want to allow anybody to be in power again. You want 
after your death, your son will be the second to you. (…) (Junior 




Others in this group said that the government had no clear direction, 
accused it of nepotism, and said that it had failed to unite the people: 
 
When we called the peace, and then the people came back from 
the bush, like the government as they call themselves. (…) They 
said, you know, like you know, you are not with us in the bush, 
so you don't have right to work in the government or anything. 
They started arresting people, people who were just 
disappearing. (…) It's just, they don't want people from outside 
to work with them. (Former journalist, female/interview 5) 
 
In groups 2 and 3, among politicians and civil society members, a mix of 
harsh voices and excusing ones could be heard. The most severe 
accusation came from an opposition politician who said that the ruling 
party had failed to fulfil their promises from the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2005: 
 
So, what came afterwards, lack of service to the people, you 
know, and falling short on the slogans. We had another slogan 
during liberation that were appealing to our people and to our 
friends. Our friends and people were believing that we were 
going to deliver on what we said. That we were against the 
repression in Khartoum. We were against dictatorship in 
Khartoum. We are for democracy, we are for human rights. We 
are for development. All these slogans. But then when we were 
in power we did the opposite. (Senior opposition politician, 
male/interview 23) 
 
Overall, in the group of politicians interviewed, the statements are 
excusing. In the group of civil society members, the government is named 
a failed one, and the need for a legal framework and for institutions is 
mentioned. There is also acknowledgement that more time is needed:  
 
I know it’s a tall order to ask someone who has never been 
criticised for over 20 years now to accept criticism simply, so 
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those are the challenges. We’ll take time, perhaps 15 years, 20 
years. (Researcher, male/interview 14) 
 
Most forgiving were the interviewees in group 4 – regular people. It was 
repeatedly mentioned that media needs to be regulated and that the 
government needs to make sure that no broadcast threatens national 
security. Hate speech was mentioned explicitly. The government itself 
was described as inclusive:  
 
Here I do stand with the president because he's trying to bring 
people together. (…) I'm from Equitoria, but this time I don't say 
the president has did something bad because there's like 4 to 5 
ministers from Equitoria here which is a good step of uniting 
people together [sic]. That's one thing I've discovered. That's 
one thing that can solve problem, what he did as the president, 
he's a Dinka, and the vice president is from Equitoria here, the 
speaker is from Upper Nile state. From this three regions 
Greater Upper Nile, Greater Equitoria and Greater Bahr el 
Ghazal. That's already a good step, you bring the minister from 
Dinka and then the deputy from Equitoria here, then assembly 
goes to Upper Nile. That's good. (Driver, male/interview 16) 
 
The perception people have of the government seems to depend on their 
position towards it. Journalists, who suffer at the hands of the 
government, are in the majority negative, while politicians and civil 
society members are rather excusing with the one or the other outlier, 
depending on lived history and experience. Regular people, however, 
view the government not too unfavourably. It was mentioned twice that 
South Sudan is a country in transition and that things will change when 
the leadership changes. Especially in the group of civil society members, 
among academics, activists and advisers, there is a sense that while 
things are not as good as they should be, there is a need to ‘bide the time’. 
Modernising the society, including its leadership, as stated in 
modernisation theory (Lerner 1958), is seen here as something which 
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cannot be done via broadcasting and messaging. Change comes by 
replacing the old with the new elites, and hence with time.  
 
6.3.1 The government and the media 
 Basically, every journalist interviewed said that the South Sudanese 
government controls the media. It was stated that “there are some topics 
that are too sensitive that the current government doesn't want you to 
discuss in the media, and they don't want the public to know about it”89, 
that “in South Sudan we work in government controlled areas, so you 
cannot report”’90, and that “we are like kind of scared and that's the 
reason why I'm not working as a journalist now”91. These statements 
were all connected to the recent closures of media houses92 and the 
threats against journalists. These incidents had shaken the journalistic 
community. Fear to discuss the government could be observed when 
recruiting for interviews. A few people refused to be interviewed when I 
said that I had questions about the government. The harsh line has led 
some media houses to engage in self-censorship: 
 
A press release is a press release of [sic] the government. You're 
not supposed to omit anything from that. Instead, as a media 
house, you can decide not to broadcast the press release (…) or 
you broadcast it as they give. (Senior staff, female/interview 1) 
 
Surprisingly, it was argued that foremost the international backed media 
keeps the line of the government: 
 
These foreign-funded institutions particularly radio stations are 
easily intimidated by the government. They tend to toe the 
                                                        
89 Junior journalist, male/Interview 12. 
90 Junior journalist, male/Interview 24. 
91 Former junior journalist, female/Interview 5. 
92 Radio Bakhita had been closed in August 2014 (CPJ 2014) and was allowed to reopen 
just shortly before I started my fieldwork in South Sudan in November 2014. The 
memory was thus fairly fresh when I started my interviews. In February 2015, the 
Minister of Information, Michael Makuei threatened to close the UN-Radio Miraya 
(United Nations 2015c). 
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government line more closely than the newspapers. Of course, 
the newspapers are mostly commercial and they are on their 
own, but they have got, if you like, fearless journalists like 
myself. I quarrel with the government every day. (Senior 
journalist, male / Interview 9) 
 
This statement from a South Sudanese journalist can be seen as self-
serving bias. Still, the fact that he did indeed quarrel with the government 
was sadly confirmed when the newspaper he published was closed. 
Furthermore, he was not the only person who said that internationally 
backed media was too soft on government.  
 
The media in South Sudan, mostly the electronic media, 
especially the radio, they play a game of, they are not 
confrontational in their work. If government has said this has 
happened in the community, sort of soft, soft news or soft sort 
of. There's no real hard information. It's the print media that has 
graduated from that. The print media is more stronger [sic] and 
more assertive on specific views by bringing different views 
together for public to make a choice. (Media activist, 
male/Interview 6) 
 
Control of the media is a feature of an authoritarian or illiberal regime 
(Siebert, Peterson and Schramm 1963), while the presence of a free and 
independent press is seen as a sign and a safeguard for a healthy 
democracy93 - which is the reason for media development (Price et al. 
2002; Howard 2003; Bonde 2006). Media development is supposed to 
add to a government’s legitimacy by keeping tabs on leadership (Coronel 
2010). South Sudanese leaders, however, reject this idea, seeing media 
as a mouthpiece to communicate with the population94. With the ongoing 
                                                        
93 South Sudan can hardly be named a democracy because the country’s government 
has never been democratically elected. The current government came into power as a 
transitional government following the referendum about the country’s secession from 
Sudan. Elections were supposed to be held in July 2015, but have been postponed due 
to the ongoing fighting (see Appendix 1.5, pp.18-24). 
94 Senior government official/interview 28. 
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conflict, the government was accused of taking a harsh stance towards 
media houses, including shutting them down and harassing journalists. 
The government does not acknowledge that there are harsh policies in 
place. This is backed up by a local researcher: 
 
It [freedom of expression and access to information] is there, 
but it is severely challenged. The government doesn’t have a 
policy that restricts freedom of expression or access to 
information. It simply has no policy, but due to the fact that the 
country is in a state of war right now, the sensitivity of the 
security organs is higher than normal. (…) The problem is not in 
the government organs, but particularly the security related 
institutions that are stifling freedom, access to information, or 
freedom of expression. (Researcher, male/Interview 14) 
 
This confirms a problem that has been named repeatedly: the need for 
institutional reform or institutional capacity building. It seems that in 
South Sudan the state institutions are not clear about their tasks and 
duties, and the communication between the different institutions is not 
working well. Asked about the shutting down of media houses, the 
responsible authorities state that they regulate media in order to protect 
the state and prevent further ethnic splits: 
 
There is always a conflict between national security and 
freedoms. Civil rights and political rights. This conflict exists, 
irrespective of the level of development of society. It exists in 
Germany, it exists in America, it exists in South Sudan. For 
example, after nine eleven in America, the patriot act was 
passed, so much of, I mean a big chunk of civil liberties and 
political rights US-citizens had enjoyed for hundreds of years 
were just stripped. Just taken away. Overnight. We have not 
done so here in South Sudan. But if we take Rwanda as an 
example, radio stations played a big role in fuelling the genocide 
that happened in Rwanda. Every government waves between 
this different interests. National security and civil rights, 
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political rights and freedom of expression, those things. (…) In 
conflict like ours then the issue of national security becomes 
paramount. Becomes more important than... not more 
important, but then there is more emphasis on national security 
than on freedom of expression and... so. Some people might call 
it censorship, but in times of warfare there is a responsibility, an 
obligation to make sure that people are safe. There is no 
incitement against... when you are in government territory than 
you don’t need to give so much airtime to groups that want to 
incite hatred and... it’s a responsibility to protect the state, to 
protect peace in the state. (Senior government official, 
male/Interview 28) 
 
South Sudanese journalists say that before December 2013 reporting 
was easier95, and that they were able to balance their reports and articles. 
It was also mentioned that media houses found themselves in troubles 
when they reported news related to the so-called rebels or broadcasted 
rebel views.96 That this is restricted in an ongoing conflict is indeed not 
a particularity of South Sudan:  
 
Well, it does happen also in... It is not happening just here, it 
does happen in developed countries also. I remember when I 
was in Britain, you couldn't quote Gerry Adams under Margaret 
Thatcher. You couldn't. You could not. So, probably we are not 
so different there. (University professor, male/Interview 17) 
 
In the view of the South Sudanese government, there are double 
standards applied when it comes to media freedom: 
 
I know there [in the United States] are a lot of restrictions [for 
the media]. But they don't want these restrictions to be applied 
here. They want us to open it. That everybody can do what they 
                                                        
95 Junior journalist, male/Interviews 15, junior journalist, male/Interview 24.  
96 Senior journalist, female/Interview 1, academic staff, male/Interview 2, junior 
journalist, male/Interview 7, government employee, male/Interview 13, and junior 
journalist, male/Interview 15. 
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want to do. (Employee in the Ministry of Information, 
male/Interview 18) 
 
The view that ‘everybody can do what they want to do’ is indeed shared 
by some. One of the journalists I interviewed asked for ‘absolute 
freedom’ for the media97. Opposed to this, the government expects media 
to perform self-censorship and it sees this as necessary, especially in the 
current situation. Whether the shutting down of media outlets and 
harassment of journalists are ordered by the government or done 
independently by the security organs is unclear, but the acts have led to 
tensions with the donors and the international community. The 
disapproval of the international community is seen as interference in the 
internal affairs of a sovereign nation. As an employee in the Ministry of 
Information said: 
 
So we would want all our partners (…), we would like to 
coordinate our work together and make sure that Radio Miraya 
is saying the same thing, or that we are saying the same thing as 
they are saying. But not working on opposite side. Radio Miraya 
or other radios that are under UN-agencies or USAID we want 
them to continue to do their job. Because they are doing an 
excellent job in helping our people on so many aspects of life. 
But they have to work under the law, under the constitution, and 
not above. You are here under the invitation of South Sudan and 
the government of South Sudan. They are doing excellent work 
and we want them to continue, but they have to understand that 
this is a sovereign country and we all must be under the 
constitution, other than that it is a violation of the constitution 
and no country would allow its own violation of its own 
constitution. (Employee in the Ministry of Information, 
male/Interview 18) 
 
                                                        
97 Junior journalist, male/Interview 12. 
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If this gives the impression that oppression of freedom of the media is 
approved of, this is by no means the case. Instead, the argument is that 
the government understands its actions as regulation of the media, and 
it deems this regulation necessary because of the situation in the country, 
in line with its rights as a sovereign nation, and it argues that many other 
nations in comparable situations have done the same.  
 
On the other hand, iNGOs giving media training in South Sudan teach a 
way of doing media which is not likely to provide new and inexperienced 
journalists with a rounded view on all journalism issues and enable them 
to navigate within a kinetic and volatile media field in a country 
experiencing violent conflict or the aftermath thereof. The government's 
wish for regulation is also grounded in the fact that media has 
contributed to the conflict in South Sudan and played a rather bad role in 
broadcasting hate speech. This wish for restriction is also phrased by 
interview participants in group 4, regular people: 
 
Some of the media, they were being restricted by so putting 
arson to the state, okay? By doing so, then the Republic 
introduced the rule of regulation in which if you wanted to set 
up a media house, you have to get a licence from the Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, though you have a incorporate 
certificate from Ministry of Justice but you have to get it. The 
government said, “No, we are not restricting the media but the 
way you talk, you should not actually provoke the citizens on the 
tribal lines.” You see? (Restaurant manager, male/Interview 4) 
 
While there may be good reasons to restrict the media in order to 
prevent hate speech, the question remains that if the government is not 
ordering the security organs to shut down media houses, as it insists, 
then who does? The answer may be that the security organs act on their 
own initiative. This has been said in some of the interviews, and it might 
be a consequence of the fact that the ruling party was an army before it 
became a movement. The ‘fight first, ask questions later’ mentality might 
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still be the prevalent mindset. This points back to media development’s 
problem: In the West, the media is not only a protector of democracy by 
playing the watchdog role; it is also a beneficiary of democratic 
structures. In a country that has yet to develop these structures, media is 
an outlaw, and journalists are asked to risk their necks without the safety 
net democracy and the rule of law provide. 
 
6.3.2 Criticism and capacity 
Regardless of who orders the shutdown of media houses, there is no 
doubt that the government insists on the necessity of media regulation. 
In particular, the government dislikes being criticised in public. This is 
not a particularity of the government. In the interviews, especially among 
civil society members, it was stated that “No South Sudanese wants to be 
embarrassed outside their place. But when you go to them they will listen 
to you. They will.”98, and that in the African and particularly the South 
Sudanese culture critique of a leader has to happen behind closed doors 
and not into a camera or a microphone.99 The same is mentioned by a 
national researcher: 
 
If you look at organisations like my own organisation, we say a 
lot in terms of criticism, and (…) the way we do what we do is 
different from what media organisations do. I know they report 
news. We don’t report news, we do analysis, but if we are 
careless, we could also (…) we could step on someone toes, but 
we try to avoid that. We are extremely careful, the tone that we 
use and how we raise issues. We make sure that we don’t make 
them reach a personal level. That’s when people begin to be 
uncomfortable, and anything can happen. You stay at the policy 
level. You don’t mince your word, but you don’t say things 
carelessly about others, because they are leaders. They deserve 
to be respected. (Researcher, male/Interview 14) 
 
                                                        
98 Consultant, male/Interview 21. 
99 Consultant, male/Interview 21. 
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This creates a problem for western style media training. Media in the 
West is established explicitly as a control mechanism on government and 
state institutions; media is supposed to act as a watchdog. It comes with 
the task to criticise in public. This is problematic in the context of the 
South Sudanese culture, and it leads to bad blood between the groups 
involved: the government, the journalists, and the donors. 
 
Also, a lack of capacity was named, meaning that the government just 
does not know, or does not want to know, what role journalists fulfil in a 
society100. These statements usually vacillated between the idea that the 
government genuinely does not know how to handle the media in a 
democracy – which was mostly accompanied by the wish that the 
international community should build this capacity in the government – 
and the position that the government simply does not care. This was 
most bluntly stated by an opposition politician: 
 
They don’t need to learn, they don’t need to be trained, they do 
know. But it is something they don’t want. It is not that the 
government doesn’t know what the media is supposed to do. 
But. They don’t want. Media to be free to broadcast what they 
want to, to tell people what they don’t want them to. (Senior 
opposition politician, male/Interview 23). 
 
Besides this, there was also a lack of technical capacity named. This refers 
to the missing legal framework for media work101 and also to a lack of 
communication between the security organs and law enforcement and 
the government. It was stated that sometimes journalists had been 
arrested without an order and without anyone knowing about this102. All 
of this contributes to a rather insecure environment for journalists and 
the problematic situation of media in South Sudan. 
                                                        
100 Academic staff, male, Interview 2, senior journalist, male/Interview 8, Midcareer 
journalist, male/Interview 9, Government official, male/Interview 13. 
101 Media activist, male/Interview 6, senior journalist, male/Interview 10, university 
professor, male/Interview 17, student, male/Interview 19. 





The government is not perceived as stable, but rather as an unstable, 
dithering one. This is a consequence of the current civil war. It is 
journalists who describe the government in the most unforgiving terms, 
whereas regular people are the most forgiving. The former is not 
especially surprising: It is journalists that suffer from the government: 
Media houses have been shut down and journalists have been harassed. 
The watchdog line and the criticism executed by a western style media 
do not sit well with a government that is used to being pampered by a 
mouthpiece media. The government rejects that it takes a harsh line 
against the media, but without a doubt the media policy, whether 
ordered or not, is enraging the international community. This leads to a 
deterioration of the relationship between the government and its 




South Sudan is a multi-ethnic state. The violent conflict in the country has 
been coined as based on ethnicity by international media and also by 
some international organisations (United Nations 2016). One of the 
reasons for media development in countries that are emerging from 
violent conflict is that media is thought to be able to contribute to 
peacebuilding by reconciling groups (Lynch and McGoldrick 2007, p.256; 
Staub et al. 2010, p.278; Staub 2013, p.580). Studying this part of media 
development in South Sudan leads to the question whether ethnicity is 
really a cause for the conflict, and what is meant by the statement that a 




 6.4.1 Media and its contribution to peace 
Three radio stations broadcast dedicated programmes for peace. The 
UN-Radio Miraya broadcasts the radio drama Sawa Shabab, produced by 
the Dutch iNGO Free Voice Unlimited in collaboration with the United 
States Institute of Peace (USIP). The aim is “to promote peace and 
stability by empowering youth to be confident, open-minded, and 
participatory citizens in a diverse society” (United States Institute of 
Peace no date). It focuses on gender equality, poverty, and interethnic 
strife and “teaches young people in South Sudan to form their own 
opinion through interactive programming” (Free Press Unlimited 2014). 
Internews’ Eyeradio broadcasts the programme ‘In Search for Peace’, a 
factual programme exploring “the prospects for peace in South Sudan by 
looking at the role of the citizens and leaders, well-wishers, regional 
leaders, and the international community” (Eyeradio no date). The 
church-financed ‘Voice for Peace’, Radio Bakhita, also broadcasts Sawa 
Shabab, but it has additional peace programmes throughout their 
broadcast: "Bakhita Radio has been an effective and consistent forum to 
promote evangelisation, sustainable peace, behaviour change and 
people’s participation in affairs that affect them. Bakhita nurtures 
Christian values with particular attention to marginalised groups and 
communities" (Bakhita 2012 – 2015). 
 
In the interviews, these programmes have not been mentioned. Media’s 
potential role in peacebuilding is, however, recognised especially in the 
group of civil society members. An academic employee of Juba University 
said with regards to the outbreak of conflict in December 2013 that it 
would have helped if media had acted as an intermediary between the 
parties:  
 
What we thought which will have helped if the media houses 
were allowed to speak, and to even bring leaders from both 
sides because that very morning I called the editor of Bakhita 
Radio and I said, "Is it possible that you can talk to the... The UN 
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so that Riek is given an opportunity to speak in the radio in the 
morning and Salva Kiir speaks in the radio again and says, 'This 
is not what we think. The country is in chaos and we're not 
thinking this way. I, Salva Kiir, I just... I'm informing all my 
soldiers to refrain.' 'I Riek Machar am doing this and that.'" That 
would have helped a lot if that thing was done but there was 
nothing actually. (Academic staff, male/Interview 2) 
 
It was mentioned repeatedly that media contributed negatively. The 
focus here was not on media actively broadcasting hate speech in the 
country but on an international media house broadcasting information 
that was not well-researched and substantiated: 
 
The media played a negative role in terms of mobilisation, 
because the message that was sent to the ordinary people, I 
remember one thing and interview with (not understandable) 
it was very dangerous, and it sparked the conflict into a tribal 
turn, because, once you were interviewing, and it was even BBC, 
they said that oh, the Nuer in Juba were being killed in the 
streets. Of course, this was not the truth, but she said it for 
political purposes. So, the Nuer were our side in the Diaspora 
and those who could speak English in the local areas and told 
the other people all the Nuer are massacred, and who said it? 
Oh, the BBC said it. Because they (not understandable), and then 
everybody took out a gun, killing the Dinka. When the killing of 
Dinka started in Akobo, and then Dinka went to UNMISS-camps, 
to kill. (Government official, male/Interview 13) 
 
The same was mentioned in the group of civil society members: 
 
I am going to say this whether it is recorded or not that my boss, 
(…) he almost, almost a hundred percent blamed the media for, 
you know, for the escalation of the crisis in 2013. According to 
him, when the BBC-lady, a journalist, I don't know from where 
flew in, and allegedly said that a number of Nuer people who 
were burned in Rum, you know in a locked room and so on, (not 
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understandable), and that lead, when that news went out, then 
the Nuer people reacted to that. And it was that particular news 
about the Nuer burned in a locked room. Which started all of 
this. At that point, he was not blaming the local, but he was 
blaming an international media. (Consultant, male/Interview 
21) 
 
The narrative that the BBC’s reporting, at least partly, was responsible 
for the conflict is strong in South Sudan. As a highly respected news 
source it reported while local information was not at hand. However, it 
was not only international media that played a negative role: 
 
The media also contributed negatively because if you look at 
what happened the last attack of Bentiu when the rebels took 
over, there was a local media that was really calling upon the 
local people to kill all the Dinka when the rebels came in. That 
was not a good thing as well. That thing is in Nuer. It's called Nas 
Radio. It was taken over and it was telling everybody else to 
come now to Bentiu to kill everybody, whether you're a South 
Sudanese, whether you're what. It was horrible. That was a 
negative side of that media but again I understand that there 
was that provocation for the revenge that media has to do that 
(Academic staff, male/Interview 2). 
 
It is especially troublesome that the interviewee mentions an 
understanding (‘I understand that (…) media has to do that’), indicating 
that the call for murder might be understandable. 
 
In general, media is portrayed as having played a very problematic role 
in the conflict of December 2013. While media should have been able to 
calm the situation, it is said that it worsened it. The narrative that it was 
the BBC’s reporting that fuelled the ongoing conflict is strong in South 
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Sudan and it can be found in high-ranking tiers of the society103. Without 
being able to either prove or dismiss this, this narrative, whether it is true 
or not, explains the widespread wish for media regulation in South 
Sudanese society.  
 
As group membership has been named here as the basis for the violence 
and the dividing factor between the people, the next part looks at how 
the South Sudanese see the role of ethnicity in the conflict. 
 
6.4.2 Group membership and ethnicity 
For the organisations working through media on peacebuilding, ethnicity 
seems to be central. Ethnicity is explicitly mentioned on the website of 
Free Press Unlimited, the iNGO that produces the peacebuilding radio 
drama Sawa Shabab. Tribal associations are named as a cause of the 
conflict and an open reference is made to the cast of the radio drama: 
 
Civil war and recurring tribal conflicts are a source of ongoing 
misery in South Sudan. One unique aspect of Sawa Shabab is 
that its cast includes people from a variety of ethnic 
backgrounds. Sawa Shahab Project Manager Hannah Rounding: 
“In the beginning, this new situation took some getting used to, 
but by now the cast members have become very close” (Free 
Press Unlimited 2014). 
 
Ethnicity is named as a dividing factor in the radio show’s cast and in the 
society. South Sudan hosts over 60 different tribes and violence broke 
out in December 2013 between Dinka and Nuer in the presidential guard, 
thus along ethnic lines. Still, people do not speak of an ethnic conflict. 
Interviewees through all four groups overwhelmingly rejected ethnicity 
as a cause for the conflict. Instead, they describe it as a “power 
                                                        
103 The ‘boss’ mentioned in Interview 21 is a high-ranking official. His title and position 
have been omitted to protect the anonymity of the interviewee. 
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struggle”104, an “issue not about ethnic war”105, and “not kind of an ethnic 
thing”106. They further say that “it’s the party itself”’107, and that “the real 
problem between the Nuer and the Dinka is not the Nuer and the Dinka. 
It is Riek Machar and Salva Kiir”108. 
 
There is an acknowledgement that ethnicity is used as a mobilisation 
tool109. This is said to be possible as the ties to one’s tribe are quite 
strong: 
 
Only few criticised their own tribes. Only few. But they also 
being very different, because if you criticise your own tribe, 
people will think you are also in your opinion you have rebelled. 
Also, in their opinion you are a rebel. You see? If you criticise 
your own tribe, people will think you are no longer part of them, 
or you are less of them. (Junior journalist, male/Interview 12) 
 
Those strong bonds let people rally behind their leader. On the other 
hand, the leader is supposed to provide jobs and opportunities to people 
from his tribe. It is this connection which brings an ethnic tone to the 
fighting: 
 
It is just because of the tribalism and the nepotism we have, if 
you, today, a big person, a commander, only those around you 
should be from that tribe because you give the power to them. 
But that's what had happened, because most of them in the 
fighting now, it is from one tribe because of the nepotism. I am 
supposed to give job to my cousin. But otherwise it was not an 
ethnic conflict. (Senior staff, female/Interview 1). 
                                                        
104 Senior government official, male/Interview 28. 
105 Academic staff, male/Interview 2. 
106 Security manager, male/Interview 3. 
107 Restaurant manager, male/Interview 4. 
108 Junior journalist, female/Interview 5. 
109 Among others, senior journalist, female/Interview 1, academic staff, 
male/Interview 2, restaurant manager, male/Interview 4, junior journalist, 
female/Interview 5, media activist, male/Interview 6, Junior journalist, 
male/Interview 7, senior journalist, male/Interview 8, junior journalist, 




Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, and other leaders in the country, use 
ethnicity and group membership in order to rally people behind them. 
While ethnicity then plays a role for mobilisation, it is not a root cause of 
the conflict. In the literature, ethnicity is defined as the sense of 
belonging to a group based on descent, history, language, religion, 
culture, or race (Horowitz 1985, p.53). Groups are known to repress 
other groups in order to improve their own position in society (Brewer 
1979; Tajfel 1982; Dovidio et al. 2005) and because resources are scarce 
(Sherif et al. 1988). Furthermore, group memberships are arbitrary 
(Tajfel and Turner 1979). In South Sudan, the tribes are fighting because 
their leader calls on them and because one follows their leader. In a harsh 
society based on kinship tradition and obedience, such issues are hard to 
overcome110. This was confirmed by a senior government official: 
 
I wouldn't say it is an ethnic conflict, because.... it started as a 
power struggle. Political power struggle (not understandable), 
and as it has happened in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
some politicians tried to, to dig into existing ethnic fault lines. 
It's easy for them to get manpower, to carry on [the] struggle, as 
we call it, or even in elections. You always go back to your 
constituency, if you like. And that is your ethnic group. In a 
country like ours, it's a guaranteed constituency. Whether it is 
political constituency or recruiting a stock from which you can 
recruit youth. What happened in 2003 [assumed a slip of the 
tongue: 2013] could be traced back to even 1983 and 1991 
when politicians disagreed on the objective of the SPLM/SPLA, 
of the revolution. And those that disagreed fell back on their 
ethnic constituency. (Senior government official, 
male/Interview 28) 
 
                                                        
110 On the role of traditional leadership in South Sudan see Modimowabarwa H. 
Kanyane, James Hoth Mai and Deng Abot Kuol (2009). 
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People follow their leader because they hope for a position and a 
livelihood, as was pointed out by a female senior journalist: 
 
It is those on the ground we are supposed to reach. These are 
the people we are supposed to convince them. You are fighting. 
But it is only one person who is going to get the post. Are all of 
you going to get the president? All of you are going to get the 
ministers? No. You are going to remain in the bush. You are 
going to remain a small military. (Senior journalist, 
female/Interview 1) 
 
This interviewee is working for the only radio programme broadcasting 
a peace programme with no involvement from western media experts, 
and she is not focusing on ethnicity. While broadcasting Sawa Shabab for 
financial reasons111, the senior staff member here points out that people 
are fighting because they hope to gain a position (“but it is only one 
person who is going to get the post”). As not everyone will be able to 
secure a position (“are all of you going to get the president? (…) You are 
going to remain in the bush!”), the senior staff member asks the audience 
in the manuscript to stop killing and to give service to the people instead. 
The way the conflict is explained in the interviews does not see ethnicity 
at its root. Ethnicity is only used as a mobilisation tool, which is possible 
because people are supposed to follow their leader. This is contradictory 
to the understanding of the term ‘ethnic war’, where the distinguishing 
feature is that ethnic groups fight explicitly for their groups’ position in 
society (Kaufman 2001, p.17). Following the ethnic cleansings in Bosnia 
and the genocide in Rwanda, ethnic conflict was in policy circles 
primarily understood as grounded in hate because of different ethnicity 
and as conducted by civilians against civilians. In reaction to this 
understanding, radio programmes for peacebuilding are designed 
                                                        
111 Senior staff at the radio station mentioned off the record that they are getting paid 
in order to broadcast the iNGO-produced radio drama. This is not unusual; it is a 
common way for South Sudanese radio stations to finance their operations. 
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primarily to overcome an assumed ethnic hate and they mostly target the 
grassroots. 
 
While this approach may contribute to reconciliation, and while it might 
even work in situations where groups do hate each other on the basis of 
group membership, it is not a promising approach in a situation where 
leaders are fighting for power and where people are obliged to follow 
them because of cultural group boundaries. Judging from the interviews, 
interventions would need to focus on the elites. Targeting the masses and 
the people on the ground – which is what a media intervention does – is 
not a promising approach in a situation where ethnic hate is, at least for 
the time being, not present. 
 
6.4.3 Summary 
This section has reviewed media’s contribution as a peacebuilding tool, 
and it has investigated whether the South Sudanese see the conflict in 
their country as based on ethnicity. Three radio stations in Juba 
broadcast dedicated peace programmes; two of them broadcasting an 
iNGO-produced radio drama with the aim to promote peace. These radio 
programmes have not been mentioned in the interviews. Still, media has 
been acknowledged in general as being able to contribute to peace. 
Instead of doing this, however, it has been noted as having fuelled the 
conflict instead, with the BBC the main accused. This understanding 
explains the wish for media regulation. What role does ethnicity play in 
South Sudan and in the conflict? Overwhelmingly, interviewees rejected 
the notion that it is an ethnic conflict, where ‘ethnic conflict’ is mainly 
understood as a conflict based on ethnic hate. Instead, the conflict was 
described as being caused by a power struggle between the elites and 





6.5 Chapter conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I present results on the question of what the effects of 
western style media in South Sudan are using unstructured interviews. 
28 interviews were conducted. The aim was to gain insights into how 
South Sudanese perceive and understand the media in their country, the 
state, and the relationships between groups. The question is whether 
these understandings are different from the understandings 
underpinning western-style media. Unsurprisingly, the understandings 
are not consistent. Perera has discussed how the desire “for verifiable, 
objective ‘facts’ obscures the extent to which drivers of conflicts are not 
only to be found in isolated pieces of ‘hard evidence’, but also in the 
incompatibility of multiple perceptions and narratives” (Perera 2017, 
p.43). In the context of my study, the question of whether journalists are 
under threat by the government of South Sudan was answered 
differently by journalists, government officials, and civil society 
members. These different narratives do not mean that some of the 
participants are lying, rather, it points to problems in the institutional 
architecture of the country, to a lack of communication between different 
institutions, and to either missing or not reliably executed media 
regulations. In this way, the interviews show, so to speak, the state of the 
state. This study looked into effects of mass media, and thus the pool of 
possible interviewees was rather wide. Interview participants were 
chosen because of their position towards the media. They are either 
journalists or media managers (group 1), working for or in the 
government (group 2), civil society members (group 3), or regular 
people (group 4). Despite the wide recruitment pool there were 
recruitment problems. In particular, regular people were wary of 
participating. While journalists, civil society, and government are all used 
to the idea of being interviewed, regular people are not. While in the end 
I managed to recruit four people who were neither journalists nor local 
elites, this was only possible after I had stayed a considerable amount of 
time in the country and gained the trust of South Sudanese friends. This 
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gives rise to the question whose voices are heard in interview studies. In 
South Sudan, I encountered a recruitment problem that would have led 
to the construction of an echo chamber, was it not for my long field work 
spell. The barriers erected by language problems and lack of confidence 
might not be a South Sudanese problem alone, but a general problem of 
interview studies in the global South.  
 
With reference to the effects of western-led media in South Sudan, there 
are different understandings of what role media is supposed to play. The 
journalists see media as working for the people. Media in this view is 
supposed to be a two-way communication between the government and 
the governed. The government, on the other hand, describes media as 
‘the ears and eyes of society’ – notably not as the ‘mouth of society’. Media 
is a communication tool but it is a one-way communication. 
Furthermore, the wish to regulate the media was phrased by participants 
from all groups, save the journalists. Among them, the wish for ‘absolute 
free’ and unregulated media was stated. This seems to hint that the short-
term trainings media development organisations conduct in South Sudan 
lead to confusion over what a media is and should do. Interestingly, the 
split in opinion echoes the distinction between academics working on 
statebuilding and media practitioners (Putzel and van der Zwan 2006, 
p.13). The short-term trainings by western experts have been named as 
a problem by South Sudanese organisations, and low and purely 
technical skills have been named repeatedly as one of the reasons why 
journalists and media houses find themselves in trouble with the 
government or security forces.  The government itself is described as 
unstable and dithering. Other accusations towards leadership were that 
it has failed to unite the country and nepotism. These accusations are 
present in all four groups, although there are different degrees. The 
journalists are the harshest and the regular people are the most 
forgiving. The perception of the government is dependent on people’s 
positions towards it. The journalists see themselves suffering from state 
organs. However, the government does not see it like this. It has been 
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mentioned that there is lack of communication between the government 
and the security organs, resulting in security organs acting on their own. 
Mostly, however, the government is of the opinion that it rightly limits 
the media and it sees regulation as necessary. There is a clear 
confrontation here between the view that the state needs to be protected 
and the wish to report unregulated. The government is aware that this 
enrages the international community but it sees this as a form of 
hypocrisy, as restrictions of freedom of expression are well known in 
donor countries, particularly the US. The South Sudanese government 
understands these enragements as interference in the internal affairs of 
a sovereign nation. Lastly, as media development is also done under the 
heading of peace journalism and with the aim to reconcile groups in a 
divided society, questions have been asked about the media’s role in 
peacebuilding and in the conflict. It was acknowledged that media can be 
a positive tool and work for peace, but none of the dedicated peace 
programmes broadcast in Juba – by the UN-Radio Miraya, the iNGO-
funded Eyeradio and the church-run Radio Bakhita – were mentioned in 
the interviews. Instead, it was said that media, namely the BBC, has 
contributed negatively to the conflict in December 2013 by fuelling hate. 
Notwithstanding that the conflict has been described as ethnic in 
international media, interview participants reject the idea that it is an 
ethnic conflict. Instead, it is described as a power struggle between 
political leaders, who fall back on their ethnic groups as a safe 
constituency. This is possible because of the strong bonds that tie the 
individual to a group. The distinction lies in the question why people 
fight. In policy circles, the concept of ‘ethnic conflict’ seems to mean that 
there is a primordial hate against members of another ethnic group, 
which leads them to engage in violence. Instead, people are fighting to 
obey their leaders and to confirm their membership in a group. This 
makes the focus on ethnicity as a dividing feature on the one hand and of 
media targeting the people on the ground on the other, quite ineffective. 
It is not claimed here that the production and broadcast of educational 
radio dramas or radio programmes in countries experiencing violent 
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conflict is useless in general. However, if such a programme is to help 





7 - Conclusions 
This thesis investigated western media in South Sudan. In a western 
understanding, the media is firmly placed outside the state; it can only 
fulfil its task of holding governments accountable by being independent 
from and firmly placed outside the state (Kumar 2006; Coronel 2010). 
This explicit distance together with the difficulties to find evidence for its 
operation (Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; Stremlau 2014) are possible 
reasons that the media as part of a statebuilding project has received 
relatively little attention in academic literature. This thesis contributes 
to the emerging literature and to our understanding of media as part of 
a statebuilding process. Hardly a peace and statebuilding mission 
happens without a media component (Orme 2010) and even if it is not 
an official state institution, it is built by western actors following a 
western logic. Thus, it is subject to the same processes of 
internationalisation and informalisation as described by Bliesemann de 
Guevara (2012, pp.11-13) with reference to western-led state 
institutions implemented in a non-western state. The 
internationalisation is evident in the way the radio stations describe 
their mission. The idea of a media that acts as a watchdog and informs 
the population to enable it to make informed choices in elections has its 
foundation in western liberal democracy. At the same time, these 
international standards, like the notion of press freedom, are not clearly 
understood among the South Sudanese population, and western-led 
media stations are described as engaging in self-censorship. In South 
Sudan, western-led media has weakened the state by undermining the 
legitimacy of the national government, and it has contributed to a 
worsening relationship between the government of South Sudan and the 
international donors. In showing that western-led media has different 
effects in a non-western country this thesis also contributes to the 
discussion about concepts, their need for context, and some of the 
consequences when this need is ignored. Schaffer (2016) shows how 
concepts mean different things dependent on their context, and 
Flyvbjerg (2001, p.20) shows that context-independence is rare in the 
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social world. Issues are seldom fixed and cannot be isolated from their 
surroundings. Yet, in the social sciences, generalisable and universally 
valid concepts are still sought after (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; 
Laitin 2003). Doing research in South Sudan, questions arose about the 
ways knowledge is produced. At the heart of this were research methods, 
which have often been described as technical tools for data gathering and 
organising112. Opposed to this, literature on the ‘messiness’ of doing 
fieldwork in conflict situations and how this adds insight emerged 
(Perera 2017).  
 
In this thesis, I have investigated the effects of media development in 
South Sudan. The country was chosen for its recent history of emerging 
from a longstanding civil war, the enthusiasm with which the citizens 
greeted and welcomed independence and their new state, and the 
massive development campaign implemented by the international 
community. The restriction to one country allowed for a comparison of 
three different methods – namely ethnographic observations, a survey, 
and unstructured, in-depth interviews - with the aims to investigate 
whether these methods deliver distinctive answers and if so, what kind 
of answers. The results show that each method provided answers 
pointing roughly in the same direction. Still, there are also substantive 
differences (for an overview see Figures 43-45). What is more, every 
method showed blind spots. It was the combination that delivered a 
more rounded answer. As it was impossible to predetermine what the 
blind spots would be, flexibility was necessary and additional research 
was required. This flexibility is offered by working as a bricoleur. When 
it became clear that interview recruitment excluded a large portion of 
society, additional informal chats were added under the heading of 
‘ethnography’; when the survey and the observation results regarding 
                                                        
112 This is evident when looking at the literature. Most textbooks on methods are ‘How 
to’-books, offering technical descriptions of how methods shall be employed (see, for 
example, Bryman 2001b; Creswell and Plano Clark 2011; Creswell 2013; Kellstedt and 
Whitten 2013; Sarantakos 2013). An awareness about methods’ behaviour in an 
environment is rare.  
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the importance of media in everyday life pointed in the exact opposite 
directions, considerations of people’s economic situation became 
prominent and flagged once more the importance of context when doing 
research. When an interview participant mentioned media’s history in 
southern Sudan, it became obvious that this would be an additional area 
of inquiry. It is the bricolage process that allows for this illumination of 
context, which leads to insights that would have been overlooked by 
limiting an inquiry to one research tradition and one or even two 
methods that are grounded in the same research paradigm. 
Triangulation or mixed methods alone would have failed as they would 
have only confirmed (or contradicted) findings. In illuminating a 
research area, the bricolage allows answers to the question why results 
are as they are, thus providing deeper insight. In this sense, bricolage is 
indeed the new “rigour in the ruins” (Kincheloe 2001, p.682) of 
traditional social sciences. Still, it is unproblematic to imagine research 
questions that are well-served by single method research and there are 
certainly reasons for such research (Ahmed and Sil 2012). My argument 
here is that methods are not context-independent. Researching complex 
questions in complex environments of which the researcher is not a 
cultural native without acknowledging and accommodating this 
complexity in the research design opens the door to one-sided 
reductionism. This seems all the more important when ‘being there’ is 
seen as an epistemic practice (Bliesemann de Guevara 2014; Bliesemann 
de Guevara 2017). Understanding ‘being there’ as a mark of good 
research might lead to the necessity for a new definition of what ‘being 
there’ means. Drawing on my work in South Sudan, I argue that ‘being 
there’ cannot be understood to mean ‘being on location’. One can be on 
location – a city, a country – and still be in very different circumstances 
than those that are important for the question researched. ‘Being there’ 
as a mark of good research must include ‘being in the situation’ (Fisher 
2017; Smirl 2015).  This is especially important when research is policy-
relevant, firstly because it is likely that policy-relevant research takes 
place in complex environments. It is highly unlikely that we find 
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"circumstances which can be strictly separated from daily understanding 
and from change" (Flyvbjerg 2001, p.20) in such situations. Second, it is 
important because policy-relevant research has implications for people's 
life.  
 
I now provide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the three 
methods employed and how they played out in South Sudan. This is 
followed by an answer to the question of the effects of media 
development in South Sudan based on all three methods.  
7.1 Researching media in South Sudan - methods 
 
In this thesis, I have looked at different ways to investigate a policy-
relevant research question in a country of the global South. The aim was 
to examine if different research methods deliver distinctive answers to a 
research question, and thus whether methods are performative (Aradau 
and Huysmans 2014) or if they are mere data gathering tools “linked 
with the ways in which social scientists envision the connection between 
different viewpoints about the nature of social reality and how it should 
be examined” (Bryman 2001b, p.4) The answer to this question – if 
research methods act in and with the environment or if they are only 
connected to a certain world view – makes an important contribution to 
the question of how research in countries experiencing violent conflict 
or the aftermath thereof is done (Bliesemann de Guevara 2017). The 
disciplining function of methodology and method (Jackson 2011, pp.9, 
10) has been described before; how things are done justifies a judgement 
of whether an inquiry is scientific or not (see Perera 2017). The proper 
conduct of inquiry (Jackson 2011), however, might lead to problems 
when the issue researched is not linear and straightforward, when it is 
messy (Law 2004). The comparison of different methods in South Sudan 
- ethnographic observation, a quantitative survey, and qualitative, in-
depth interviews – showed that no method alone delivered a 
comprehensive understanding of the question but that a combination is 
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called for to provide a more complete understanding and answer to the 
research question regarding the effects of media in a peace and 
statebuilding operation. I will now explain the three methods in detail.  
 
7.1.1 Ethnography 
Ethnography is here understood as a third perspective, a bridge, so to 
speak, that can span the quantitative/qualitative divide. Jackson has 
pointed out that “the statistical methodology dominates much of the field 
of IR” (Jackson 2008, p.92), and he goes on to state that the use of 
qualitative techniques does not constitute a departure from statistical 
methodology and especially the search for causality. Ethnography is a 
descriptive approach (Jackson 2008) and as a naturalistic and holistic 
approach that studies phenomena in their natural settings, it can cluster 
qualitative and quantitative research. It is a reflexive, eclectic and 
political perspective that is especially useful when researching themes of 
policy-relevance in the global South. Ethnographic research aims “at 
acquiring a deep knowledge of the social community and the individual, 
[and] fieldwork typically entails adapting to a local area and culture (…). 
Knowledge is considered 'deep' when a subject is examined in the 
context of its complex connections” (Bray 2008, p.297). It is this deep 
understanding, with its attention to context, reflexivity, and political 
awareness that distinguishes an ethnographic approach from a 
qualitative approach, where the main distinguishing feature is that the 
qualitative approach is concerned with words instead of numbers. Vrasti 
(2008) criticises rightly a use of ethnography merely as a method but 
without its methodological and political underpinnings in International 
Relations. Doing ethnography means that the environment, the 
researcher, and her baggage are part of the fieldwork and research 
process. This awareness to context and open or hidden relations 
between the people in the social setting under investigation is what sets 
ethnography apart and makes it of special value when researching in an 
alien environment where the main concepts of the research question, 
and also 'research' itself, might be understood differently by the 
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researcher and the participants. This is why I name it a bridge. By paying 
attention to the surroundings and aiming for deep understanding, 
ethnography provides the possibility of starting and accommodating the 
complex negotiation process Schaffer (2016) calls necessary to 
understand concepts as they are understood in the research 
environment. This is necessary for both quantitative and qualitative 
research. To give an example, it took the experience of living with a 
severely limited electricity supply to understand that this might play a 
role in the way people consume media. I had this experience when I 
worked as a project coordinator in Bor, Jonglei in 2013, where, despite 
my accommodation having been in one of the best hotels in the city, only 
three hours of electricity per day were provided. This made me 
understand that I would have to observe people's media consumption in 
their everyday life instead of just asking for 'time spent listening to a 
radio'113. I needed the experience of the South Sudanese reality, beyond 
the expat house with the normally 24/7 working generator, to 
understand that this needed to be an area of investigation. This leads to 
the question of what ‘being there’ actually means. Ethnography’s 
preference for ‘being there’ has been criticised (Stepputat and Larsen 
2015), but a definition of ‘being there’ is missing. Bliesemann de Guevara 
(2014; Bliesemann de Guevara 2017) and Fisher (2017) both have 
shown the limits and problems of ‘being there’ as an epistemic practice, 
when ‘being there’ is only understood as ‘being in the location’, instead 
of as ‘being in the situation’.    
 
It has been said that ethnography comes with a representation problem; 
that it only represents the world as the researcher sees and understands 
it while omitting the voices of the researched (see van Maanen 1995; van 
                                                        
113 It would hardly make a difference if this question is asked in a questionnaire or a 
qualitative interview. People seldom mention things that are normal to them; they take 
it for granted that the conversational partner knows about them, it is, after all, 
normality. As a western researcher, having an unlimited electricity supply is normal. In 
my normality, people can listen to a radio whenever they want. Thus, my sense of 
normality prevented me from questioning the assumption that media can play an 
important role in peace and statebuilding. 
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Maanen 2011). Indeed, I presented here the interpretations of what I 
heard, saw, and experienced. There is the danger that there are gross 
misinterpretations among my findings. Still, this is not a peculiarity of the 
ethnographic approach. In interview studies and questionnaire research 
it is also the researcher who asks the questions, steers in a certain 
direction, and choses the parts of an interview highlighted in the 
research paper. Interpreting is part of doing research, but ethnography 
with its awareness to surroundings and the long-term investment in a 
country or situation, might have a better chance to limit 
misinterpretations. With the familiarity of the territory, more chances 
opened up to test my interpretations in everyday life and chats with 
South Sudanese acquaintances. Time is a powerful remedy against 
misinterpretations, and ethnography takes time. At the same time, 'time' 
is what might count against ethnography in purely practical terms. 
Gaining 'deep understanding' takes time. It is much more time-costly 
than a qualitative or quantitative approach. A possible trade-off for 
urgent policy-relevant research might be to inject a bit of ethnography in 
a research project; by living locally for some months, research will be 
strengthened. In this study, ethnography has proven so valuable that I 
conclude that even a bit of ethnography is better than no ethnography at 
all. 
 
In the literature, 'access' is named as a problem in ethnography (Bryman 
2001a, p.xviii; Bryman 2001b, pp. 292–298; Feldman et al. 2003; 
Harrington 2003, p.593; Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, pp. 42–43; 
Sarantakos 2013, p.220). I did not experience this and access was simple 
enough to gain. Still, this would certainly have been different with 
another research topic. Access to the daily work of Radio Miraya, to give 
just one example, would certainly have been harder to achieve. My 
research area was people's everyday life, and with teaching at the 
university, playing chess, and hanging out at the local bar I could easily 
interact with South Sudanese and with South Sudanese everyday life. 
This, however, raises questions about ethics. While I never hid my 
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profession and the reason why I was in Juba, I doubt that people were 
constantly aware of me as a researcher. On the one hand, this was good 
cementing ethnography's status as a rather unobtrusive method. On the 
other hand, it is problematic, and it can only partially be healed by being 
aware and acting constantly with the participants' well-being in mind. 
This includes a strict policy to protect participants' identity. Another 
point here is that not only the participants' but also the researcher's 
safety is more under threat than with an interview study, which would 
not require an intense mingling in the everyday life of a country. South 
Sudan is not the safest of places, and I experienced some rather dire 
situations. There is a trade-off to be made with this methodological 
approach, and risks need to be negotiated. A last problematic point with 
ethnography is that its reach is rather small. The question can be asked 
if this is necessarily so. Quite obviously, one researcher cannot 
investigate a whole country ethnographically. Still, research questions 
can have boundaries; if a question concerns media development, 
perceptions of the state, or interethnic cooperation, it is possible to 
identify areas of importance for an ethnographic research study. 
 
7.1.2 Survey 
The quantitative approach with its focus on measurement, objectivity, 
and generalisability is described as the scientific approach to research in 
political science (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013). Numbers, as Merry 
(2016) and Porter (1995) both point out, come with objectivity and thus 
trustworthiness.  Nevertheless, the need for context and understanding 
of the environment showed very clearly during data gathering. Two 
surveys were conducted, one in December 2014, the other in July 2015. 
The first survey pointed to the importance of understanding the 
asymmetrical relationship between researcher and nationally recruited 
interviewers. For both surveys, I employed students as interviewers, and 
in both cases I spent roughly 90 minutes in class to explain my research 
and the questionnaire. For the first survey, however, conducted at the 
beginning of my fieldwork in Juba, I was introduced to the students by a 
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high-ranking member of the faculty. Recruitment for the second survey 
started after I had taught a class and most students knew me already 
from my presence on campus. Student researchers from the first survey 
were of the belief that I was an employee of the UN or an iNGO, and they 
hoped that I might be able to get them one of the coveted jobs with one 
of these bodies. They were under the impression that the more answers 
were ticked on the questionnaire the better, and their wish to please me 
made them press respondents for as many answers as possible. 
Furthermore, they did not want to bother me with questions but give the 
image of independent and good interviewers. The result of this wish to 
make a good impression was multiple ticking of boxes, which created 
several subcategories on the questionnaire; 17 alone for the independent 
variable. This rendered the survey unusable and resulted in the need to 
conduct a second survey. The experience with the first survey 
illuminates a problem with the data gathering process. My surveyors 
were subject to interviewer perceptions of the situation bias (Balnaves 
and Caputi 2001, p. 87), which was because of the way they saw me. The 
first survey showed clearly that using hired interviewers one has little 
control over the process (Bowling 2005). It has been named one of the 
strengths of questionnaire research that questions are standardised, as 
this means that the research is easily repeatable and can be checked for 
reliability. The multiple ticking and scribbling in the margins showed 
that answers were negotiated between the surveyor and the participant. 
Judging from the questionnaires, there must have been quite a bit of 
discussion, calling the repeatability into question. Extensive training 
periods for surveyors of up to three weeks have been advised (Nichols 
1991, p.28). This would have been outside the scope of my means, and it 
would also weaken one of the strengths of questionnaire research: that 
data can be obtained relatively quickly and economically. Lastly, the 
second set of surveyors came from the same background and had the 
same training as the first one – the difference in data quality changed 




The positive points about surveys are that they give an idea about the 
scope of a phenomenon and that they provide sound evidence – or claim 
to do so. When it comes to statebuilding operations in countries of the 
global South, sound evidence is increasingly asked for. Decisions on 
projects and programmes need to be based on sound evidence, which can 
be understood and acknowledged despite cultural differences (Sutcliffe 
and Court 2006; Stremlau 2014; Merry 2016). Surveys deliver such 
evidence. Furthermore, surveys allow for the relatively fast collection of 
huge amounts of data and, much more so than ethnography or 
interviews, surveys can be conducted and analysed with a certain 
amount of speed. While these are clear advantages of surveys, therein 
lies also a catch. Surveys are prone to one-sidedness. They come with a 
tendency to define concepts in line with western researchers' 
perspectives, ignoring the lived normality of the subect being 
researched. This is where a combination of ethnography and surveys is 
particularly fruitful, as each heals the others weakness, a point already 
made by Lieberman (2005).  Ethnography can provide context to a 
survey study, whereas a survey shows the scope of a phenomenon. Still, 
using ethnographic inquiries in a survey compromises the survey’s 
strengths of delivering results relatively fast. Ethnography takes time. 
Still, this trade-off seems worth it.   
 
To summarise, surveys are widely understood as being ‘scientific’ and 
providing clear and objective evidence. How data gathering did take 
place is, however, important knowledge that should not be omitted from 
research studies, as it allows for evaluation of data quality. My two 
surveys showed the importance of the researcher’s position towards the 
national hired interviewers, which had a serious effect on data quality.  
 
7.1.3 Interviews 
The main problem I encountered with interviews was recruiting 
participants. This is an acknowledged but also underreported problem 
with interview studies (AHRQ no date; Potter and Hepburn 2012, p.557). 
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Recruitment was not problematic with journalists, politicians, university 
professors, or NGO-leaders. All these groups were relatively easy to 
cover with people being in general open to share thoughts and insights. 
Of course, there was the one or the other national leader who did not find 
time for an interview, but no one I asked refused point-blank. The 
problem was the response rate of regular people - South Sudanese who 
lacked higher education, were unemployed, or in blue-collar jobs or 
working as day labourers. These people, who are the majority of the 
population, were wary to answer questions and to be recorded. Initially, 
I thought that this was due to the sensitive nature of my research, and I 
made efforts to assure people of confidentiality and anonymity. In fact, 
this was not the concern. Interviewing someone means putting them in 
the spotlight and this was a position with which regular people were 
unfamiliar. People were scared to answer questions because they 
thought they could not answer them; they feared they would not 
understand the question and lack the knowledge to answer ‘correctly’. 
The problem I encountered was not confidentiality but confidence. In 
medical research problems with mistrust and resulting problems with 
recruitment are documented (Corbie-Smith et al. 2002; Fuqua et al. 
2005). In the social sciences, however, the literature focuses mostly on 
best practices once recruitment is done (Bryman 2001b; Knapik 2006). 
Interviewing by proxy has been named as a strategy to overcome the 
problem with interview recruitment (Cammett 2013), but following the 
experience with the survey I was not convinced that this would be 
sufficient. This means that my interview study focuses mainly on elites, 
if 'elites' are understood as relatively well-educated people. The masses, 
which are the main audience of mass media, were despite my best efforts 
mostly excluded. This raises doubts about the representativeness and 
usefulness of interview studies, and about whose voices are heard in 
such studies. I achieved interesting results from the interviews and 
getting insights into how government officials, elites in society and, last 
not least, the journalists themselves understand the media is important 
and a valid area of inquiry. Still, the actual target audience of media 
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development as a democracy strengthening and peacebuilding tool was 
severely underrepresented in the interview study. 
 
It is, of course possible that this problem is unique to South Sudan, yet it 
is doubtful. Developing countries of the global South come with 
enormous social stratification. It seems doubtful that this stratification 
should result in a rather shy population regarding interviews only in 
South Sudan. Despite my participation in South Sudanese everyday life, 
participants for the interview part were mostly educated, middle-class 
professionals who worked with foreigners and were, in their positions as 
academics, consultants, journalists, and politicians used to giving 
answers. This means that interview studies come with a certain level of 
exclusion. Furthermore, they also come with the question to what extent 
interviewees might tell what the researcher supposedly wants to hear – 
an effect and a danger of interview studies that has been described 
before (Morris 2009; Johnson and Rowlands 2012). While the 
government officials I interviewed usually had the interest to show their 
country in a good light, journalists often hoped for funding. I was 
repeatedly asked for either advice or for direct help for a project whose 
funding was about to run out. In order to present themselves as worthy 
of funding, journalists presented themselves as protecting assumedly 
western values. And it is, of course, not only interviewees who might 
have an agenda, it is the researcher too. I repeatedly caught myself 
believing someone who said something that was congruent with my 
ideas and theories. I was a lot more mistrusting when people's answers 
contradicted my theories. On the contrary to ethnography, in interviews 
questions are targeted. This is an advantage as it allows zooming in on 
particular parts of the puzzle. It is also a disadvantage as the researcher 
is an active participant in the research situation (Kvale 2007); the 
researcher helps create the situation and this tendency is a lot more 
forceful in the one-on-one situation of an interview than in the 




Finally, interviews are time-intensive when it comes to data preparation 
and analysis. Transcribing interviews takes a lot of time and effort. 
Engaging a professional transcription service, which I did for part of my 
interviews, led to what I name the 'Lost in Transcription'-problem. South 
Sudanese speak English with a relatively harsh accent. This led to my 
professional transcribers misunderstanding some utterances and 
sentences. I was quite surprised when in one of my interviews the topic 
of discussion was "boarder-raiders' - I could not remember ever having 
discussed something like this in South Sudan. When I checked the 
recording, the puzzle was solved. We had been talking about 'boda-
riders', young men with motorbikes who provide transportation in Juba. 
 
In summary, then, there are two main problems with interview studies. 
First, they are rather exclusive in focusing on a middle-class or elite as 
participants. This can be healed by combining interviews with surveys or 
ethnographic observations and informal interviews. Second, as a social 
situation the researcher is actively engaged in the conversation which 
might be part of the construction of meaning specific to this situation. On 
the other hand, more targeted questions are possible in interview 
studies, steering the interview towards the area of interest, and also 
covering past and future. This is not possible with ethnographic 
observations, which are, however, better in providing context that is less 
touched by the researcher and the interview situation. As with 
ethnography, interview studies cannot deliver knowledge on how 




In general, the three methods investigated different portions of South 
Sudanese society. Ethnography captured older South Sudanese, but also 
students. The survey targeted mostly students and younger people, and 
the interviews were mostly done with elites or skilled professionals, and 
with journalists themselves. This was not planned, but emerged while 
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doing research as a consequence of employing a snowball system for 
data collection for the survey and recruitment problems for the 
interviews. It had outcomes for the research results, to give an example, 
doing only interviews would have meant that the degree to which people 
in South Sudan are dissatisfied with journalists’ education would have 
escaped me. On the other hand, if I had done only a survey, it is likely that 
I would not have thought about asking a question on journalists’ 
education – after all, this is the primary business of western media 
development organisations. It is rather likely that, having worked in 
journalism myself, I would have assumed that good training is done and 
that people are satisfied with journalists’ professionalism. The 
interviews revealed a blind spot, coming from my professional 
background. On the other hand, while the set of cultural rules with 
regards to criticising government and leadership emerged from the 
observations and informal chats and the interviews, the dimension 
would have eluded me had I decided on doing interviews alone. It was 
the experience of living in South Sudan and the informal chats in 
everyday life situations (plus my own, sometimes unpleasant, 
encounters with the representatives of the government) that shone a 
clear spotlight on the strengths of this feeling and the importance of it. 
Interviewing did not highlight the magnitude. 
 
This shows that when doing research in a country with a complex social 
reality of which the researcher is not a cultural native, relying on one 
method alone might lead to distorted results. In particular, it shows 
ethnography emerging as a possible bridge between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches to research in developing countries or countries 
in violent conflict. Such research, for better or worse, is often done by 
researchers who are not native to the country in question. At the same 
time, the social reality in such a country is complex, to an extent because 
of the experience of violent conflict, poverty, and underdevelopment. 
Portions of reality are hidden while others are overly salient. Every 
method employed here was only able to shine a light on a part of the 
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compound mechanism at work in social life (table 42). A more rounded 
understanding and the correction of assumptions based on the 
researcher’s background was only achieved by looking at the results 
delivered by all three methods. The thesis offers an account of the 
practices – understood as the day-to-day actions and processes - of doing 
research in a country of the global South.  
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Figure 42: Methods: Strengths and weaknesses 
 
The case study is media development in South Sudan, an exciting and 
fitting case as ‘media development’ and ‘research’ share a feature: they 
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both come from a conceptual background alien to the environment in 
which they are unleashed. The thesis shows that for such a transplant of 
concepts adjustment is necessary. It cannot be expected that concepts 
from the West act the same way and deliver the same results in the global 
South.  
 
In showing this and in offering an alternative approach to social 
knowledge production and inquiry, this thesis makes a significant 
contribution to both scholarship and praxis. Firstly, it shows that 
research limited to one perspective and method might be misleading in 
an environment more complex than the method can grasp. This is 
important as it widens our understanding how research is done and it 
shows that the choice of perspective and method(s) needs to take the 
research environment into account. Furthermore, it adds to the 
discussion concerning the qualitative/quantitative divide. I do not make 
an argument that the one or the other research tradition is superior. 
Quite the opposite, my account shows that under the circumstances 
described here, no method alone would have sufficed. This is also not an 
argument for the general superiority of mixed methods research. Rather, 
I show that there are circumstances when mixed approaches are called 
for, and there are others. In arguing that the context of the environment 
shapes research results, I add to the argument brought forward by Sil 
and Katzenstein (2010, p.2), that “scholarly discourse risks becoming 
dominated by self-referential academic debates at the expense of 
addressing the complexities and messiness of everyday problems”.  
 
7.2 Researching media in South Sudan - results 
 
In this section, I detail the answers the three methods delivered on the 
question of the effects of media development in South Sudan. I first 
provide a brief overview of the results delivered by the three methods. 
Following this, I compare the results of each method applied to the three 
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elements used in the empirical chapters - media, the state, and groups. 
This shows that concepts are not good travellers and that a transfer from 
a western to a non-western country is problematic. If media 
development were only about the technicalities – the means of mass 
communication – without ideological underpinnings there might not be 
a problem. Still, media development is not value-free and technical, but 
comes with a strong connotation. It brings the idea that it holds 
governments accountable and strengthens democracy (Kumar 2006; 
Coronel 2010, Orme 2010; Kalathil 2011). Furthermore, it is thought that 
it can help end conflict and reconcile groups (Lynch and McGoldrick 
2007; Orme 2010; Staub et al. 2010; Staub 2013). In South Sudan, 
however, ‘media’ is on the one hand understood as a mouthpiece of 
government. On the other hand, it is, if uncontrolled, seen as a danger. 
Media in South Sudan is subject to internationalisation and 
informalisation (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012), which leads to problems 
for the newly trained journalists in South Sudan and to the deterioration 
of the relations between the national government and international 
donors.  
 
7.2.1 Comparison I: The media 
The justification for media development and the money spent on it is that 
it strengthens democracy as was explored in chapter 2. Historically, 
radio was the instrument of choice to ‘modernise’ people’s mindset 
(Lerner 1958). It was seen as easier to access, cheaper, and faster than, 
for example, school education (Sparks 2007). A crucial condition for 
radio to work its magic, however, would be that people have access to it 
on a regular basis and in everyday life. Drawing on ethnography, it 
cannot be confirmed that media plays a particularly big role in South 
Sudan society. While people like to listen to music, they are not especially 
keen on listening to the news. More important, however, than people’s 
preferences or like or dislike of media in general, is that the ability to 
listen to media is severely limited. There is no power distribution; in 
order to have electricity one needs to have a generator and fuel, and only 
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the affluent part of South Sudanese society can afford this. Most South 
Sudanese live without electricity. Listening to media on a mobile would 
be a possibility, but batteries need to be charged, which comes with costs. 
Another line of argument brought forward by iNGOs is that people listen 
in groups in community houses or as part of iNGOs listener groups114. 
While this might be so, it is not mass media but rather resembles school 
education. Mass media is supposed to work on the masses. There is no 
evidence that electronic media plays a big role in the average South 
Sudanese’s everyday life (Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; Stremlau 
2014). One does see many people reading newspapers, which can be 
shared and put to use in a household after reading. While one of the 
doctrines of media development experts is that radio is the medium of 
choice to reach people (see Fraser and Restrepo-Estrada 2002), it might 
be that in South Sudan newspapers would be a better option. 
 
Opposed to this, the survey – like other surveys (EDC 2008; Internews 
2015a) – confirmed media’s importance for the South Sudanese. 68.3% 
of respondents said that they have a radio in their household, and 26.3% 
stated that they listen to the radio on their mobile. Only 4.1% reported 
that they do not own a radio. Accordingly, 58.1% said that they listen to 
radio ‘a few times a day’. 24.1% stated that they listen ‘once a day’. These 
are impressive numbers, which show that money spent on such projects 
is well worth it. This notwithstanding, observations in the country tell a 
different tale. There is a clear difference between statements from 
surveys and observations made in Juba. Informal chats revealed three 
reasons why people overstate their media consumption. First, they do so 
because they understand media as important and would listen more 
often if they could. The statements in surveys thus seem to reflect a 
desired and not an actually existing reality. Secondly, with a lot of iNGOs 
and UN-agencies working in South Sudan people know that baseline 
surveys are done before a new project is started. Projects come with 
                                                        
114 Informal chats with iNGO-workers. Field notes 26 January 2015. 
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employment possibilities and offer chances to create income. The 
positive statements are an exaggeration because iNGO-activities are 
welcomed as a possible source of income. By stating that a project would 
be important, participants want to pave the way and make sure that the 
project actually starts. A similar effect of statements given as a favour or 
a courtesy has been described in the literature (Johnson and Rowlands 
2012). Third, iNGOs offering media activities often have regular listener 
groups to evaluate people’s reactions to their radio dramas and 
messages. These listener groups come with provisions of food and 
drinks, sometimes also with money for transportation and other fringe 
benefits. The presence of these listener groups is well known in South 
Sudan, and participants in surveys want to show that they would be good 
members of a listener group. This resembles the students I hired as 
interviewers for my first survey, who wanted to show that they are good 
interviewers and hence interpreted my guidelines how to fill out the 
questionnaire rather freely. This is a reminder that with surveys a 
researcher does not really control how data are collected. Here this led 
to respondents stating a considerable amount of media consumption 
because they see this as a step towards becoming a regular in a listener 
group. Besides this, the question “How often are you listening to radio” 
is in general rather vague and invites respondents to guesswork. What 
do we mean by “listening to radio”? Have it on in the background while 
doing the dishes or rather listening like I would in a supervisory 
meeting? Questionnaires hardly ask for such distinctions, and even if 
they did, it seems questionable that the answers would be something 
other than speculation. After all, people rarely keep a detailed account of 
media consumption. 
 
The comparison of quantitative and ethnographic data clearly showed 
that numerical data cannot be taken at face value. It is important to know 
the environment from which the data is taken; how data are collected 
and by whom; and if there are hidden (or open) intentions to answer the 
one or the other way are all important information to evaluate data 
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quality. Knowing South Sudan and its severe electricity limitations 
heightened awareness to the contradiction of the two data sets produced 
by two different methods and allowed for taking respondents’ answers 
not literally but with a pinch of salt. It also led to an investigation into 
possible explanations for the contradiction. My results here add to the 
emerging body of literature on the need for context. Merry (2016) points 
towards the limitations of artificially created indicators for quantitative 
research, which makes results comparable on a global scale, but loses the 
nuances which would make them meaningful to the people whose 
experiences are supposedly captured. Schaffer (2016) points in this very 
same direction with his criticism of positivist concepts that are just data 
containers, or, in the words of Satori: “It can be said that we have a 
concept of A (or of A-ness) when we are able to distinguish A from 
whatever is not-A” (Sartori 1984, p.74). Schaffer (2016) makes the case 
that such an understanding of concepts omits the (possibly) distinctive 
conceptualisations of people from a different cultural background. He 
uses the example of the gol, the structure in the Nuer’s social 
organisation closest to what we understand as family, but which is still 
something different. One could say that the data-container family is too 
small for the gol. Similiarly, ‘media’ is understood in the West differently 
from how it is understood in South Sudan.   
 
Could this context have been delivered by any qualitative method, 
namely also by the third method employed in this research, the in-depth 
interviews? It seems questionable. It would, of course, have been 
possible to ask respondents about their media consumption habits. 
However, if, as has been indicated in informal chats, the reason for the 
exaggeration was either a wrong perception of one’s media consumption 
time or to recommend oneself for further research participation, it seems 
unlikely that more meaningful answers would have been given in an 
interview. As it was, in this research I did not ask about media 
consumption time in the interviews. As said in chapter 6, one of the 
problems when it came to interviewing, was recruitment. Due to the 
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nature of my research and the situation in the country, regular people 
were very wary to be interviewed and mostly refused. The majority of 
individuals willing to participate in this part of the study were elites and 
skilled professionals, and journalists themselves. It thus made sense to 
investigate another set of questions, mainly about the role media should 
have in the society and how media is done. This revealed other insights, 
for example an ambiguous understanding of ‘press freedom’. 
Unsurprisingly, most journalists interviewed advocated for a rather 
broad interpretation of press freedom. Most other interviewees, working 
for the government, the university, or in some other high-skilled jobs, 
asked for some control over the media. These results, the considerable 
confusion about the meaning of ‘press freedom’, and the wish for the 
government to control the media, were confirmed by doing ethnography. 
My students’ essays showed a surprising variance of definitions, with a 
portion of them advocating for the government controlling the media. 
The need for this was also confirmed in the survey. It was here where all 
three methods confirmed each other. Another field of surprisingly great 
method conformance was the question of journalists’ education. Both in 
the interviews and in the survey, respondents stated that journalists are 
not well-educated, which was named as one reason why they find 
themselves in trouble with the government. This notion was rejected 
only by the journalists themselves. In terms of ethnography, it would 
have been most fruitful to observe how journalistic education is done in 
South Sudan. As it is, this was not possible. I have from former 
professional stays in South Sudan some knowledge of the subject, but 
there is a clear question of how objective and neutral I can be in 
retrospect. Still, the experience of what I named the AMDISS-incident, 
when Radio Tamazuij, a media outlet operating with funding from the 
Netherlands, attacked the AMDISS, points to at the very least 
questionable journalistic standards and behaviour. Whether this is 
because of bad education and missing knowledge or whether there is a 
political agenda behind it cannot be answered with the data at hand. Still, 
all three methods confirmed each other and added additional insights. 
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Interviewees stated that journalists do not have good skills and are not 
well-educated, which was confirmed in the survey, thus by another 
portion of society as the survey captured more regular people. With 
ethnography, it was possible to see that there is indeed some 
questionable journalistic behaviour. 
 
Figure 43 shows an overview of the findings, with contradictory results 
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Figure 43: Results ‘media’ 
 
7.2.2 Comparison II: The state 
With regards to the understanding of the state and the government, the 
three methods mostly confirmed each other. They all showed a 
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considerable difference to the western understanding, calling the 
western-led media’s ability to provide the expected outcomes and 
function like ‘at home’ into question. 
 
Ethnographic observations showed a country with a different set of rules 
concerning government than in the established democracies of the 
western world. People in South Sudan do not understand the state as an 
institution that needs to provide. The government is understood to be 
more a kind of robber baron, with the citizens paying taxes to be left 
alone. There is no expectation that the government has the responsibility 
to provide public goods and consequently, they are not seen as being 
accountable. This is in opposition to the literature, where taxes are 
described as the triggering mechanism for people demanding goods and 
representation (Brautigam 2008; Moore 2008; Besley and Persson 
2009). People phrased the fear that if voted out of office, the leaders 
would not go quietly and more fighting would be the consequence. 
Furthermore, a cultural rule forbids criticising the leaders openly. All this 
is problematic with regards to a media underpinned by western values; 
as these western values are quite contrary to the understanding of 
leadership in South Sudan. 
 
Probably due to it being anonymous, the survey showed a society close 
to evenly divided on the question whether the government works in the 
best interest of the South Sudanese. Puzzling here was not so much how 
many respondents disapproved, but how many approved of the 
government. When the survey had been conducted, fighting and violent 
conflict had increased – although, at this time Juba was still peaceful – 
and the economic situation was well on its way from bad to very bad, 
with worse clearly to come. The surprisingly high number of people 
approving of the government might be explained by the set of rules found 
in observations and informal chats, while the close to an equally large 
number of individuals stating disapproval might be explained by the 
anonymous nature of the survey. In this sense, the results do not 
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necessarily contradict the findings from the ethnographic observations. 
The survey did contradict ethnography with regards to the question 
whether peaceful leadership is possible in South Sudan. In the survey 
most respondents stated that they did believe this to be possible. In 
informal interviews, conducted under the heading ethnography, people 
phrased the fear that the government would not go quietly if voted out 
of office. The difference of the results cannot be explained with the data 
at hand. It might be that the difference is due to distinctive cohorts as 
participants. My chess partners and people I met in everyday life were 
mostly older and not too well-educated115, whereas the majority of 
respondents to the survey are fairly young and students. It seems 
possible that the younger cohort that answered the questionnaire are 
simply more optimistic than the older South Sudanese, who had 
experienced years of war.  
 
The interview study did confirm the strict hold the South Sudanese 
government has on the country, and it also confirmed the control the 
government exercises over the media. Besides the members of 
government I was talking to, close to everyone confirmed that there is a 
firm government control that has tightened with the outbreak of conflict. 
The interviews also showed different understandings of press freedom, 
with the journalists wanting to have the least control exercised. The 
government justifies the control with the situation the country is in and 
makes the point that every country exercises some control over the 
media. This statement was also given by some of the people in the group 
of civil society members. Members of both groups of government and 
civil society said that journalists lack education, which has forced the 
government's hand to control them more tightly. The interviews thus 
showed a significant difference in content or discontent about how the 
government acted towards the media. As this topic emerged relatively 
early and quite clearly in the process of doing interviews, I included a 
                                                        
115 Ethnography also took place at Juba University, but this particular question about 
peaceful leadership change was never discussed in this environment. 
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question on ‘journalists’ education and professionalism’ in the survey to 
gather the opinion of a wider audience. Close to half the sample, 45.5% 
of respondents, said that journalists in South Sudan are not well-
educated. 
 
Figure 44 shows an overview of the findings, again with contradictory 
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Figure 44: Results 'the state' 
 
7.2.3 Comparison III: Groups 
Part of the reason for media development is that it is thought to better 
the relationships in a country and between groups in a divided society 
(Theranian 2002; Lynch and McGoldrick 2007; Staub et al. 2010; Staub 
2013). Objective information provided by a trusted source shall improve 
relations between groups. In South Sudan, radio stations play dedicated 
peace programmes – radio dramas that should enable the citizens to 
solve confrontational situations peacefully (Bakhita 2012-2015; 
Eyeradio no date; United States Institute of Peace no date). South Sudan 
is a severely divided country with over 60 different tribes. Ethnicity has 
been named as the cause of South Sudan’s internal war. When fighting 
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broke out in December 2013, it did so between soldiers of President 
Salva Kiir Mayardit, a Dinka, and his on-and-off Vice President Dr Riek 
Machar, a Nuer. Instead of pointing towards ethnicity as a driver of 
conflict, scholars and analysts (Johnson 2011; LeRiche and Arnold 2012; 
de Vries and Justin 2014; de Waal and Mohamad 2014) have pointed to 
rivalry in the army and the elites as the root cause of the conflict. The 
question here was how are group relations ‘on the ground’? Is South 
Sudan plagued by hatred between people in everyday life? 
 
Observations and informal chats pointed in a different direction. My 
students, my chess partners, and acquaintances from a local bar detailed 
that the conflict is not a tribal or ethnic one. Instead, they named it a 
power struggle of the elite class, in particular of the president and the 
vice president, going back to the Nasir declaration and the split in the 
SPLA in 1991 (Akol 2003). Ethnicity does play a role to the extent that it 
is a safe constituency in South Sudan. This is connected to the set of 
cultural rules mentioned above. People are culturally bound to their 
leader. The leader provides and for this provision, people follow. If 
necessary, they fight. One cannot afford to lose the tribal affiliation, and 
this would happen should one refuse followership. The war is fought by 
soldiers – war professionals – and followers who are bound in a cultural 
way to a leader who orders. Ethnic hate was not mentioned. The survey 
confirmed this, as did the interviews. ‘Intergroup relations’ and ‘cross-
group friendships’ have been named as indicators for positive behaviour 
and attitudes towards other groups in conflict- and post-conflict societies 
(Fearon and Laitin 1996; Varshney 2002; Kenworthy et al. 2016). Thus, 
in the survey, I asked for the desire to live in a segregated 
neighbourhood, the composition of the circle of friends and 
acquaintances, and contact in everyday life. Another question referred to 
the belief in a possibility of peaceful coexistence. As laid out in chapter 5, 
respondents showed no sign of ethnic or tribal hate; the majority had 
positive relations with members of other tribes in everyday life, and only 
a small percentage mentioned a need or desire to live in a segregated 
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neighbourhood. Roughly two-thirds of the sample said that they believe 
in the possibility of peaceful coexistence of all tribes. This is of especial 
interest as more people experience friendly relations (84.9%) than 
believe in peaceful coexistence (59.7%). This might be what MacGinty 
(2014) named a ‘grudging coexistence’: social rules that people build to 
navigate deeply divided societies. People might follow social practices 
enabling them to navigate life in a country in violent conflict but might 
not believe in the possibility of a political deal and thus lasting peace. 
This would confirm the ‘conflict as political struggle’ thesis. In the 
interviews the ethnic struggle-thesis was also rejected. Literally 
everyone named the conflict a power struggle with roots in the country’s 
past and fought not by neighbours but by war professionals on the one 
hand, and because people cannot turn against their tribe but have to 
follow their leaders, on the other hand. Thus, the interviews also 
confirmed the ‘set of rules’ that binds people to their tribes and 
superiors. However, some of the journalists argued for the importance of 
peace programmes and media as a tool to improve relationships in the 
country. This line of argument came even if it was mentioned before that 
it is not ethnic hate that makes people fight but obedience to leaders. 
Mostly, the importance of peace programmes was stated by journalists 
and media professionals dependent on international funding for their 
programmes.  
 
All three methods confirm each other regarding the question of group 
relations between the ethnic tribes in South Sudan. This is quite a clear 
answer: ethnicity is not a root cause of the conflict in South Sudan. The 
conflict is not yet caused by an ancient hate between the groups or by 
mistrust between the groups. At the moment war professionals fight 
their leaders’ battles, and the leaders fall back on their ethnic 
constituency. There is still no ethnic hate in the citizenry, among the 
people on the ground. This makes peace programmes working on the 
people on the ground an insufficient policy. Instead of people on the 
ground, leaders should be the target audience group to overcome the 
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conflict. There is, however, no guarantee that things will stay like this. 
Should the fighting go on, people on the ground might start mistrusting, 
and eventually hating each other on the basis of group membership.  
 
Group relations are not only about the ethnic groups. Group associations 
are arbitrary, multiple, fluid, and can be made salient (Tajfel et al. 1979; 
Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1982). Reviewing the political economy of 
states and statebuilding, Bliesemann de Guevara and Kuehn (2013) have 
argued that three sets of interests exist in countries under intervention 
and statebuilding: the masses, the elites, and the intervenors. I 
investigated the relationship between the government and the 
international donors, also because there were hints that western style 
media has a negative impact on this relationship. Ethnographic 
observations showed that media policies rather impaired these liaisons. 
This was most apparent in the expulsion of the United Nation’s special 
envoy Toby Lanzer and the events surrounding the threat to close down 
the UN-Radio Miraya. Both events caused an outcry in the international 
community and confirmed the perception of the South Sudanese 
leadership as ruthless and authoritarian. In Juba, however, the 
accompanying behaviour of the UN and the international community 
were described as ‘arrogant’ and it was stated that the UN had to follow 
the rules in South Sudan. This was confirmed in the interviews. In the 
survey, close to half the sample had a rather unfavourable view of 
UNMISS and a majority stated that iNGOs do not cooperate sufficiently 
with the government. It seems that there is a conflict concerning the 
understanding of the sovereignty of a nation on the ground, with the 
question being if the provision of humanitarian aid and other help gives 
the UN a right to govern, and if so, to what extent.  
 
I again give an overview over the findings on groups below (Figure 45). 
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Figure 45: Results 'groups' 
7.3 Closing thoughts 
 
In this study, I have investigated media development in South Sudan and 
the process of knowledge production in a country of the global South. 
Although considered an important part of peace and statebuilding 
(Kumar 2006; Coronel 2010; Orme 2010), evidence for the effects of 
media development is elusive (Schoemaker and Stremlau 2014; 
Stremlau 2014). Furthermore, media is hardly understood as a part of 
statebuilding. In western thought the media is firmly situated outside the 
state as a fourth estate (Coronel 2010). I argue that western-led media in 
a non-western country is undergoing processes of internationalisation 
and informalisation (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010; 2012). It is 
internationalised as is evident in the western journalist education by 
media development organisations that try to implement the watchdog 
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concept of media. In South Sudan, this led to confusion about the 
meaning of press freedom among the journalists, it lacks substance in the 
population who phrase a need for regulation of the media, and it weakens 
the legitimacy of the government, whose authority on the question of 
press regulation is undermined by the international community. In 
consequence, it causes the relationship between the government and the 
international donors to deteriorate. This is not to approve of censorship 
and undemocratic behaviour. Instead, I have shown that the media on 
the one hand, and the state and relationships between groups as the two 
entities media supposedly affects on the other hand, are so different that 
the implementation of media as a mere technical endeavour leads to 
intense problems. These problems have been described in the 
statebuilding literature (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012) with reference to 
state institutions. The media is no such institution, but media 
development is subject to the same processes and problems.  
 
Overall, media plays a less significant role in everyday life than expected. 
This is mostly due to the lack of electricity. This result from observations 
is controversial to statements made in the survey, where respondents 
overwhelmingly claimed that they listen to radio daily or several times a 
day. Observations showed that this is an exaggeration at best, as regular 
people simply lack the electricity to listen to the radio that often. Some 
NGOs believe that people use their phones for listening, but charging 
batteries, which needs to be done at corner shops, is costly. Evidence for 
this praxis being widespread could not be obtained. As detailed in 
chapter 4, this discrepancy between observed and stated behaviour is 
probably due to the research environment itself, underpinning my 
conclusion that the environment must be taken into account when doing 
research. 
 
Media development is done because it is assumed that a pluralist media, 
providing neutral and objective information, will enable citizens to hold 
governments accountable and participate in governance, thus 
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strengthening democracy (Orme 2010; Kalathil 2011; Stremlau et al. 
2015). Furthermore, the provision of neutral information by a trusted 
source is thought to help overcome and heal tensions in an ethnically 
divided society (Lynch and McGoldrick 2007; Staub 2013). Ethnographic 
observations, however, pointed to the existence of a set of cultural rules, 
which oblige people to obedience towards their rulers. Furthermore, 
there exists a ‘Do not criticise the leader’-taboo, which is contrary to 
western-led media’s task of acting as a watchdog and holding 
government accountable. In interviews, many government workers and 
skilled professionals mentioned this. Similarly, my students at Juba 
University confirmed this, and in the survey a high percentage of 
respondents indicated a reluctance to the media’s open critique of the 
government. This obedience to the leader also seems to be an enabling 
mechanism for the conflict. All three methods confirmed that ethnicity is 
not a cause of the conflict, even if it is used as a mobilisation tool. 
Ethnicity can be utilised for fighting as people have a duty to oblige. 
Ethnic hate is no part of this, and an effective conflict management tool 
would thus work either directly on the leaders or against the people's 
sense of obedience. 
 
This means that media cannot hold a government truly accountable – it 
is relatively questionable that people would vote against their leader. 
Government and leadership simply follow other rules in South Sudan, 
and on the contrary to western thought, a government’s legitimacy is not 
connected to the provision of public goods (McLoughlin 2015). Also, 
while the broadcasting of peace programmes to help people make 
peaceful decisions in times of conflict surely does not do harm, it also 
does not seem to do much good. People do not fight because they hate 
each other based on tribal association; they fight because they are 
ordered to, either as war professionals or because they are obliged to a 
leader. At the very least, it is questionable whether media is even a 
trusted source of information. The survey and the interviews showed 
that journalists are seen as not well-educated and not professional. At 
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the same time, the survey revealed that a relatively high percentage of 
respondents believe and have no problem with the government using 
media to do their bidding. The government is seen by a relatively high 
percentage of respondents as a reliable source of information. 
 
Media in South Sudan comes from a different cultural background, and 
people experience it differently. Especially journalists that are educated 
by western NGOs construe ‘press freedom’ quite extensively. This creates 
problems with the government and the security organs, which increased 
when fighting broke out again in December 2013. The governmental 
action against the media, including the closure of media houses, outraged 
the international community. In turn, this angered the government 
which felt threatened in their sovereignty. In this way, western-
underpinned media has not contributed to democracy but instead 
weakened the legitimacy of the government and caused a deteriorating 
relationship between the GoSS and the international community. The 
problem seems to be mostly that binding and enforceable rules with 
regards to the media in South Sudan have not been discussed between 
the stakeholders, meaning here the donors and the government, nor have 
such rules been implemented. This has led to a clash of the different 
understandings of what the media is, can, and should do.  
 
It has been said that the methods employed here have delivered some 
contradictory results, in particular the discrepancy between the survey 
and ethnography concerning media’s role in everyday life. Such 
competing knowledge claims are, however, in themselves valuable hints 
of an underlying social reality (see Perera 2017). Here, they hint at the 
peculiarities of the environment and of the importance of knowing how 
survey data have been collected to assess such discrepancies. In South 
Sudan with its bad economy, participating in a survey regarding media 
flags it up to participants that a project is about to be done. This provides 
jobs and possibilities to earn, and in consequence, participants overstate 
their media consumption time. In this way, the environment has an 
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impact on research findings, methods are performative (Aradau and 
Huysmans 2014).    
 
The research outcome of the three different methods on the question 
“What are the effects of western-underpinned media in South Sudan?” 
showed that no method alone would have delivered a reasonably full 
picture. Every method shone a spotlight on some portions of social life in 
South Sudan and the media’s role in it but left other parts in the dark. 
This does not mean that a mixed method research design is necessary for 
every research problem. For some, however, it is, and it seems that for 
policy-relevant research in a country of the global South a more detailed 
research process such as the one I have done in South Sudan is indeed 
necessary (Sil and Katzenstein 2010).  
 
Doing media and doing research are both not merely technical 
undertakings, and they should not be treated as such in a country of the 
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Appendix 1: Ethnography 
 
1.1 Press freedom 
 
 
Figure 46: Transitional Constitution of South Sudan, extract 
 
Extract from the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (Government of Southern 
Sudan 2011, p.8) detailing freedom of expression and media.  
 
1.2 Media development and development for communication 
 
Mail from David Hoffman, founder of the media development iNGO Internews. Hofman 
details his personal view on the difference between ‘media development’ and ‘media for 
development/communication for development’ and shares his experience of the 
discussion about definitions in the practitioner community. E-mail addresses and 






Figure 47: Mail from David Hofman, Founder Internews 
 
1.3 Media affiliations 
 
This section contains several imprints of media in South Sudan, showing the affiliations 
these media houses have.  
 
The Niles is “is a bi-lingual website offering independent, balanced coverage of 
Sudanese and South Sudanese current and cultural affairs as well as a platform for the 
coaching and professional development of journalists in Sudan and South Sudan.” (The 
Niles website no date). It is a publication of MICT, a small iNGO working in the area of 
media development, and financed by the German Federal Foreign Office.  
 
 
Figure 48: The Niles imprint 
6 
 




Figure 49: Radio Miraya Facebook page 
 
Imprint of the New Nation:  
  
Figure 50: New Nation imprint 
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Radio Tamazuj is very secretive about their affiliation and editors, as can be seen 
in the mail below written to the author. In Juba, it is said that they belong to the 
Dutch NGO Free Press Unlimited. Their Facebook page gives a telephone number 
in The Netherlands as contact (see above). The number given seems indeed to be 
an extension number of Free Press Unlimited, as shown by OneSite Europe, a 
European contact database for policy and development organisations, supported 
by the OECD (OneSite no date) On the screenshot below from OneSite, Free Press 
Unlimited’s telephone number is given as +31 35 625 0110. The telephone 
number given on the Facebook page of Tamazuj is +31 35 625 4340. It seems 









Figure 52: Mail exchange Radio Tamazuj 











Figure 53: Extract OneSite Europe 
Extract OneSite Europe (One Site no date) 
 
1.4 Congratulation messages  
 
Selection of congratulatory messages, published by different companies and 
institutions to mark the anniversary of Independence Day on 09 July 2015. 
















































































1.5 Postponed elections 
 
President Salva Kiir Mayardit had been elected President of the Government 
of Southern Sudan before independence. In agreement with the Transitional  
Constitution of South Sudan, he was sworn in as president of the new country: 
 
 



















Regarding the President’s tenure the constitution states: 
 
 
Figure 59: Transitional constitution of South Sudan, extract III 
 
 
On 6 January 2015, The Citizen published an article based on an interview 
with Professor Abednego Akok Katchuol, the Chairperson of the National 
Electoral Commission (Arou 2015). In it, the international community is 







Figure 60: Extension of term, The Citizen 
 
Shortly after this, the parliament extended its term and the term of President Kiir. On 25 




Figure 61: Extension of term, The Citizen II 
 
Two days later, The Citizen reported reactions to the move, with many opposition 
politicians naming it ‘self-serving’. The same was reported, also on the 27 March 2015, in 
the newspaper Juba Monitor under the headline ‘Extending President’s term illegal says 




   





Very outspoken was William D. Tor, a regular columnist of The Citizen. On 01 May 2015 


































Figure 64: National Election Act, extract 
 






Figure 65: Distribution of ethnic groups in South Sudan, UNOCHA (2009) 
 
1.6 Relationship between the government and iNGOs 
 
 










Figure 67: Expulsion of UN special envoy 






Figure 68: Interference of NGOs, newspaper article   
 




1.7 The AMDISS-incident 
 
 










Figure 71: AMDISS reaction in The Citizen (Bol 2015) 
 
 
Figure 72: Tamazuj mail to the author 
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Appendix 2: Survey 
 
This appendix contains the output of all tests run in SPSS and the associated 
questionnaire used for the second survey. It starts with a remark for the surveyor that 
this questionnaire needs to be filled out by a male Dinka. These notes were included to 
model the population of South Sudan as much as was possible. 
2.1 Questionnaire, 2nd survey 
 
Researcher: This questionnaire needs to be filled out by a male Dinka 
 
What is your gender? 
 Male          Female 
 
How old are you? 
 Younger than 18              18-29         30-49        50-64             65 and above 
Where are you from? 
Equatoria            Jonglei                   Upper Nile state             Bhar e Gazal 
 
What is your tribe?  
Dinka             Nuer              something else (please state: ______________________)   
What is your level of education? 
Never went to school   Secondary school 
Primary school                 University / college   
 
What do you do for a living? 
I am a student / pupil                          I am a day labourer 
I own a business                                    I am a refugee 
I am unemployed                             Something other (please state: _____________) 
 
Is there a radio in your household? (Please tick just one box) 
Yes             No         I listen to radio at work          I listen to radio on my mobile 
 
How often do you listen to radio? (Please tick just one box) 
A few times a day                 Once a week 
Once a day                            It might play in the background but I do not pay attention 





Which radio station are you listening to the most? (Please tick just one box!) 
Radio Miraya                                 Eye Radio 
Voice of America                          Radio Bakitha 
Dream Radio                                 Liberty Radio 
BBC Radio                                      Radio Tamazuj 
SS-TV                                               City FM 
Capital FM                                     I do not care 
 
What do you like most listening to on the radio? (Please tick just one box!) 
News and Information                            Radio Drama 
Music                                                           Health and education programmes 
What is your main source of information? (Please tick only one box!) 
Radio                                     Teachers                             Family 
Newspaper                           Church / Mosque             Friends and colleagues 
 
Who do should pay for radio and journalists? (Please tick only one box!) 
The government – informing citizens is important 
They should sell advertisements and make their own money 
The public – a small fee should be paid by everyone 
Donors and organisations like the UN 
 
State how much you agree or disagree with the below statements. Tick only ONE 









I believe what I hear on the radio      
I trust what I hear in the media 
when it comes from an official 
source. 
     
Most information on the radio 
comes from the government 
     
Media in South Sudan is accurate, 
balanced and neutral 
     
The government is using media to 
influence people 
     
The government is working in the 
best interest of all people in South 
Sudan 
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UNMISS is working in the best 
interest of people in South Sudan 
     
I believe that Dinka and Nuer and 
all other tribes can live together 
peacefully in South Sudan. 
     
I do not trust members from other 
tribes than my own 
     
South Sudan’s journalists are not 
well educated and not professional. 
     
The government is right in 
controlling the media. 
     
It is important to me to live in a 
neighbourhood with only members 
of my own tribe. 
     
Media criticises the government 
unfairly and too much 
     
 
Do you have in everyday life contact with members of other tribes than your own? 
Yes                  No 
 
How do you feel when you have contact with members from other tribes? 
It is no big deal. 
I feel scared 
I try to avoid contact with members from other tribes 
 
Does your circle of friends and acquaintances include: 
Dinka:     Yes               No  
Nuer:      Yes                No 
Shilluk:   Yes               No 
Member of other tribes than your own: Yes                No 
Only members of your tribe:  Yes            No 
 
Would you advise your children only to marry someone from your own tribe? 
Yes                           No 
Do you think that in South Sudan leadership can be changed peacefully and on 
demand of the people of South Sudan? 
Yes                   No 
 




2.2 Output SPSS 
 
GET 
 FILE='H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20151221_SS II clean.regroupsav.sav'. 
 
Warning # 5281. Command name: GET FILE 
SPSS Statistics is running in Unicode encoding mode. This file is encoded in 
a locale-specific (code page) encoding. The defined width of any string 
variables are automatically tripled in order to avoid possible data loss. You 
can use ALTER TYPE to set the width of string variables to the width of the 
longest observed value for each string variable. 
DATASET NAME DataSet1 WINDOW=FRONT. 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Gender Age Location Tribe Education Employment 






Output Created 03-DEC-2016 14:45:08 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20151221_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with 
valid data. 
Syntax FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Gender 
Age Location Tribe Education 
Employment 
 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:02.67 
Elapsed Time 00:00:01.52 
 
 






 gender age 
Where are you 
from 




N Valid 461 458 451 461 461 
Missing 0 3 10 0 0 
 
Statistics 
 What do you do for a living 





 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid male 246 53.4 53.4 53.4 
female 215 46.6 46.6 100.0 
Total 461 100.0 100.0  
 
age 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid younger than 18 13 2.8 2.8 2.8 
18 - 29 239 51.8 52.2 55.0 
30 - 49 168 36.4 36.7 91.7 
50 - 64 27 5.9 5.9 97.6 
65 and above 11 2.4 2.4 100.0 
Total 458 99.3 100.0  
Missing 99 3 .7   
Total 461 100.0   
 
Where are you from 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Equatoria 126 27.3 27.9 27.9 
Jonglei 97 21.0 21.5 49.4 
Upper Nile state 100 21.7 22.2 71.6 
Bhar e Gazal 124 26.9 27.5 99.1 
Warrap 3 .7 .7 99.8 
38 
 
Unity 1 .2 .2 100.0 
Total 451 97.8 100.0  
Missing 99 10 2.2   
Total 461 100.0   
 
What is your tribe 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Dinka 221 47.9 47.9 47.9 
Nuer 88 19.1 19.1 67.0 
other 152 33.0 33.0 100.0 
Total 461 100.0 100.0  
 
level of education 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Never went to school 27 5.9 5.9 5.9 
Primary school 37 8.0 8.0 13.9 
Secondary school 112 24.3 24.3 38.2 
University / college 285 61.8 61.8 100.0 
Total 461 100.0 100.0  
 
What do you do for a living 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Student 223 48.4 48.5 48.5 
Business owner 55 11.9 12.0 60.4 
Unemployed 91 19.7 19.8 80.2 
Day labourer 53 11.5 11.5 91.7 
Refugee 9 2.0 2.0 93.7 
Something other 9 2.0 2.0 95.7 
Office worker 20 4.3 4.3 100.0 
Total 460 99.8 100.0  
Missing 99 1 .2   
Total 461 100.0   
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=gov_best_interest 








Output Created 03-DEC-2016 14:55:32 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20151221_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 




 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.56 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.23 
 
Statistics 
The government works in the best 
interest of all people in South 
Sudan  
N Valid 460 
Missing 1 
 
The government works in the best interest of all people in South Sudan 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 94 20.4 20.4 20.4 
Agree 85 18.4 18.5 38.9 
I don't know 38 8.2 8.3 47.2 
Disagree 115 24.9 25.0 72.2 
Strongly disagree 128 27.8 27.8 100.0 
Total 460 99.8 100.0  
Missing 99 1 .2   











Output Created 03-DEC-2016 14:59:58 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20151221_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 




 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.48 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.19 
 
Statistics 
UNMISS is working in the best 
interest of people in South Sudan  
N Valid 456 
Missing 5 
 
UNMISS is working in the best interest of people in South Sudan 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 101 21.9 22.1 22.1 
Agree 118 25.6 25.9 48.0 
I don't know 48 10.4 10.5 58.6 
Disagree 100 21.7 21.9 80.5 
41 
 
Strongly disagree 89 19.3 19.5 100.0 
Total 456 98.9 100.0  
Missing 99 5 1.1   
Total 461 100.0   
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=NGOs_good_job NGOs_gov 






Output Created 03-DEC-2016 15:01:47 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20151221_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 





 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:01.01 





NGOs are doing 
a good job 
International 




N Valid 457 456 





International NGOs are doing a good job 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 146 31.7 31.9 31.9 
Agree 188 40.8 41.1 73.1 
I don't know 34 7.4 7.4 80.5 
Disagree 51 11.1 11.2 91.7 
Strongly disagree 38 8.2 8.3 100.0 
Total 457 99.1 100.0  
Missing 99 4 .9   
Total 461 100.0   
 
International NGOs are not working enough with the government 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 85 18.4 18.6 18.6 
Agree 137 29.7 30.0 48.7 
I don't know 56 12.1 12.3 61.0 
Disagree 127 27.5 27.9 88.8 
Strongly disagree 51 11.1 11.2 100.0 
Total 456 98.9 100.0  
Missing 99 5 1.1   





Output Created 03-DEC-2016 15:03:35 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20151221_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
43 
 




 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.25 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.14 
 
Statistics 
Do you think that in South Sudan 
leadership can be changed 
peacefully and on demand of the 
people?  
N Valid 456 
Missing 5 
 
Do you think that in South Sudan leadership can be changed peacefully and 
on demand of the people? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 297 64.4 65.1 65.1 
No 159 34.5 34.9 100.0 
Total 456 98.9 100.0  
Missing 99 5 1.1   
Total 461 100.0   
 
 
SAVE OUTFILE='H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav' 
 /COMPRESSED. 
*Nonparametric Tests: Independent Samples. 
NPTESTS 
 /INDEPENDENT TEST (gov_best_interest UNMISS_best_int NGOs_good_job NGOs_gov 
Lead_change) GROUP (Station_regroup_II) KRUSKAL_WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE) 
 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE 









Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 











 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS 
USERMISSING=EXCLUDE 
 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 
CILEVEL=95. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.72 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.53 
 







Output Created 03-DEC-2016 15:43:51 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 






 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.37 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.36 
 
MEANS TABLES=UNMISS_best_int BY Station_regroup_II 




Output Created 03-DEC-2016 15:54:52 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing For each dependent variable in a table, 
user-defined missing values for the 
dependent and all grouping variables 
are treated as missing. 
Cases Used Cases used for each table have no 
missing values in any independent 
variable, and not all dependent 
variables have missing values. 
Syntax MEANS TABLES=UNMISS_best_int 
BY Station_regroup_II 
 /CELLS=COUNT MEDIAN. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.00 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.00 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Included Excluded Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
47 
 
UNMISS is working in the 
best interest of people in 
South Sudan * Which station 
regrouped with BBC 
456 98.9% 5 1.1% 461 100.0% 
 
Report 
UNMISS is working in the best interest of people in 
South Sudan  
Which station regrouped 
with BBC N Median 
UN-Radio Miraya 192 2.50 
Liberal Radio stations (Eye, 
VoA) 
81 2.00 
RoSS Church Radio 
(Bakhita) 
25 2.00 
State media SS-TV 29 3.00 
small SS radios 42 3.00 
BBC 87 4.00 
Total 456 3.00 
 
CROSSTABS 
 /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY UNMISS_II 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 





Output Created 03-DEC-2016 15:59:53 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
48 
 
Cases Used Statistics for each table are based on 
all the cases with valid data in the 
specified range(s) for all variables in 
each table. 
Syntax CROSSTABS 
 /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY 
UNMISS_II 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 
 /COUNT ROUND CELL 
 /BARCHART. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.30 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.20 
Dimensions Requested 2 
Cells Available 349496 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Which station regrouped 
with BBC * UNMISS_II 
456 98.9% 5 1.1% 461 100.0% 
 





agree/Agree I do not know 
Which station regrouped 
with BBC 
UN-Radio Miraya 96 22 
Liberal Radio stations (Eye, 
VoA) 
49 7 
RoSS Church Radio 
(Bakhita) 
15 1 
State media SS-TV 11 5 
small SS radios 20 5 
BBC 28 8 
Total 219 48 
 
Which station regrouped with BBC * UNMISS_II Crosstabulation 
Count  





Which station regrouped with BBC UN-Radio Miraya 74 192 
Liberal Radio stations (Eye, VoA) 25 81 
RoSS Church Radio (Bakhita) 9 25 
State media SS-TV 13 29 
small SS radios 17 42 
BBC 51 87 
Total 189 456 
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Radio Lis_Radio Main_source What_listen SS_media_neutral 
Journ_edu Believe 
 gov_influence Pay gov_controll Media_critics 






Output Created 03-DEC-2016 16:17:27 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with 
valid data. 
Syntax FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Radio 
Lis_Radio Main_source What_listen 
SS_media_neutral Journ_edu Believe 
 gov_influence Pay gov_controll 
Media_critics 
 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:01.64 






Is there a radio 
in your 
household 
How often do 
you listen to 
radio? 
What is your 
main source of 
information 
What do like 
listen to the 
most 





N Valid 460 461 459 461 453 









I believe what i 
hear on radio 
The government 
uses media to 
influence people 
Who should pay 
for radio and 
journalists 
The government 
is right to 
control the 
media 
N Valid 459 460 459 459 461 




Media criticises the government unfairly and too 
much 
N Valid 460 
Missing 1 
 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
 
SAVE OUTFILE='H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav' 
 /COMPRESSED. 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Radio Lis_Radio Main_source What_listen SS_media_neutral 
Journ_edu Believe 
 gov_influence Pay gov_controll Media_critics 





Output Created 03-DEC-2016 16:20:53 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 





Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with 
valid data. 
Syntax FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Radio 
Lis_Radio Main_source What_listen 
SS_media_neutral Journ_edu Believe 
 gov_influence Pay gov_controll 
Media_critics 
 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:01.44 




Is there a radio 
in your 
household 
How often do 
you listen to 
radio? 
What is your 
main source of 
information 
What do like 
listen to the 
most 





N Valid 460 461 459 460 453 









I believe what i 
hear on radio 
The government 
uses media to 
influence people 
Who should pay 
for radio and 
journalists 
The government 
is right to 
control the 
media 
N Valid 459 460 459 459 461 




Media criticises the government unfairly and too 
much 






Is there a radio in your household 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 314 68.1 68.3 68.3 
No 19 4.1 4.1 72.4 
I listen to radio at work 6 1.3 1.3 73.7 
I listen to radio on my mobile 121 26.2 26.3 100.0 
Total 460 99.8 100.0  
Missing 99 1 .2   
Total 461 100.0   
 
How often do you listen to radio? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid A few times a day 268 58.1 58.1 58.1 
Once a day 111 24.1 24.1 82.2 
A few times a week 41 8.9 8.9 91.1 
Once a week 30 6.5 6.5 97.6 
It might play in the 
background, but I do not pay 
attention 
11 2.4 2.4 100.0 
Total 461 100.0 100.0  
 
What is your main source of information 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Radio 319 69.2 69.5 69.5 
Newspaper 82 17.8 17.9 87.4 
Teachers 10 2.2 2.2 89.5 
Church/Mosque 18 3.9 3.9 93.5 
Family 3 .7 .7 94.1 
Friends and colleagues 27 5.9 5.9 100.0 
Total 459 99.6 100.0  
Missing 99 2 .4   
Total 461 100.0   
 
What do like listen to the most 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid News and information 359 77.9 78.0 78.0 
53 
 
Music 53 11.5 11.5 89.6 
Radio drama 12 2.6 2.6 92.2 
Health and education 36 7.8 7.8 100.0 
Total 460 99.8 100.0  
Missing 99 1 .2   
Total 461 100.0   
 
Media in South Sudan is accurate, balanced and neutral 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 34 7.4 7.5 7.5 
Agree 99 21.5 21.9 29.4 
I don't know 55 11.9 12.1 41.5 
Disagree 152 33.0 33.6 75.1 
Strongly disagree 113 24.5 24.9 100.0 
Total 453 98.3 100.0  
Missing 99 8 1.7   
Total 461 100.0   
 
South Sudan's journalists are not well educated and not professional 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 73 15.8 15.9 15.9 
Agree 136 29.5 29.6 45.5 
I don't know 36 7.8 7.8 53.4 
Disagree 139 30.2 30.3 83.7 
Strongly disagree 75 16.3 16.3 100.0 
Total 459 99.6 100.0  
Missing 99 2 .4   
Total 461 100.0   
 
I believe what i hear on radio 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 131 28.4 28.5 28.5 
Agree 247 53.6 53.7 82.2 
I don't know 19 4.1 4.1 86.3 
Disagree 48 10.4 10.4 96.7 
Strongly disagree 15 3.3 3.3 100.0 
Total 460 99.8 100.0  
54 
 
Missing 99 1 .2   
Total 461 100.0   
 
The government uses media to influence people 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 131 28.4 28.5 28.5 
Agree 196 42.5 42.7 71.2 
I don't know 47 10.2 10.2 81.5 
Disagree 66 14.3 14.4 95.9 
Strongly disagree 19 4.1 4.1 100.0 
Total 459 99.6 100.0  
Missing 99 2 .4   
Total 461 100.0   
 
Who should pay for radio and journalists 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid The government - informing 
citizens is important 
165 35.8 35.9 35.9 
They should sell 
advertisements and make 
their own money 
155 33.6 33.8 69.7 
The public - a small 
feeshould be paid by 
everyone 
18 3.9 3.9 73.6 
Donors and organisations 
like the UN 
121 26.2 26.4 100.0 
Total 459 99.6 100.0  
Missing 99 2 .4   
Total 461 100.0   
 
The government is right to control the media 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 117 25.4 25.4 25.4 
Agree 114 24.7 24.7 50.1 
I don't know 18 3.9 3.9 54.0 
Disagree 100 21.7 21.7 75.7 
Strongly disagree 112 24.3 24.3 100.0 




Media criticises the government unfairly and too much 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 68 14.8 14.8 14.8 
Agree 94 20.4 20.4 35.2 
I don't know 76 16.5 16.5 51.7 
Disagree 125 27.1 27.2 78.9 
Strongly disagree 97 21.0 21.1 100.0 
Total 460 99.8 100.0  
Missing 99 1 .2   
Total 461 100.0   
 
*Nonparametric Tests: Independent Samples. 
NPTESTS 
 /INDEPENDENT TEST (SS_media_neutral gov_influence Believe Info_from_gov 
Journ_edu gov_controll Media_critics) GROUP (Station_regroup_II) 
KRUSKAL_WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE) 
 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE 





Output Created 03-DEC-2016 16:28:57 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 






 /INDEPENDENT TEST 
(SS_media_neutral gov_influence 
Believe Info_from_gov Journ_edu 




 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS 
USERMISSING=EXCLUDE 
 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 
CILEVEL=95. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.39 






 /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY gov_cont_II 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 





Output Created 03-DEC-2016 16:33:32 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics for each table are based on 
all the cases with valid data in the 
specified range(s) for all variables in 
each table. 
Syntax CROSSTABS 
 /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY 
gov_cont_II 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 
 /COUNT ROUND CELL 
 /BARCHART. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.16 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.17 
Dimensions Requested 2 
Cells Available 349496 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Which station regrouped 
with BBC * gov_cont_II 









agree/Agree I do not know 
Which station regrouped 
with BBC 
UN-Radio Miraya 95 11 
Liberal Radio stations (Eye, 
VoA) 
32 4 
RoSS Church Radio 
(Bakhita) 
11 1 
State media SS-TV 21 2 
small SS radios 22 0 
BBC 50 0 
Total 231 18 
 







Which station regrouped with BBC UN-Radio Miraya 88 194 
Liberal Radio stations (Eye, VoA) 45 81 
RoSS Church Radio (Bakhita) 14 26 
State media SS-TV 6 29 
small SS radios 20 42 
BBC 39 89 
Total 212 461 
 
CROSSTABS 
 /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY Media_Critics_II 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 





Output Created 03-DEC-2016 16:38:07 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 





Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics for each table are based on 
all the cases with valid data in the 
specified range(s) for all variables in 
each table. 
Syntax CROSSTABS 
 /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY 
Media_Critics_II 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 
 /COUNT ROUND CELL 
 /BARCHART. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.19 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.17 
Dimensions Requested 2 
Cells Available 349496 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Which station regrouped 
with BBC * Media_Critics_II 
460 99.8% 1 0.2% 461 100.0% 
 




Total 1.00 2.00 3.00 
Which station regrouped 
with BBC 
UN-Radio Miraya 63 28 103 194 
Liberal Radio stations (Eye, 
VoA) 
29 16 36 81 
RoSS Church Radio 
(Bakhita) 
6 7 13 26 
State media SS-TV 14 6 9 29 
small SS radios 16 8 17 41 
BBC 34 11 44 89 
60 
 
Total 162 76 222 460 
 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
 




 /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY Media_Critics_II 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 





Output Created 03-DEC-2016 16:39:22 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics for each table are based on 
all the cases with valid data in the 
specified range(s) for all variables in 
each table. 
Syntax CROSSTABS 
 /TABLES=Station_regroup_II BY 
Media_Critics_II 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 
 /COUNT ROUND CELL 
 /BARCHART. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.16 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.16 
Dimensions Requested 2 




Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Which station regrouped 
with BBC * Media_Critics_II 
460 99.8% 1 0.2% 461 100.0% 
 





agree/Agree I do not know 
Which station regrouped 
with BBC 
UN-Radio Miraya 63 28 
Liberal Radio stations (Eye, 
VoA) 
29 16 
RoSS Church Radio 
(Bakhita) 
6 7 
State media SS-TV 14 6 
small SS radios 16 8 
BBC 34 11 
Total 162 76 
 







Which station regrouped with BBC UN-Radio Miraya 103 194 
Liberal Radio stations (Eye, VoA) 36 81 
RoSS Church Radio (Bakhita) 13 26 
State media SS-TV 9 29 
small SS radios 17 41 
BBC 44 89 
Total 222 460 
 
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=Trust_tribes everyday_life_contact Feel_contact 
Friends_other_tribes 
 Lead_change 






Output Created 03-DEC-2016 16:47:52 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 






 /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN 
MAX. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.00 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.00 
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Trust_tribes everyday_life_contact Feel_contact 
Friends_other_tribes 
 Lead_change 





Output Created 03-DEC-2016 16:49:07 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
63 
 







 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.62 




I do not trust 
members from 
other tribes than 
my own 





How do you feel 








other tribes than 
your own? 
Do you think 





on demand of 
the people? 
N Valid 459 456 456 435 456 
Missing 2 5 5 26 5 
 
Notes 
Output Created 03-DEC-2016 16:50:02 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 









 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.75 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.67 
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Trust_tribes everyday_life_contact Feel_contact 
Friends_other_tribes 
 Tribes_live_peace 






Output Created 03-DEC-2016 16:55:42 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 







 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.64 






I do not trust 
members from 
other tribes than 
my own 





How do you feel 








other tribes than 
your own? 
I believe that 
Dinka and Nuer 





N Valid 458 454 455 435 460 
Missing 3 7 6 26 1 
 
Frequency Table 
I do not trust members from other tribes than my own 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 50 10.8 10.9 10.9 
Agree 93 20.2 20.3 31.2 
I don't know 17 3.7 3.7 34.9 
Disagree 156 33.8 34.1 69.0 
Strongly disagree 142 30.8 31.0 100.0 
Total 458 99.3 100.0  
Missing 99 3 .7   
Total 461 100.0   
 
Do you have in everyday life contact with members of other tribes? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 386 83.7 85.0 85.0 
No 68 14.8 15.0 100.0 
Total 454 98.5 100.0  
Missing 99 7 1.5   
Total 461 100.0   
 
How do you feel when you have contact with members of other tribes 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid It is no big deal 366 79.4 80.4 80.4 
I feel scared 56 12.1 12.3 92.7 
I try to avoid contact with 
members from other tribes 
33 7.2 7.3 100.0 
Total 455 98.7 100.0  
66 
 
Missing 99 6 1.3   
Total 461 100.0   
 
Does your circle of friends include members of other tribes than your own? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 362 78.5 83.2 83.2 
No 73 15.8 16.8 100.0 
Total 435 94.4 100.0  
Missing 99 26 5.6   
Total 461 100.0   
 
I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 158 34.3 34.3 34.3 
Agree 117 25.4 25.4 59.8 
I don't know 22 4.8 4.8 64.6 
Disagree 63 13.7 13.7 78.3 
Strongly disagree 100 21.7 21.7 100.0 
Total 460 99.8 100.0  
Missing 99 1 .2   
Total 461 100.0   
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=mix_neighbourhood 





Output Created 03-DEC-2016 17:03:56 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 





Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 




 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.14 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.13 
 
Statistics 
It is important to live in a 
neighbourhood with only members 
of my tribe  
N Valid 460 
Missing 1 
 
It is important to live in a neighbourhood with only members of my tribe 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 35 7.6 7.6 7.6 
Agree 41 8.9 8.9 16.5 
I don't know 11 2.4 2.4 18.9 
Disagree 174 37.7 37.8 56.7 
Strongly disagree 199 43.2 43.3 100.0 
Total 460 99.8 100.0  
Missing 99 1 .2   
Total 461 100.0   
 
*Nonparametric Tests: Independent Samples. 
NPTESTS 
 /INDEPENDENT TEST (Tribes_live_peace) GROUP (Tribe) 
KRUSKAL_WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE) 
 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE 










Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 




 /INDEPENDENT TEST 
(Tribes_live_peace) GROUP (Tribe) 
KRUSKAL_WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIR
WISE) 
 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS 
USERMISSING=EXCLUDE 
 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 
CILEVEL=95. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.17 





 /TABLES=Tribes_Live_Peace_II BY Tribe 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 






Output Created 03-DEC-2016 17:07:34 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics for each table are based on 
all the cases with valid data in the 
specified range(s) for all variables in 
each table. 
Syntax CROSSTABS 
 /TABLES=Tribes_Live_Peace_II BY 
Tribe 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 
 /COUNT ROUND CELL 
 /BARCHART. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.27 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.19 
Dimensions Requested 2 
Cells Available 349496 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 




What is your tribe 
460 99.8% 1 0.2% 461 100.0% 
 
Tribes_Live_Peace_II * What is your tribe Crosstabulation 
Count  
 
What is your tribe 
Total Dinka Nuer other 
Tribes_Live_Peace_II 1.00 167 49 59 275 
2.00 11 5 6 22 
3.00 43 33 87 163 
Total 221 87 152 460 
 
Notes 
Output Created 03-DEC-2016 17:08:47 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics for each table are based on 
all the cases with valid data in the 
specified range(s) for all variables in 
each table. 
Syntax CROSSTABS 
 /TABLES=Tribes_Live_Peace_II BY 
Tribe 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 
 /COUNT ROUND CELL 
 /BARCHART. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.16 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.16 
Dimensions Requested 2 






Output Created 03-DEC-2016 17:09:39 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II 
clean.regroupsav.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
461 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics for each table are based on 
all the cases with valid data in the 
specified range(s) for all variables in 
each table. 
Syntax CROSSTABS 
 /TABLES=Tribe BY 
Tribes_Live_Peace_II 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 
 /COUNT ROUND CELL 
 /BARCHART. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.14 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.14 
Dimensions Requested 2 
Cells Available 349496 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
What is your tribe * 
Tribes_Live_Peace_II 
460 99.8% 1 0.2% 461 100.0% 
 
What is your tribe * Tribes_Live_Peace_II Crosstabulation 
Count  








What is your tribe Dinka 167 11 43 221 
Nuer 49 5 33 87 
other 59 6 87 152 
Total 275 22 163 460 
 
 
SAVE OUTFILE='H:\My Documents\texts\5 statistics\20160312_SS II clean no BBC.sav' 
 /COMPRESSED. 
RECODE Which_station (1=1) (2=2) (5=3) (7=4) (8=5) (3=6) (6=6) (9=6) (11=6) INTO 
Which_Stat_II. 
VARIABLE LABELS Which_Stat_II 'Which_Stat_II'. 
EXECUTE. 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Which_Stat_II 
 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Notes 
Output Created 03-DEC-2016 17:18:55 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II clean no 
BBC.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
372 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 




 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.16 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.15 
 
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1. 
 










Output Created 03-DEC-2016 17:20:43 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II clean no 
BBC.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
372 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 




 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.16 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.14 
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Trust_tribes mix_neighbourhood everyday_life_contact 
Feel_contact 
 Friends_from_own_tribe Tribes_live_peace 





Output Created 03-DEC-2016 17:34:03 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II clean no 
BBC.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
74 
 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
372 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 








 /BARCHART PERCENT 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.73 




I do not trust 
members from 
other tribes than 
my own 
It is important to 
live in a 
neighbourhood 
with only 
members of my 
tribe 





How do you feel 








your own tribe? 
N Valid 369 371 366 367 341 




I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can 
live together peacefully in South Sudan 





I do not trust members from other tribes than my own 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 46 12.4 12.5 12.5 
Agree 76 20.4 20.6 33.1 
I don't know 14 3.8 3.8 36.9 
Disagree 125 33.6 33.9 70.7 
75 
 
Strongly disagree 108 29.0 29.3 100.0 
Total 369 99.2 100.0  
Missing 99 3 .8   
Total 372 100.0   
 
It is important to live in a neighbourhood with only members of my tribe 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 32 8.6 8.6 8.6 
Agree 36 9.7 9.7 18.3 
I don't know 9 2.4 2.4 20.8 
Disagree 134 36.0 36.1 56.9 
Strongly disagree 160 43.0 43.1 100.0 
Total 371 99.7 100.0  
Missing 99 1 .3   
Total 372 100.0   
 
Do you have in everyday life contact with members of other tribes? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 309 83.1 84.4 84.4 
No 57 15.3 15.6 100.0 
Total 366 98.4 100.0  
Missing 99 6 1.6   
Total 372 100.0   
 
How do you feel when you have contact with members of other tribes 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid It is no big deal 287 77.2 78.2 78.2 
I feel scared 50 13.4 13.6 91.8 
I try to avoid contact with 
members from other tribes 
30 8.1 8.2 100.0 
Total 367 98.7 100.0  
Missing 99 5 1.3   
Total 372 100.0   
 
Does your circle of friends include only members of your own tribe? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 43 11.6 12.6 12.6 
76 
 
No 298 80.1 87.4 100.0 
Total 341 91.7 100.0  
Missing 99 31 8.3   
Total 372 100.0   
 
I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly agree 118 31.7 31.8 31.8 
Agree 91 24.5 24.5 56.3 
I don't know 21 5.6 5.7 62.0 
Disagree 54 14.5 14.6 76.5 
Strongly disagree 87 23.4 23.5 100.0 
Total 371 99.7 100.0  
Missing 99 1 .3   
Total 372 100.0   
 
CROSSTABS 
 /TABLES=Tribe BY Tribes_Live_Peace_II 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 





Output Created 03-DEC-2016 17:49:57 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II clean no 
BBC.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
372 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics for each table are based on 
all the cases with valid data in the 





 /TABLES=Tribe BY 
Tribes_Live_Peace_II 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 
 /COUNT ROUND CELL 
 /BARCHART. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.19 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.19 
Dimensions Requested 2 
Cells Available 349496 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
What is your tribe * 
Tribes_Live_Peace_II 
371 99.7% 1 0.3% 372 100.0% 
 










What is your tribe Dinka 123 10 35 168 
Nuer 38 5 31 74 
other 48 6 75 129 
Total 209 21 141 371 
 
*Nonparametric Tests: Independent Samples. 
NPTESTS 
 /INDEPENDENT TEST (Tribes_live_peace Trust_tribes mix_neighbourhood) GROUP 
(Which_station) KRUSKAL_WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE) 
 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE 









Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II clean no 
BBC.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 











 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS 
USERMISSING=EXCLUDE 
 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.19 





Output Created 03-DEC-2016 18:01:44 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II clean no 
BBC.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
372 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics for each table are based on 
all the cases with valid data in the 
specified range(s) for all variables in 
each table. 
Syntax CROSSTABS 
 /TABLES=Which_Stat_II BY 
Tribes_Live_Peace_II 
mix_neighbourhood_II Trust_Tribes_II 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 
 /COUNT ROUND CELL 
 /BARCHART. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.41 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.40 
Dimensions Requested 2 
Cells Available 349496 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Which_Stat_II * 
Tribes_Live_Peace_II 
371 99.7% 1 0.3% 372 100.0% 
Which_Stat_II * 
mix_neighbourhood_II 
371 99.7% 1 0.3% 372 100.0% 
Which_Stat_II * 
Trust_Tribes_II 
369 99.2% 3 0.8% 372 100.0% 












Which_Stat_II Miraya 107 13 73 193 
Voice of America 14 0 5 19 
SS-TV/SS-Radio 19 1 9 29 
Eyeradio 35 2 25 62 
Bakhita 13 1 12 26 
Small stations 21 4 17 42 
Total 209 21 141 371 
 










Which_Stat_II Miraya 33 2 158 193 
Voice of America 6 0 13 19 
SS-TV/SS-Radio 7 1 21 29 
Eyeradio 11 2 49 62 
Bakhita 5 0 21 26 
Small stations 6 4 32 42 
Total 68 9 294 371 
 










Which_Stat_II Miraya 72 5 115 192 
Voice of America 6 1 12 19 
SS-TV/SS-Radio 8 2 19 29 
Eyeradio 19 2 41 62 
Bakhita 8 1 17 26 
Small stations 9 3 29 41 




 /TABLES=Which_Stat_II BY Tribes_live_peace 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 





Output Created 03-DEC-2016 18:09:36 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II clean no 
BBC.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
372 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics for each table are based on 
all the cases with valid data in the 
specified range(s) for all variables in 
each table. 
Syntax CROSSTABS 
 /TABLES=Which_Stat_II BY 
Tribes_live_peace 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT 
 /COUNT ROUND CELL 
 /BARCHART. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.16 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.15 
Dimensions Requested 2 
Cells Available 349496 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
82 
 
Which_Stat_II * I believe 
that Dinka and Nuer and all 
tribes can live together 
peacefully in South Sudan 
371 99.7% 1 0.3% 372 100.0% 
 




I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully 
in South Sudan 
Strongly agree Agree I don't know Disagree 
Which_Stat_II Miraya 60 47 13 28 
Voice of America 7 7 0 3 
SS-TV/SS-Radio 15 4 1 0 
Eyeradio 19 16 2 11 
Bakhita 5 8 1 7 
Small stations 12 9 4 5 
Total 118 91 21 54 
 




I believe that Dinka and 
Nuer and all tribes can live 
together peacefully in 
South Sudan 
Total Strongly disagree 
Which_Stat_II Miraya 45 193 
Voice of America 2 19 
SS-TV/SS-Radio 9 29 
Eyeradio 14 62 
Bakhita 5 26 
Small stations 12 42 
Total 87 371 
 
CROSSTABS 
 /TABLES=Which_Stat_II BY Tribes_live_peace 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT ROW COLUMN TOTAL 







Output Created 03-DEC-2016 18:11:39 
Comments  
Input Data H:\My Documents\texts\5 
statistics\20160312_SS II clean no 
BBC.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
372 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics for each table are based on 
all the cases with valid data in the 
specified range(s) for all variables in 
each table. 
Syntax CROSSTABS 
 /TABLES=Which_Stat_II BY 
Tribes_live_peace 
 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES 
 /CELLS=COUNT ROW COLUMN 
TOTAL 
 /COUNT ROUND CELL 
 /BARCHART. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.16 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.17 
Dimensions Requested 2 
Cells Available 349496 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Which_Stat_II * I believe 
that Dinka and Nuer and all 
tribes can live together 
peacefully in South Sudan 
371 99.7% 1 0.3% 372 100.0% 
Which_Stat_II * I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan 
Crosstabulation 
 
I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live 




agree Agree I don't know Disagree 
Which_Stat
_II 
Miraya Count 60 47 13 28 
% within 
Which_Stat_II 
31.1% 24.4% 6.7% 14.5% 
% within I believe that 
Dinka and Nuer and 
all tribes can live 
together peacefully in 
South Sudan 
50.8% 51.6% 61.9% 51.9% 
% of Total 16.2% 12.7% 3.5% 7.5% 
Voice of 
America 
Count 7 7 0 3 
% within 
Which_Stat_II 
36.8% 36.8% 0.0% 15.8% 
% within I believe that 
Dinka and Nuer and 
all tribes can live 
together peacefully in 
South Sudan 
5.9% 7.7% 0.0% 5.6% 
% of Total 1.9% 1.9% 0.0% 0.8% 
SS-TV/SS-
Radio 
Count 15 4 1 0 
% within 
Which_Stat_II 
51.7% 13.8% 3.4% 0.0% 
% within I believe that 
Dinka and Nuer and 
all tribes can live 
together peacefully in 
South Sudan 
12.7% 4.4% 4.8% 0.0% 
% of Total 4.0% 1.1% 0.3% 0.0% 
Eyeradio Count 19 16 2 11 
% within 
Which_Stat_II 
30.6% 25.8% 3.2% 17.7% 
% within I believe that 
Dinka and Nuer and 
all tribes can live 
together peacefully in 
South Sudan 
16.1% 17.6% 9.5% 20.4% 
% of Total 5.1% 4.3% 0.5% 3.0% 
Bakhita Count 5 8 1 7 
% within 
Which_Stat_II 
19.2% 30.8% 3.8% 26.9% 
85 
 
% within I believe that 
Dinka and Nuer and 
all tribes can live 
together peacefully in 
South Sudan 
4.2% 8.8% 4.8% 13.0% 
% of Total 1.3% 2.2% 0.3% 1.9% 
Small stations Count 12 9 4 5 
 
Which_Stat_II * I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan 
Crosstabulation 
 
I believe that 
Dinka and Nuer 




Total Strongly disagree 
Which_Stat_II Miraya Count 45 193 
% within Which_Stat_II 23.3% 100.0% 
% within I believe that Dinka and 
Nuer and all tribes can live 
together peacefully in South 
Sudan 
51.7% 52.0% 
% of Total 12.1% 52.0% 
Voice of America Count 2 19 
% within Which_Stat_II 10.5% 100.0% 
% within I believe that Dinka and 
Nuer and all tribes can live 
together peacefully in South 
Sudan 
2.3% 5.1% 
% of Total 0.5% 5.1% 
SS-TV/SS-Radio Count 9 29 
% within Which_Stat_II 31.0% 100.0% 
% within I believe that Dinka and 
Nuer and all tribes can live 
together peacefully in South 
Sudan 
10.3% 7.8% 
% of Total 2.4% 7.8% 
Eyeradio Count 14 62 
% within Which_Stat_II 22.6% 100.0% 
86 
 
% within I believe that Dinka and 
Nuer and all tribes can live 
together peacefully in South 
Sudan 
16.1% 16.7% 
% of Total 3.8% 16.7% 
Bakhita Count 5 26 
% within Which_Stat_II 19.2% 100.0% 
% within I believe that Dinka and 
Nuer and all tribes can live 
together peacefully in South 
Sudan 
5.7% 7.0% 
% of Total 1.3% 7.0% 
Small stations Count 12 42 
 
Which_Stat_II * I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live together peacefully in South Sudan 
Crosstabulation 
 
I believe that Dinka and Nuer and all tribes can live 
together peacefully in South Sudan 
Strongly 
agree Agree I don't know Disagree 
Which_Stat
_II 
Small stations % within 
Which_Stat_II 
28.6% 21.4% 9.5% 11.9% 
% within I believe that 
Dinka and Nuer and 
all tribes can live 
together peacefully in 
South Sudan 
10.2% 9.9% 19.0% 9.3% 
% of Total 3.2% 2.4% 1.1% 1.3% 
Total Count 118 91 21 54 
% within 
Which_Stat_II 
31.8% 24.5% 5.7% 14.6% 
% within I believe that 
Dinka and Nuer and 
all tribes can live 
together peacefully in 
South Sudan 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 31.8% 24.5% 5.7% 14.6% 
 





I believe that 
Dinka and Nuer 




Total Strongly disagree 
Which_Stat_II Small stations % within Which_Stat_II 28.6% 100.0% 
% within I believe that Dinka and 
Nuer and all tribes can live 
together peacefully in South 
Sudan 
13.8% 11.3% 
% of Total 3.2% 11.3% 
Total Count 87 371 
% within Which_Stat_II 23.5% 100.0% 
% within I believe that Dinka and 
Nuer and all tribes can live 
together peacefully in South 
Sudan 
100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 23.5% 100.0% 
 
 
Appendix 3: Interviews 
 
This appendix contains additional information on the interviewees. The majority of 
interviewees asked for anonymity. As the security situation has deteriorated in the 
country since all personal data have been omitted.  
 
3.1 List of interviewees 
 
Group 1 – Journalists 
 
Interview 1: Senior staff at a South Sudanese radio station, financed through 
advertisement, selling of airtime and by the Catholic Church in South Sudan. I met her 




Interview 5: Former journalist, female, rather junior. She belongs to a group of young 
South Sudanese females hanging out in one of the bars frequented by expats, which was 
how I met her. Works at times for a security organisation, doing translations and operates 
as fixer. Interview conducted 14 December 2014 
 
Interview 7: Male journalist, has been working for the government as well as for iNGO-
financed radio. Junior positions. I met him through word of mouth. In the following, he 
became my research assistant and fixed a couple of governmental interviews for me. 
Interview conducted 07 January 2015. 
 
Interview 8: Senior journalist and editor, male. Works in and with AMDISS. Past position 
as correspondent for a European media house. Interview conducted 25 March 2015. I 
contacted him because of his important position in South Sudanese media. 
 
Interview 9: Midcareer journalist, male. Postgraduate degree from a European 
institution. Leading position in a newspaper. Contacted him because of his position. 
Interview conducted on 25 March 2015. 
 
Interview 10: Senior journalist and editor. Major media player in South Sudan. Contacted 
because of his position. Interview conducted on 25 March 2015. 
 
Interview 12: Junior journalist. Male. Worked for newspaper and radio. Contact made by 
research assistant. Interview conducted 04 April 2015. 
 
Interview 15: Junior journalist, mostly working for newspaper. Freelancing. Contact 
made by research assistant. Interview conducted 18 June 2015. 
 
Interview 22: Midcareer journalist, male, working at the government-owned station. 
Having a fairly secure and good position there. Interview conducted 27 July 2015. 
 
Interview 24: junior journalist, male, freelancer and student. Working for an iNGO-
newspaper project which, at the time of interview, was about to lose funding. Interview 




Group 2 – Government 
 
Interview 11: SPLA officer. Contact made through a South Sudanese acquaintance. 
Interview conducted 18 April 2015 
 
Interview 13: Government official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Contact made by a 
South Sudanese acquaintance. Interview conducted 16 April 2015 
 
Interview 18: Official from the Ministry of Information and Broadcast. Directly contacted 
because of his position. Interview conducted 30 June 2015 
 
Interview 20: Minister in the local government. Contact made with a cold-call e-mail. 
Interview conducted 03 July 2015. 
 
Interview 23: Senior opposition politician. Cofounder of the SPLM, responsible figure in 
the Nasir-split (1991). Contact made through a South Sudanese acquaintance. Interview 
conducted 27 July 2015. 
 
Interview 28: High-ranking official in the SPLM and the government. Contact made via e-
mail. Interview conducted 14 August 2015. 
 
Group 3 – Civil society 
 
Interview 2: Academic staff, Juba University. Postgraduate degree from a European 
institution, contact made before the research stay in Europe, through mutual friends. 
Interview conducted 28 November 2014. 
 
Interview 6: Media activist and lobbyist. Consultant on some projects. Contacted through 
a South Sudanese acquaintance. Initial interview conducted 20 December 2014, an 
unrecorded follow-up interview conducted on 24 May 2015. 
 
Interview 14: Researcher from a South Sudanese institution, male. Contacted him 




Interview 17: Professor from Juba University. Met and contacted through my work at the 
University. Interview conducted 29 June 2015. 
 
Interview 21: Media consultant. Met through a public lecture organised by the UN. Initial 
interview conducted 20 June 2015, unrecorded follow-up on 12 August 2015. 
 
Interview 25: Consultant from the MDI, Media Development Institute. Met him when 
waiting for another interview. Interview conducted 09 August 2015 
 
Interview 26: Employee at AMDISS/MDI. Contact made through a cold-call visit.  
Interview conducted 09 August 2015 
 
Interview 27: National worker, project manager, midcareer, at an iNGO. Met him through 
work. Interview conducted 13 August 2015 
 
Group 4 – regular listeners 
 
Interview 3: Security manager, male. Acquaintance made through mutual acquaintances. 
Interview conducted 03 December 2014. 
 
Interview 4: Restaurant manager, working at the restaurant in a hotel I have been living 
in at one of my professional stays in South Sudan before the fieldwork. Interview 
conducted 08 December 2014. 
 
Interview 16: Driver. Contact made through a friend of mine who is working as an expat 
for the same organisation the interviewee works for. Interview conducted 28 June 2015. 
 










3.2 Interviews - Coding Scheme 
 
 
Area of Interest 1: Media 
 
Open Codes Properties 
Media task What should media do? 
Media general What media is there in RoSS? 
Shutdown on Media How do media people see crackdown of 
media houses? 
Government Media Relationship How do the people think the government 
sees the media?  
International community What they need / should do 
Treatment How is the government treating the media? 
Journalist media How do the journalist see the media? 
Media people view How do people see the media? 
Practical media Work in a media house 




Area of Interest 2: Government 
 
Open Codes Properties 
President What is the President doing and how 
successful is he? What do people think 
about the President?  
Government view on media How does the government see the media? 
People view How do people see the government? 
Behaviour How does government behave towards 
people? 
System change Can politics/government change? 
 
 
Area of Interest 3: Groups 
 
Open Codes Properties 
Power struggle Leaders are fighting / why are leaders 
fighting 
Ethnicity Ethnicities, role in the conflict 
Overcoming the conflict How can the conflict be ended? 
92 
 
Conflict reasons Power struggle, leaders, nepotism 
Groups Working together, ingroup/outgroup 
dynamic 
Donors/iNGOs Working with/for foreigners, opinions 
about foreigners, opinions on foreign 
radio stations 
Trust Trusting government, trusting media 
Trust II Trust in other people / different tribes. 
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